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Summary 
The thesis presents a theoretical analysis of the role that organisational sensemaking 
processes play in shaping how incumbents respond to disruptive innovations. Christensen’s 
theory of disruptive innovation is described and analysed with a view to extend our 
understanding of the challenges that disruptive innovations present to incumbents. The 
contribution of the thesis is to position and analyse these challenges as an organisational 
sensemaking problem.  
Christensen’s theory offers convincing arguments regarding the challenges disruptive 
innovations present to incumbents. However, current understanding of these challenges is 
based on a decision-making perspective, which is rooted in a rational model of organisations, 
and focuses only on the effects of cognition on actions, leaving the effects of action on 
cognition unaccounted for. By drawing on Weick’s organisational sensemaking perspective, 
the thesis brings more light to the obscured features within the context where incumbents 
perceive or interact with disruptive innovations. This affords a broadened focus on and a 
richer understanding of organisational processes and their outcomes through embracing 
cognition and action, as well as the interplay between the two, within organisational contexts.  
Thus, the thesis reveals the limits of the theory of disruptive innovation by presenting 
additional dimensions to what shapes human conduct in organisations. Considerations of 
identity, enactment, commitment, plausibility, and the effects of interrupted projects are 
among the sources of insight from sensemaking that offer additional or alternative ways for 
understanding of and theorising about Christensen’s observations about disruptive 
innovation.  
The thesis concludes by highlighting the implications of a sensemaking perspective on the 
study of established organisations and their potential challenges in addressing disruptive 
innovation driven market changes. Thus, positioning incumbents’ challenges as a 
sensemaking problem also links the fields of innovation and sensemaking.  
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Opsomming 
Die tesis bied 'n teoretiese analise van die rol wat organisatoriese singewingsprosesse speel in 
hoe gevestigde organisasies op ontwrigtende innovasie reageer. Christensen se teorie van 
ontwrigtende innovasie word beskryf en ontleed om ons begrip uit te brei oor die uitdagings 
wat ontwrigtende innovasie aan gevestigde organisasies bied. Die bydrae van die tesis is dat 
hierdie uitdagings as 'n organisatoriese singewingsprobleem gestel en ontleed word. 
Christensen se teorie bied oortuigende argumente oor die uitdagings wat ontwrigtende 
innovasies verteenwoordig. Huidige verstaan van hierdie uitdagings is egter gegrond op 'n 
besluitnemingsperspektief gewortel in 'n rasionele model van organisasies en fokus daarom 
slegs op die effek van kognisie op aksies, terwyl die effek van aksies op kognisie agterwee 
gelaat word. Die tesis werp, met behulp van Weick se organisatoriese singewingsperspektief, 
meer lig op hierdie verskuilde aspekte binne 'n konteks waar gevestigde organisasies 
ontwrigtings waarneem of mee omgaan. Hierdie benadering bied 'n breër fokus op en 'n ryker 
begrip van organisatoriese prosesse en hul uitkomste deur die insluiting van kognisie en 
aksie, sowel as die wisselwerking tussen die twee binne organisatoriese kontekste. 
Die tesis ontbloot dus die grense van die teorie van ontwrigtende innovasie deur addisionele 
dimensies wat menslike gedrag in organisasies vorm te beskryf. Oorwegings van identiteit, 
verbintenis, toewyding, geloofwaardigheid en die gevolge van onderbrekings in projekte is 
van die singewingsaspekte wat op Christensen se waarnemings oor ontwrigtende innovasie 
van toepassing gemaak word. 
Die tesis sluit af deur die implikasies van 'n singewingsperspektief op die studie van 
gevestigde organisasies en hul potensiële uitdagings in die hantering van ontwrigtende 
innovasiegedrewe mark veranderinge te beklemtoon. Dus, die posisionering van gevestigde 
organisasies se uitdagings as 'n singewingsprobleem slaan ook 'n brug tussen die velde van 
innovasie en singewing. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Schumpeter, an economic scholar, has long observed and theorised about innovation driven 
discontinuous market changes which nevertheless characterised economic developments, 
accordingly describing the incongruous process as “creative destruction”.1 Thus, the 
captivating concept embodies a deep sense of paradox, given that creation and destruction are 
conflicting notions.2 On the one hand is the bringing of new products, methods or services, as 
well as new firms, markets and industries, into existence. The flipside of the process destructs 
these very human values it has produced, as the new render the old inapt. Scholars have 
subsequently come to appreciate the insight that organisational trajectories taken to reach 
heights of success may still be in the direction of peril.3 That is, while innovation is 
considered a necessity for continued success, it embodies complexities which require skilful 
handling, through which continued prosperity, survival or both can be sustained.   
The innovations which drive a force such as creative destruction, resulting in established 
firms’ (henceforth incumbents) offerings4 being supplanted, are considered to be mainly 
driven by small entrepreneurial firms (henceforth entrants). The introductions of these new 
offerings redefine laws of competition which restructure, and in some cases obliterate some, 
markets. Hence, they challenge established firms to either adjust to the new competitive 
landscape or face possible demise.5 Augsdorfer et al. vividly illustrate the process as follows: 
“the carpet is pulled out from beneath the current players [while] the stage is set for a new 
scene which may involve new characters and leave behind the old.”6 The key message in 
their imagery is that the dynamism of these occasional and unforeseen discontinuous changes 
                                               
1 Schumpeter (2003, pp. 81-86); in reference here is his initial theorisation on the concept of creative 
destruction, which explained how small, entrepreneurial firms often introduced innovations which are deadly to 
their established counterparts (Mark I). Schumpeter’s later work would also consider how established firms may 
be in an advantageous position through possessing capabilities which restricted entrants to competitively operate 
within their established markets (Mark II).  
2 McCraw (2007)   
3 Smith & Tushman (2005); Christensen (1997[2016]); Tushman & O’Reilly (1996) 
4 The term “offering” is used to refer, generally so, to the innovations offered by either entrants or incumbents 
without specification of their categorisation or qualities.  
5 Schumpeter (1943[2003]); Tushman & O’Reilly (1996) 
6 Augsdorfer et al. (2013, p. 47) 
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tends to render coping mechanisms of most incumbent leaders futile.1 Accordingly, these 
drastic changes are associated with the possible dethronement of the incumbents from 
positions of market or industry leadership by the new players.2 Schumpeter had indeed noted 
that these emerging innovations “compete with the old products and old methods not on equal 
terms but at a decisive advantage that may mean death to the latter.”3 Hence, new offerings 
may appeal to and lead to a shift in consumption patterns as the greater customer base of 
incumbents’ offerings switch and move en masse to adopt entrants’ offerings, rendering the 
old less attractive if not obsolete.4 Despite the challenge which entrants’ offerings tend to 
present incumbents with in this regard, it is generally acknowledged that the propensity for 
incumbents to ignore or belatedly respond to the hazard is higher.5 Consequently, entrants 
continue to gain market strongholds, reaching a point at which they begin to challenge their 
established counterparts.6 At this stage the competitive landscape may favour entrants and 
their offerings resulting in potential failure, by incumbents, to adjust to the new competitive 
landscape, while entrants rise to market or industry dominance.   
Gans notes that ever since “Schumpeter tantalized us with the notion of ‘creative destruction’ 
…we have wondered about the mechanics of the process.”7 Indeed, vestiges of the theoretical 
heritage of creative destruction continue to be discernable within propositions of several 
scholars’ theories. These scholars continue to push further frontiers of our understandings of 
the mechanics and forces behind the phenomenon.8 Henderson and Clark also note that 
“[f]ollowing Schumpeter's emphasis on creative destruction, the literature has characterized 
different kinds of innovations in terms of their impact on the established capabilities of the 
firm.”9 Indeed, the relationship between innovation types and their success or impact on 
competitors’ response capacity has been a critical nexus for theorisation about the causals 
mechanisms of failure and success of the innovations of concern. The earlier categorisation of 
incremental versus radical; which were ensued by competency-enhancing versus competency 
                                               
1 Meyer et al. (1990)  
2 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
3 Schumpeter (2003, p. 32) 
4 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
5 Henderson (2006); Charitou & Markides (2003); Tripsas & Gavetti (2000); Christensen (1997[2016]) 
6 Charitou & Markides (2003); Christensen (1997[2016]) 
7 Gans (2016a, p. 84) 
8  E.g., Christensen (1997[2016]); Henderson & Clark (1990); Tushman & Anderson (1985) 
9 Henderson & Clark (1990, p. 11) 
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destroying ensued;1 and then architectural versus modular;2 before the more topical, 
sustaining versus disruptive innovations;3 all hinge on this connection.  
What knits together the work of many scholars pursuing the question of how innovations 
succeed in supplanting dominant offerings on the market is the eagerness to unravel the 
underlying causal mechanisms which facilitate the revolutionary process. The categorisation 
of innovations has remained a consistent feature of these endeavours. The aim has remained 
to pry apart innovations which succeed in leading to evolutionary changes to prevalent 
consumption patterns from those which are revolutionary.4 Notably, the question about the 
underlying mechanisms which drive both the success of the new offerings and the failure of 
incumbents to respond remains a highly contended one.5 The emerging picture becomes that 
of interrelated anchor points by which scholars attempt to have an improved grasp on this 
subject.6 The interrelatedness of these categorisations, mechanisms of substitution and 
incumbents’ troubles, however, also highlight the complexity and breadth of the subject. The 
current study joins these scholarly efforts by concentrating attention towards difficulties with 
which incumbents may have in responding to new offerings, which challenge their continued 
success, existence, or both.  
As Christensen observes, earlier theorisation suggested that discontinuous or revolutionary 
market changes were driven by radically different innovations; whereas continuous or 
evolutionally environmental changes were based on incremental innovations.7 Thus, the 
impaired competitiveness in incumbents’ offerings was considered to be a function of lacking 
requisite proficiencies for imitating the increasingly more competitive, emerging offerings. 
Tushman and Anderson would nevertheless propose an alternative view, focusing instead on 
the nature of the knowledge driving innovations, accordingly presenting competency-
destroying versus competency-enhancing categorisations. They proposed that competency-
                                               
1 Tushman & Anderson (1986) 
2 Henderson & Clark (1990) 
3 Christensen (1997 [2016]) 
4 Tushman & O’Reilly (1996) 
5 Henderson (2006);  Christensen (1997 [2016]); Henderson & Clark (1990) 
6 Indeed, improved understandings on the subject should lead to scholars devising better theories, or better the 
preparedness of practitioners for responding to possible risks related to the threats which may be posed by 
competitor innovations. It may conceivably also afford better strategic approaches to introduce innovations into 
markets. 
7 Christensen (2006); it must be noted that the focus here was on technological products, although the subject 
has become broadened to look at innovations in general, particularly because the success of these technological 
products is often facilitated by a novel business model.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
destroying, breakthrough innovations, led to discontinuities through “destroy[ing] order in a 
product class”,1 subsequently changing the competitive landscape to favour the newly 
introduced innovations. Conversely, competency-enhancing innovations, which were 
considered to be “overwhelmingly initiated by existing, successful firms”,2 were considered 
to result in continuous market changes. Hence, their views broadened the focus from the mere 
radicalness of the innovations to account for the knowledge behind innovations and its impact 
on competitor’s response capacity, or lack of it. Nonetheless, Tushman and Anderson’s 
account ignored “the sometimes disastrous effects on industry incumbents of seemingly 
minor improvements”3 in the architecture of the new offerings. To address this blind-spot, 
Henderson and Clark proposed what they referred to as architectural innovations, which 
“change the way in which the components of a product are linked together, while leaving the 
core design concepts untouched.”4 The authors suggested an extension to the prior 
categorisations of radical versus incremental by adding modular and architectural 
dimensions.   
Incumbents’ inefficiencies to respond to innovation driven market ferments was thus largely 
seen as a function of the intricacies inherent in the attacker’s (entrants) offerings. This basis 
for understanding incumbents’ tragedies would however be turned on its head by 
observations from studies conducted by Christensen, primarily from the disk drive industry 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.5 Christensen pointed out that although some 
innovations which led to incumbents’ difficulties were sometimes complex and costly to 
develop, some of them “were simple extensions of what the leading companies already did 
better than anyone else.”6 Accordingly, he argued that some of the challenges incumbents 
confront had nothing to do with the nature of the innovations, instead focusing on managerial 
decision-making dynamics to explain the problem. Like his predecessors, he proposed two 
categories, namely sustaining innovations versus disruptive innovations, which nevertheless 
departed from using only the characters of the innovation to explain its effects. The former 
category is said to be aimed at satisfying the needs of incumbents’ dominant customers, 
leaving a segment of customers situated either in the lower-end tier or non-users (e.g. those 
                                               
1 Tushman & Anderson (1986, p. 461) 
2 Tushman & Anderson (1986, p. 460) 
3 Henderson & Clark (1990, p. 9) 
4 Henderson & Clark (1990, p. 9) 
5 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
6 Christensen (2016, p. xvi) 
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who cannot afford incumbents’ offerings) unattended.1 Principally, sustaining innovations 
focus on improving attributes already valued by dominant customers in order to derive more 
profit or stay ahead of the competition. Disruptive innovations take advantage of the 
customers not served by incumbents through sustaining innovations by offering inferior and 
low performing (disruptive) innovations, which nevertheless improve over time, reaching 
levels incumbents’ customers find acceptable.2  
 
1.2 Problem Development 
According to Henderson, the theory of disruptive innovation has served to revive “debate 
within academia as to the role of the market in shaping incumbent response to discontinuous 
technological change.”3 Despite this, Weeks highlights that “Christensen’s work has been 
rarely subjected to the peer reviews that most academics undergo.”4 Thus, despite gaining 
popularity5 it has nevertheless evaded requisite scholarly scrutiny, at least initially. However, 
an increased scholarly scrutiny has led to the interrogation of its theoretical tenets.6 For 
instance, Danneels had noted “a lack of constructive criticism of the core concept of [the] 
theory, namely ‘disruptive technology,’ as well as its mechanisms and effects on firms and 
industries.”7 Both have subsequently been attended to by Christensen,8 although the latter is 
of continuing contention. To the extent that scholars have debated the causal mechanisms 
which lead to incumbents’ failure to address innovation driven changes which threaten their 
continued viability, there remains two predominant camps, namely competence-based and 
cognitive-based narratives.9 The former camp tends to argue that market shifts are facilitated 
                                               
1 Christensen (1997[2016]); it is worth noting that Christensen acknowledges that a niche market can still exist 
in the higher-end level of incumbents’ market. He proposes that a different name and explanation other than 
“disruption” be provided, which should help us understand how these innovations and their emergence from the 
top tier of the markets function in impacting incumbents and their markets. (Christensen, 2006, pp. 50-51) 
2 Christensen (1997 [2016]) 
3 Henderson (2006, p. 5); this article is particularly important because it succinctly encapsulates much of prior 
contentions related to the supposed innovator’s dilemma, while directing attention to the core analytical focal 
point of the theory of disruptive innovation.     
4 Weeks (2015, p. 419) 
5 King & Baartartogtokh (2015); Weeks (2015); Danneels (2004) 
6 King & Baartartogtokh (2015);  Markides (2006); Tellis (2006); Danneels (2004); 
7 Danneels (2004, p. 246); Christensen has since addressed some of Danneels’ criticism while, as Weeks (2015, 
p. 219) notes, he is sometimes dismissive of those who criticise his work. 
8 Christensen (2006) 
9 Eggers & Kaplan (2013); Tripsas & Gavetti (2000)  
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by competencies with which incumbents are deficient.1 The cognitive camp takes the view 
that incumbent leaders are often blinded by their cognitive frames or beliefs,2 which 
undermine their ability to foresee the potential danger behind emerging innovations. Thus, 
this latter view embraces the assumption that even if incumbents may have the potential to 
muster the requisite competency for successfully responding to the imminent danger, they are 
likely to recognise the implications for market challenges when it is already too late.3  
The theory of disruptive innovation leans towards the cognitive camp, with its core 
arguments taking a strategic rationality perspective, particularly focusing on decision-making 
dynamics of organisational leaders,4 to explain how incumbents fail to respond to disruptive 
innovations. The concept, innovator’s dilemma, reflects this point as its description makes 
clear: “the logical, competent decisions of management that are critical to the success of their 
companies are also the reasons why they lose their positions of leadership.”5 Christensen 
rejects the arguments made from the competency-based view, resolutely arguing that the real 
challenge within incumbents, especially in responding to disruptive innovations, relates to 
their strategic choices, which mirror their resource allocations processes.6 For Christensen, 
managerial beliefs, especially as inculcated by business schools, limit resource allocation 
towards disruptive innovation in incumbents, who tend to favour sustaining innovations.7  
Meanwhile, Bessant and Phillips assert that incumbents’ difficulties to respond to the 
innovations which come to challenge the viability of their businesses (taking a generic 
perspective thus), may be a consequence of constraints which function in a mode similar to 
cognitive dissonance. They make their point in this manner: 
       The problem is not simply one of missing important signals about emerging shifts in  
       innovation trajectories in the environment. In a number of cases the information was  
       available to the enterprise but its decision-making and resource allocation processes  
                                               
1 Eggers & Kaplan (2013); Henderson (2006) 
2 Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) 
3 E.g. Tripsas & Gavetti (2000); Christensen (1997[2016]; Garud & Rappa (1994) 
4 Christensen (2016, pp. 42-48)  
5 Christensen (2016, p. xvii) 
6 Christensen (1997[2016]); Henderson (2006) 
7 Christensen (1997[2016])  
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       failed to deal adequately with the new information. Arguably there are internal filters  
       which act in a fashion analogous to cognitive dissonance in human psychology.1 
Like Christensen, their focal point is decision-making and related conceptions about resource 
allocation, although their reference broadens coverage because it includes cognitive 
dissonance – a different dimension to the problem. While Bessant and Phillips may speak of 
decision-making and cognitive dissonance in the same breath, the two differ in the manner in 
which they relate to human conduct. Cognitive dissonance regulates post-decisional conduct 
in which a chosen alternative’s negative consequences invoke a negative psychological 
feeling; thus the ensuing conduct is driven towards the removal of this feeling.2 According to 
Festinger “[t]he existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate 
the person to try to reduce [it.] When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, 
the person will actively avoid situation and information which would likely increase the 
dissonance.”3 Evidently, this process differs from the decision-making process which is 
driven towards choosing the best from at least two alternatives,4 which is nevertheless 
operating under constraints associated with bounded rationality as the work of Simon has 
come to inform organisational scholars.5  
Such a drive as effort to avoid situations and information which increases the dissonance 
begins to bring into focus a different drive to conduct which is not accounted for by a 
decision-making perspective. Therefore, the disparity suggest some potential limits to 
understandings around the supposed innovator’s dilemma given that in the context of 
disruption we understand little, for instance, about the consequences of decisions on the 
behaviour on leaders of incumbents.6 While scholars have made strides in understanding 
incumbents’ challenges by concentrating on managerial cognition and organisational 
competencies, we thus understand little about managerial constraints placed upon them by 
effects tied to cognitive dissonance. 
                                               
1 Bessant & Phillips (2013, p. 365) 
2 Festinger (1957) 
3 Festinger (1957, p. 3) 
4 Brunsson (2007) 
5 Simon (1991) 
6 Weeks (2015, p. 424) 
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Boland contrasts a decision-making perspective with organisational sensemaking,1 which 
implicitly and yet appropriately suggests the latter to be a possible alternative to studying 
organisations and their processes. For at least three interrelated factors, that is apt. The first is 
that the organisational sensemaking perspective has its roots tied to dissonance theory.2 
Secondly, and as a consequence of the first, it suggests the possibility that approaching the 
challenge incumbents’ face from a sensemaking perspective should be fruitful scholarly 
effort. It should further give us a better understanding beyond the assertion made by Bessant 
and Phillips. Indeed, Christensen and his associates invite scholars to approach the problems 
from different perspectives.3 Third, it has already been highlighted that the decision-making 
perspective appears to be partial in explaining organisations and their processes, but this 
contrast can be sharpened further.  
As far as the decision-making perspective is concerned, Boland questions, if rhetorical, where 
“the alternatives that a decision maker chooses among come from in the first place if not from 
the engaged search for the conditions of betterment by an actor?”4 The focus on the actor and 
the actions necessary to be taken prior to perceiving alternatives ties in well with Weeks’ 
dissatisfaction that Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovations fails “to address the 
ambiguities [italics added] of managerial agency”.5 The common thread that runs through the 
remarks of both Boland and Weeks is their search for actions in the decision-making 
perspective or the theory of disruption. Notably, Weeks is not only sensitive to the actions 
which seem unaccounted for, but also to the significance of their traces, the meaning of 
which is not immediately obvious [ambiguous] to the actor.  
Brunsson observes that a “decision making perspective fails to recognize that practitioners do 
more than make decision … [which] is only a step towards action”6 He goes further to 
explain that “[a]n action perspective makes it easier and important to observe that there exist 
both decisions without action and actions without decisions.”7 Thus, the preoccupation with 
organisational decisions, as sustained by the presumption that all organisational actions ensue 
from some specified decisions, miss the point that commitment to projects does not always 
                                               
1 Boland (2008) 
2 Weick (2001); Weick (1995); Weick (1964) 
3 Christensen et al. (2015, p. 53) 
4 Boland (2008, p. 59)  
5 Weeks (2015, p. 424) 
6 Brunsson (2007, p. 35) 
7 Brunsson (2007, p. 35) 
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depart from clearly set out decisions.1 Boland clarifies that a decision-making perspective is 
rooted in scholarly tradition which devalues action “as a basis for truth, in favor of the belief 
in an ideal form that provides a basis for judging what is true.”2 He goes further to address 
the ontological and epistemological consequences when explaining that the dominance with 
which such a perspective has become meant that its tradition “has been carried down to us in 
the form of certain presumptions about the world — both as to what it is comprised of, and as 
to how we can know it.”3 This stands in stark contrasts with a sensemaking perspective. 
The objective is not to disparage the decision-making perspective, on which the theory of 
disruption rests. Rather, to trace the source of the problem associated with this perspective, 
given the evidently enduring ontological and epistemological implications associated with 
adopting it. Meanwhile, this has gradually sharpened the contrast between the two 
perspectives (decision-making, including its assumptions of strategic rationality and 
sensemaking), pointing to aspects to which attention can be directed if we are to begin to 
address the related limitations of the former. Simultaneously then, attention is drawn to what 
is evidently a blind-spot of the theory of disruptive innovation,4 hence, largely ignored in 
debates around the supposed innovator’s dilemma. 
Weick does suggest that “[o]ne way to shift the focus from decision making …is to look 
more closely at sensemaking in organizations.”5 Rather than focusing on people who are 
struggling to make choices when confronted with problems, framing problems as questions of 
sensemaking directs attention away from the why behind people’s choices, to the contextual 
features of the environment in which people confront problems, which may render even 
competent people inept.6 It is an appreciation of the unfolding of human conduct, more 
directly so within an organisational context (the focus of this study), as an “experience of 
being thrown into an ongoing, unknowable, unpredictable streaming of experience in search 
of answers to the question, ‘what’s the story?’” Such a portrayal underlines constraints for 
comprehensive appreciation of consequences of conduct before the fact, and limitations of 
                                               
1 Brunsson (2007); Mintzberg et al. (1990)  
2 Boland (2008, p. 59) 
3 Boland (2008, p. 59) 
4 A notable exception is the work of Lettice and Thomond (2008), which recognises organisational actions and 
cognitions, which however devote attention specifically to incumbent leaders’ schemas and how they influence 
resource allocations.   
5 Weick (1993, p. 365) 
6 Snook (2001, pp. 206-207) 
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human foresight placed upon by a fact of action itself unfolding into an unknowable terrain. 
Borrowing from Reed, Weick also points out that "the linkages between decisions and actions 
are loosely-coupled and interactive rather than linear."1 Weick goes further to question 
assumptions about accuracies in managerial perceptions and their rationality for 
understanding organisational processes given the less research available for their support.2  
In addition to the invitation Christensen and associates extend to scholars, Danneels laments 
that the diversity of disciplines from which scholars approach the subject has not been 
accompanied by work of interdisciplinary nature; bringing together “ideas from several 
disciplines to form a comprehensive and rich understanding of the phenomenon.”3 Weick 
sensemaking perspective seems appropriate for these tasks for several reasons notable from 
the preceding discussions, namely, (a) it derives from a different scholarly tradition from 
decision-making, thus offers a different perspective on the problem,4 therefore it should 
afford a novel approach to learning about the supposed innovator’s dilemma; (b) it focuses on 
both  cognition and actions;5 and (c) more importantly, the interplay between the two towards 
influencing organisational outcomes.6  
 
1.3 Statement of Problem 
Given sensemaking’s “central role in the determination of human behaviour”,7  the following 
research question is pursued: In what ways may organisational sensemaking processes shape 
incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations? Implicit in this question is the constantly 
referred to problem of these organisations as often struggling to address innovation driven 
market changes. The question invites an inquiry which is attentive, and thus sensitive, to 
linkages between processes of sensemaking and constraints these processes place on human 
                                               
1 Weick (1993, p. 634 citing Reed 1991, p. 561) 
2 Weick et al. (2005, p. 415) 
3 Danneels (2006, p. 3) 
4 Boland (2008) 
5 Weick (1995); Weick (1988) 
6 Weick (2001); Weick (1964); the concept of organisational outcomes will be used in this study to particularly 
refer to successes or failures as a consequence of prior organisational processes as shaped by cognitions and 
actions. It is worth noting, nevertheless, of the potential loose and tight couplings between actions and their 
outcomes (Weick, 1976), which means the reference does not aim to link specified actions and outcomes but 
applied more generally to look, for instance, at relatedness of concepts such “strategic choices” (actions) and 
organisational failure” (outcome).   
7 Weick et al. (2005, p. 409) 
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conduct, which may result in the failure of organisational members to respond to disruptive 
innovations.   
 
1.4 Intent of the Study 
The intent of this inquiry is to subject the theory of disruptive innovation to an analysis based 
on the alternative perspective of sensemaking as an effort to increase our understanding of the 
challenges incumbents in addressing disruptive innovations.   
 
1.5 Research Design  
The study follows a qualitative research approach, which according to Creswell, is used “to 
develop theories when… existing theories do not adequately capture the complexity of the 
problem we are examining.”1 Additionally, Creswell mentions that qualitative research is 
necessary when “a problem or issue needs to be explored.”2 Drawing on Karl Weick’s 
sensemaking perspective, the study is devoted to exploring, theoretically so, the possible 
links between organisational sensemaking processes and incumbents’ difficulties in 
addressing disruptive innovations. Both the theory of disruptive innovation and the 
sensemaking perspective are described and analysed, which forms the background upon 
which incumbents’ challenges can be explicated from the alternative viewpoint of 
sensemaking. The study draws examples from the work of other scholars, which either 
reference similar cases used in the theory of disruptive innovation, or contain grains of useful 
information for demonstrating how organisational sensemaking processes may take shape. 
Their selection is thus not systematic but rather based on usefulness in exhibiting more 
clearly the points advanced in the study.  
 
                                               
1 Creswell (2007, p. 40) 
2 Creswell (2007, p. 39) 
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1.6 Delimitation  
Although there are suggestions that disruptive innovations are paired with business models 
which may conflict with those of incumbents,1 the current study focuses on internal 
organisational processes vis-à-vis notable disruptive innovation challenges which can be 
explicated in sensemaking terms. In particular, effort is directed towards understanding how 
organisational members make sense of factors, internal or external to the firms, by 
highlighting how sensemaking processes may shape the cognitions and conduct of these 
organisational members in manner which constrain them from addressing disruptive 
innovations. In short, the study approaches the problem investigated from the internal 
perspective of incumbents outwards. 
 
1.7 Layout of the Study 
The first chapter (Chapter 1) has given an introduction to the study, giving the background on 
the subject of focus, accordingly highlighting the gap in our understanding, while indicating 
the approach by which the challenge incumbents confront will be explored. The next chapter 
(Chapter 2) presents a descriptive and analytical discussion of Clayton Christensen’s theory 
of disruptive innovation, which is followed by a discussion of Karl Weick’s sensemaking 
perspective (Chapter 3). Thereon, the ensuing chapter (Chapter 4) offers an alternative 
explanation of incumbents’ challenges by explaining how organisational sensemaking 
processes may shape their responses to disruptive innovations. Finally conclusions of the 
study are presented in the last chapter (Chapter 5), presenting the position taken in the study 
following the discussions presented in Chapter 4.  
  
                                               
1 Christensen (2006, p. 43); it must be noted, and as it will be evident in chapter two, that Christensen also takes 
a similar approach in that he acknowledges that a business model may be the challenge which lead to 
incumbents’ failures to respond to disruptive innovations, however, he directs his core arguments on internal 
processes which shape incumbents’ responses.    
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Chapter 2: Disruptive Innovation Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Christensen’s theory of disruption is fundamentally based on findings from a series of case 
studies conducted in the disk drive industry, and later the excavator industries during the late 
1980s to the early 1990s, in the USA.1 The question he sought to answer in these initial 
studies was why incumbents, which “invest aggressively in technologies necessary to retain 
their current customers…”2 can still fail when disruptive innovations emerge. Thus, he sought 
to understand why these organisations remain successful in innovation projects which serve 
their current customers, but prone, nevertheless, to failure at investing in innovations which 
are outside their primary customer base. Following the case studies, his observation was that 
“the logical, competent decisions of management that are critical to the success of their 
companies are also the reasons why they lose their positions of leadership.”3 This has been 
the centrepiece of Christensen’s thinking on the theory of disruption, based on which the 
concept of the innovator’s dilemma is coined. He explains that the nature of disruption goes 
against good management philosophy, which effectively promotes the serving of current 
customers, although that has the potential to lead to failure in the face of disruption.4 The 
theory has gone through many modifications, from its nascent observational stages, then 
categorisation and association, before a descriptive stage and is currently considered to be at 
a normative stage.5 
Christensen mentions as critical to the dilemma the motivations which dictate processes of 
resource allocation, which are influenced by incumbents’ resource dependencies, but also 
hinting at the career needs of organisational members at different levels. He observes that 
incumbents tend to be biased towards allocating resources to innovation projects which 
dominant customers want, which are sustaining in nature whilst neglecting disruptive 
                                               
1 Christensen (1997 [2016]) 
2 Bower & Christensen (1995, p. 43); the label “incumbent” is used in this study, and the remainder of the 
discussions, to more specifically refer to an established firm which is well-run and successful resulting in its 
position of leadership within its respective industry. An “entrant”, on the other hand, is a “smaller company with 
fewer resources” (Christensen, 2015, p. 16) which is initiates or is part of firms which initiate a disruptive 
market. 
3 Christensen (2016, xvii) 
4 Christensen (1997 [2016]) 
5 Christensen (2006) 
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innovations. To support this view, Christensen emphasises the scarcity of resources, as when 
he asserts that: “meeting the needs of established customers and fending off competitors takes 
all the resources a company has, and then some.”1 On the basis of resource dependence, he 
views that external stakeholders such as customers and investors control how organisations 
allocate their resources. He highlights the asymmetries of motivation to emphasise that 
incumbents have less impetus to focus on disruptive innovation, which is the opposite for 
entrants. We then see incumbents who tend to delay adopting disruptive innovations 
following their emergence, which result in unpreparedness as emerging disruptive 
innovations begin to gain a rapid following, including that of or by the dominant customers of 
incumbents. This process of mass adoption of disruptive innovations, including by 
incumbents’ customers, marks a disruption.2 
While in early stages Christensen made reference to disruptive technology, he later changed 
this label to disruptive innovation, the rationale for which accounts for the business model 
paired with the technology.3 Thus, his reference to innovation considers both the technology 
and the business model it is paired with, brought about by entrants which make it difficult for 
incumbents to emulate. Although references such as the business model, rather than the 
technology, is what causes the challenge for incumbents, such insight derives from personal 
conversations rather than research.4 Furthermore, much of the debates offered by Christensen 
focus on the internal causes of incumbents’ failures. 
The most complete discussions of Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation are presented 
in his seminal book The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms 
to Fail, which was first published in 1997. As such, the current chapter discusses 
Christensen’s theory of disruption, based primarily on the updated version of this source.5 It 
is important to note that the theory is constantly going through modifications, which means 
some of the assertions made in the 1997 are now out-dated.6  Indeed Christensen continues to 
invite scholars to find anomalies in the theory, as an effort to find aspects on which further 
                                               
1 Bower & Christensen (1995, p. 44) 
2 Christensen (2015, p. 46) 
3 Christensen (2006, p. 49) 
4 Christensen (2006, p. 49) 
5 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
6 Christensen et al. (2015) 
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strengthening may be based.1 It is for this reason that some up-to-date aspects of the theory 
are often found in Christensen’s later works. In line with these developments, Christensen 
expresses that “[d]espite broad dissemination, the theory’s core concepts have been widely 
misunderstood and its basic tenets frequently misapplied.”2 By that, he seeks to clarify that 
some of the criticisms of the theory are at times referring to aspects which have been 
addressed in later stages. In the interest of presenting the framework in an up-to-date form, 
Christensen’s later publications are consulted in conjunction with the seminal book. With this 
section serving as presenting a more general discussion of the framework as an introductory 
background, the ensuing sections delve into the main ideas which anchor disruptive 
innovation theory’s core arguments.  
The current chapter looks at the core tenets of the theory of disruption, giving its historical 
background, before looking at sustaining and disruptive innovations. From this, the 
discussion proceeds to look at the core concepts which underpin the theory, through which 
Christensen explains how decisions, as well as what influences them, shape incumbents’ 
responses to disruptive innovations. They include a value network framework, asymmetric 
motivation, and resources-processes-values framework. Organisational decision-making 
processes, as articulated by Christensen, are then examined, before delving into the profiles 
of the firms referred to as incumbents in this study, including the contexts in which they 
operate. The final part of the chapter offers a critical review of the theory, highlighting its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
2.2 Sustaining versus Disruptive Innovations 
The sustaining versus disruptive innovation categorisation focuses primarily on the target 
customers served, but also considers pricing, performance and convenience dimensions of the 
innovation. These categorisations are tied to the growth path of an organisation’s innovation, 
which differ on the basis that the former’s path is within the current pool of customers, while 
the latter focuses on new customers, at least initially. The theory explicates on the 
incumbents’ inherent propensity to succeed in sustaining innovation initiatives and their 
                                               
1 Christensen (2006) 
2 Christensen et al. (2015) 
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incapacity to respond to disruptive innovations. This, as he argues, is despite the fact that 
incumbents often have the capability and resources to develop the same innovations. Figure 1 
demonstrates the growth trajectories of sustaining versus disruptive innovations. It also 
displays the markets in which two different types of disruptive innovations are initiated and 
their performance and growth trajectory over time.  
 
 
Figure 1: Two dimensional model of disruptive innovation. Source: Christensen (2017) 
 
2.2.1 Sustaining Innovations 
Sustaining innovations “improve the performance of established products, along the 
dimensions of performance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically 
valued.”1 They are “innovations that make a product or service perform better in ways that 
customers in the mainstream market already value.”2 Hence, these innovations focus on 
satisfying the needs of the current, established customers. They are the mainstream offerings 
which incumbents consciously improve in order to serve the needs of current customers. For 
this reason, a sustaining innovation growth path focuses on brining better offerings to the 
established market.3 What motivates organisations to follow this growth path is the sense of 
assurance that there are already established customers in these markets, which guarantees 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, p. xix) 
2 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 72) 
3 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
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sales; hence the motivation to improve these innovations is to derive increased profit 
margins.1  
As Figure 1 indicates, the pace of technological progress leads sustaining innovations to 
surpass customer needs over time through performance overshooting. In accordance, prices 
for these innovations also become too high. Effectively, this growth trajectory leaves 
underserved customers at the low-end tier, although there may also be neglected market in 
the periphery. 2 Christensen considers that incumbents rarely follow the disruptive path, in 
favour of sustaining innovations. In his words, “[s]ustaining innovations are nearly always 
developed and introduced by established industry leaders… those same companies never 
introduce or cope well with disruptive innovations.”3 He explains that in addition to gaining 
higher profit margins as the motivation, incumbents are also driven to follow sustaining 
innovations in order shield their current customers from their competitors.4 In this way, 
pursuing an innovation strategy which is based on sustaining innovation guarantees 
immediate benefits in terms of maximising profits, while enabling these firms to win 
competitive wars.  
 
2.2.2 Disruptive Innovations  
Disruptive innovations first target low-end or new markets, introducing new attributes which 
are initially not attractive to incumbents’ dominant customers. They are “financially 
unattractive for the leading incumbent to pursue, relative to its profit model and relative to 
other investments that are competing for the organization’s resources.”5 The incipient growth 
paths of these innovations are characteristically outside of incumbents’ dominant customer 
base. These innovations are considered to be of relatively low performance and cost initially, 
with the additional attributes they offer not only promising low return on investment, but also 
of lesser value to incumbents’ dominant customers. It is a “product or service… that's 
actually worse, initially, as judged by the performance metrics that mainstream customers 
                                               
1 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
2 Christensen (1997[2016]) 
3 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 72) 
4 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 72) 
5 Christensen (2006, p. 49) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 18 
value.”1 They emerge “at the low end if the market, in the simplest, most unassuming”2 
products or services, selling on the basis of convenience and/or price dimensions. Thus, they 
are usually introduced to the market as of inferior quality compared to the mainstream 
innovations and therefore appeal to the underserved customers at the lower end tier of the 
market (low-end disruption), or focused on non-consumers (new-market disruption). 3 
Christensen and Overdorf substantiate that “because disruptive products nearly always 
promise lower profit margins per unit sold and are not attractive to the company's best 
customers, they're inconsistent with the established company's values.”4 
However, the acceptance of disruptive innovations by incumbents’ dominant customers 
catches on over time as they improve on the attributes which were previously judged to be 
unattractive and begin to appeal to a larger market. Christensen and Overdorf point to 
uncertainty as another characteristic of disruptive innovation. They remark that disruptive 
innovations “occur so intermittently that no company has a routine process for handling 
them”5 which highlight one of the key characteristics of these innovations which leads to 
incumbents’ trouble when responding to them. Christensen terms the point at which, in the 
process, incumbents’ dominant customers switch from sustaining to disruptive innovations en 
masse the disruption.6 More precisely, what defines a disruption is when “a smaller company 
with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent businesses.”7 
Christensen does make note that a common pattern with disruptive innovations is that they 
take “time, experimentation, and trial and error to achieve.”8 Therefore, disruption is 
understood as a process in contrast to an event.9 Due to their focus on sustaining innovations 
and their related higher profit margins, incumbents initially feel unthreatened by the 
developments of disruptive innovations. Christensen points out that it is only when it is too 
late – when entrants have gained a stronghold – that incumbents notice the imminent threat.10  
                                               
1 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 72) 
2 Christensen (2016, p. x) 
3 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 45) 
4 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 73) 
5 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 73) 
6 Christensen et al. (2015, p. 46) 
7 Christensen et al. (2015, p. 46) 
8 Christensen (2016, p.222) 
9 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 69) 
10 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 46) 
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Low-end disruptions directly attack the existing value network, while the new market 
disruption creates its own first – through new consumption – before pulling in customers 
from incumbents’ value network (discussed later). At their initial stage, low-end disruptive 
innovations target the low-end tiers of the market, but improve in both quality and 
performance over time, until they become appealing to incumbents’ dominant customers. 
That is, low-end disruptions begin at the lower tier of an existing value network and follow a 
growth trajectory that moves towards the point intersecting with mainstream customers’ 
performance expectations or needs. As indicated by Figure 1, the performance trajectory of 
disruptive innovations improves until it reaches main stream customers. They “attack the 
least-profitable and most overserved customers at the low end of the value network.”1  Low-
end markets are the least profitable bottom tiers of the market, made up of customers with 
minimal expectations and thus less demanding, compared to mainstream customers.  
New market disruptions are those which initiate a new value network before they attack 
incumbents’ existing and draw from them customers, thus resulting in the shrinking of the 
market pool of these incumbents. New-market disruptions have to “invent the upward path, 
because no one has been into that trajectory before.”2 Christensen uses the concept of 
“nonconsuption” to explain new-market disruptions, because instead of targeting consumers 
in the value network of incumbents, they turn those who have previously not used the 
products into users.3 In so doing, they create a new value network. As an example, he 
explains how the initial introduction desktop photocopiers enabled photocopying of 
documents at the office, whereas in previous cases photocopying was done by specialised 
corporates with specialised technicians for operating printers, who served the office workers. 
Thus, the introduction of desktop photocopiers turned people in the office into direct 
customers for the photocopiers, who consequently no longer needed the services of 
specialised corporates. In this case, therefore, the innovation lies in both turning non users 
into users by growing the market pool of users, and the convenience as a matter of easier 
access to a product or service.4 In addition, these innovations are also cheaper. However, In 
contrast to low-end, new-market disruption “doesn’t invade the mainstream market; rather, it 
pulls customers out of the mainstream value network into the new one because these 
                                               
1 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 45) 
2 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 81) 
3 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 45-46) 
4 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 45) 
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customers find it more convenient to use the new product.”1 Ultimately, incumbents succumb 
to this shift in consumption pattern.  
 
2.3 Value Network Framework 
Rooted in game theory,2 the value network concept was introduced by Christensen in The 
Innovator’s Dilemma to define “the context within which a firm identifies and responds to 
customers’ needs, solves problems, procures input, reacts to competitors, and strives for 
profit.”3 Christensen makes note that the concept bears resemblance with Nash’s Equilibrium, 
in which case “Company A’s understanding of the optimal, self-interested (maximum-profit) 
strategy of each of the other companies in the systems, Company A cannot see any better 
strategy for itself than the one it presently is pursuing.”4 Because this applies to all the other 
companies in the system “none of the companies is motivated to change course, and the entire 
system therefore is relatively inert to change.”5 He explains that “managerial decisions that 
make sense for companies outside a value network may make no sense at all for those within 
it, and vice versa.”6 This is in line with the view that entrants, who are not part of a value 
network or are new within it, instead find markets which are unattractive to incumbents 
viable for business to them, in addition to the size of profit margins as another factor on this.7  
Christensen argues that value networks have a direct bearing on managerial decision-making, 
as he states that “each firm’s competitive strategy, and particularly its past choices of 
markets, determines its perceptions [italics added] of the economic value of a new technology 
[i.e. innovation].”8  In this way, he argues further, value networks shape “decision making for 
organisations within them… organisations grow within these value networks, with the result 
that ‘they are likely to develop capabilities, organizational structures, and cultures tailored to 
                                               
1 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 46) 
2 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 69) 
3 Christensen (2016, p. 32) 
4 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 69) 
5 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 69) 
6 Christensen (2016, p. 32) 
7 Given that game theory assumes participants’ rational decision-making, the concept of value network can be 
understood to be based on this similar assumption. However, this is not an exception with Christensen’s theory 
of disruptive innovation. Assumptions of rational decision-making as underpinnings of his arguments are 
expounded further down, with this section briefly discussing decision-making as it relates to value networks. 
8 Christensen (2007, p. 32) 
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their value network’s distinctive requirements.’”1 Thus, organisations within the value 
network will filter the opportunities or threats presented by new innovations in a different 
manner from those which are outside the value network. For instance, an organisation whose 
growth strategy has set expectations in conjunction with its current turnover would set growth 
target based on the size of this turnover. In the case of incumbents, this implies that their 
profit margins will likely be much higher than those of entrants, meaning that what 
incumbents perceive as small margins may appear attractive to entrants. On this basis, 
Christensen concludes that “[v]alue networks strongly define and delimit what companies 
within them can and cannot do.”2 In relation to this is the view that resource allocation 
towards innovations will be driven by how organisations see value in a particular market, and 
because incumbents’ growth strategies favour higher profits, disruptive innovations become 
unattractive. Accordingly, “[t]his pattern of resource allocation accounts for established 
firms’ consistent leadership in [sustaining innovations] and their dismal performance in 
[disruptive innovations].”3   
While Christensen recognises that organisations are able to escape value networks, he 
explains that the process is rather upward than downward, in the sense that it is easier to 
move into networks of higher value than those of lower value. This is thus in line with the 
view that profit margins determine which markets will be of interest to organisations and it 
corresponds with the view that all innovations improve over time. He explains that an 
“important strategic implication of this rational pattern of upmarket movement [italics added] 
is that it can create a vacuum in lower-end and value networks that draw in entrants with 
technologies and cost structures better suited to competition.”4 Therefore, rational 
organisational leaders “can rarely build a cogent case for entering small, poorly defined low-
end markets that offer only lower profitability.”5 
 
                                               
1 Christensen (2007, p. 33) 
2 Christensen (2007, p. 53) 
3 Christensen (2007, p. 32) 
4 Christensen (2016, p. 87) 
5 Christensen (2016, p. 77) 
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2.4 Asymmetric Motivation 
Christensen considers the impetus to allocate innovation resources for innovation projects as 
a key problem which shape the innovator’s dilemma because it dictates which projects will 
get funds and those which will not. The disruptive innovation diagram (Figure 1) shows that 
entrants’ innovations start at the lower-end tiers of the market targeting a different set of 
customers from incumbents’. However, the growth trajectory entrants follow are in the 
direction of entrants’ market segments (i.e. dominant customers), ascending to higher profit 
levels enjoyed by incumbents. Nevertheless, incumbents remain focused on their dominant 
customers. Accordingly, Christensen makes note that “[s]ustaining projects addressing the 
needs of the firms’ most powerful customers almost always [italics in original] preempted 
resource from disruptive technologies with small markets and poorly defined customer 
needs.”1  
The emerging picture is that of unevenness in which, initially, entrants are focused on the 
lower-end or small markets from which they establish themselves. Nevertheless they 
ultimately adopt a sustaining strategy and begin to gaze up-market attracted to the profit 
margins realised by players at the mainstream sector. Conversely, incumbents find entrants’ 
markets less attractive, at least initially. This unevenness, briefly explains the concept of 
asymmetric motivation. Entrants find disruptive innovations attractive in the early stages, at 
which point derivable profit margins can be accommodated by their cost structures. 
Incumbents’ sizes vis-à-vis their growth aspirations, cost structures, competitive pressures 
and customer demands render disruptive innovations unattractive to them at this early stage. 
Thus, the concept of asymmetric motivation is central to the innovator’s dilemma.2 However, 
over time this unevenness takes a different shape, in which incumbents experience declines 
while entrants ascend to the top. This full rotation is equivalent to a disruption, when the 
dominant customers incumbents serve subscribe to entrants offerings en masse.  
 
 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, p. 43) 
2 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 35) 
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The “paralyzing effect on industry leaders” which facilitates this rotation and the considered 
resulting customer consumption shift, is summed up in this manner: 
     With resource allocation processes designed and perfected to support sustaining  
     innovation, [industry leaders] are constitutionally unable to respond. They are always  
     motivated to go up-market, and almost never motivated to defend the new or low-end  
     markets that the disruptors find attractive.1 
Thus, asymmetric motivation is regarded as the core factor which is internal to incumbents, 
disabling them to respond to disruptive innovations. Christensen adds to this, explaining that 
as entrants move upmarket, they develop skills, processes and cost structures (a business 
model) suited to operate profitably in these new markets. Thus, entrants evolve with the new 
market in a manner which places them in stark contrast with incumbents in characteristics 
necessary to thrive in the same (i.e. disruptive) markets.2 As incumbents continue to ignore 
these markets, entrants continue to advance in capabilities necessary to render disruptive 
innovation offerings. Incumbents will in turn struggle to develop the capabilities swift 
enough as they recognise the necessity. Indeed, Christensen observes that incumbents do at 
least make efforts to respond, although these efforts are intrinsically made when it is already 
too late, constraining their outcomes mostly to survival rather than maintaining or regaining 
leadership positions.3  
 
2.5 Resources-Processes-Values Framework 
Core to the resources-processes-values (RPV) framework is the view that the very same skills 
which enable organisations to succeed are the basis for their failure in the face of disruption.4 
The RPV framework portrays organisations as having both tangible and intangible enablers.5 
It is viewed that both resources and processes are likely to be organisational enablers because 
they represent what organisations can do, however their values contradict this as they define 
                                               
1 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 35) 
2 Christensen (2016, p. 47) 
3 Christensen (2016, p. 47)  
4 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 72) 
5 Christensen & Raynor (2003, p. 178-187) 
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“what organisations cannot do.”1  
 
2.5.1 Resources 
Resources are comprised of “people, equipment, technology, product designs, brands, 
information, cash, and relationships with suppliers, distributors, and customers.”2 Christensen 
adds that resources are those organisational enablers which can be “hired and fired, bought 
and sold, depreciated or built.”3 They are those parts of the organisation which are movable 
and/or quantifiable, and thus the most tangible of the three.4 Christensen considers that 
resources increase the chance for incumbents to successfully respond to disruption; however 
he acknowledges that this alone is not sufficient.5 Furthermore, he recognises that on the 
contrary, entrants’ lack of resources is not considered to be a critical success factor in driving 
disruption as “their values can embrace small markets, and their cost structures can 
accommodate low margins.”6  
 
2.5.2 Processes  
Processes are defined as “the patterns of interaction, coordination, communication, and 
decision making employees use to transform resources into products and services of greater 
worth.”7 Through processes organisations turn inputs, in the form of resources, into outputs, 
in the form of products or services.8 Organisational processes can be formal, informal or 
cultural.9 While some of these processes are explicitly stated in documents and thus formal, 
some remain informal and less obvious as, for instance, factors of refinement of the processes 
are not always documented.10 Christensen explains that processes contribute to the 
innovator’s dilemma in the sense they are meant to remain relatively unchanged, where any 
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6 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 73) 
7 Christensen & Overdorf (2000, p. 68) 
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change is under tight controls so as to achieve consistency.1 They are designed to achieve 
specific purposes, and by virtue of this, they cannot achieve different purposes for which they 
are not designed. Bower and Christensen argue that essentially “the processes and incentives 
that companies use to keep focused on their main customers work so well that they blind 
those companies to important new emerging markets.”2 Organisational processes are 
therefore both strengths, because they are continuously improved to achieve the purpose for 
which they are designed and weaknesses as they become ineffective in the face of drastic 
changes.3 Christensen views that the premises regulating processes have more influence in 
how organisations approach the analysis of their environments and formulations of strategy.4  
 
2.5.3 Values  
While values can generally be defined in terms of ethics, in the RPV Framework they are 
defined more specifically as “standards by which employees set priorities that enable them to 
judge whether an order is attractive or unattractive, whether a customer is more important or 
less important, whether an idea for a new product is attractive or marginal.”5 It is reckoned 
that values govern decision-making, and that this applies throughout different levels of the 
organisation.6 In as much as “[a] company's values reflect its cost structure or its business 
model”,7 values also define weaknesses as they “define the rules employees must follow for 
the company to prosper.”8 Due to their size, incumbents’ values are thus considered to 
embody growth and the ability to sustain this growth. Therefore, smaller markets are not 
considered valuable to pursue, an explanation which mirrors prior discussions of asymmetric 
motivation. As Christensen & Overdorf state it, “[o]ne of the bittersweet results of success, in 
fact, is that as companies become large, they lose the ability to enter small, emerging 
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markets.”1 Thus, we are reminded that the diffusion of innovation usually begins small and 
grows as it gains attraction, and that this works against the values incumbents develop.  
Since organisational strategies tend to be growth oriented, the types of markets they find 
attractive typically mirror their growth aspiration relative to current sizes. In other words, 
large firms will have growth targets in proportion to their current annual turnover, a 
percentage of which is much higher than that of smaller firms.  
     A company’s values, by necessity, must reflect its cost structure or its business model,  
     because these define the rules its employees must follow in order for the company to make  
     money. If, for example, the structure of a company’s overhead costs requires it to achieve  
     gross profit margins of 40 percent, a powerful value or decision rule will have evolved that  
     encourages middle managers to kill ideas that promise gross margins below 40 percent.2  
The latter part of the quotation reflects the discussions already made previously when 
discussing asymmetric motivation. There is also a hint of a recognition that values “[must be] 
consistent with the strategic direction and the business model of the company”,3 which is 
explained in relation to how larger firms require to equip people at different levels with an 
understating of what priorities are and on what basis they can make independent decisions. 
Indeed, these independent decisions are assumed to mirror the firm’s values and be in line 
with its strategic direction and business model. To sum up, resources, processes and values 
represent internal organisational issues which become impediments for investing in disruptive 
innovations.  
 
2.6 Decision-Making and Resource Allocation 
There are several suggestions so far that the dilemma incumbents come to confront, as 
explained by Christensen, originates from how organisational members make choices and 
what influenced the decision behind these choices, which subsequently lead to negative 
organisational outcomes. As he explains it: “[r]esource dependence as it is enacted through 
the resource allocation process is the causal mechanism that makes it difficult for the leading 
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incumbents to address a disruption.”1 These process are however considered to “make 
sense”,2 or said alternatively, rational, except that in their consequence they lead to losses in 
leadership positions and/or failures. Christensen references what he considers as rational to 
incumbents as those choices that are in line with efforts to satisfy lead customers. This 
observation is notable from the following statement: “Good resource allocation processes 
[italics added] are designed to weed out proposals that customers don’t want. When these 
decision-making processes work well, if customers don’t want a product, it won’t get funded; 
if they do, it will.”3 He explains that “[g]ood management do what makes sense [i.e. what is 
rational], and what makes sense is primarily shaped by their value network.”4  
Thus, the core arguments which sustain the theory, in as far as incumbents’ dilemma is 
understood, rest upon and are themselves shaped by assumptions about decision-making 
processes and what influence these decision processes. Implicit in the notion of the 
innovator’s dilemma is the presenting of incumbents as having to choose between two 
supposedly difficult alternatives, namely, disruptive and sustaining innovations. This section 
looks especially at those aspects of the theory which clarify Christensen’s thinking regarding 
what shapes the processes of decision-making, which he considers to be the eventual 
difficulties incumbents face in dealing with disruptive innovations.  
Christensen reports that he interviewed “more than eighty managers who played key roles in 
the disk drive industry’s leading firms, both incumbents and entrants, at times when 
disruptive technologies had emerged.”5 He goes further to state that he “tried to construct, as 
accurately and from as many points as possible, the forces that influenced these firms’ 
decision-making processes regarding the development and commercialization of the 
technologies either relevant of irrelevant to the value networks in which the firms were at the 
time embedded.”6 Based on these interviews, he sketches what he refers to as a “decision-
making pattern”7 by which he illustrates decision-making processes in incumbents, 
meanwhile pointing out observed problem areas of the process. He explains that while 
incumbents fail in the face of disruption, they are organisations which have nevertheless been 
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well run, except that “there is something about the way decisions get made in successful 
organizations that sows the seeds of eventual failure.”1 The assertion can be understood as 
implying that changing these decision patterns in ways that favour disruptive innovations as 
well should lead to incumbents’ successes in disruptive innovation markets.  
Observed as a process of the decision-making pattern, Christensen explains that when 
prototypes of potentially disruptive innovation are made in incumbent organisations, they are 
typically presented to lead customers through marketing departments. In line with this is the 
observation that, during his case studies, prototypes of disruptive innovations were often 
found to have been previously developed by incumbent organisations despite not being 
commercialised. If the lead customers show no interest, it typically follows that developments 
of these prototypes are almost without reservation thwarted. It is only when lead customers 
show interest do the projects get resources, and when they do not, in which case the 
innovation does not address the needs of these customers, the project is starved of requisite 
resources. However, innovations that do not get support do not necessarily die, as 
entrepreneurial individuals at times do establish new companies to pursue their 
commercialisation. This cohort tends to include “frustrated engineers from [these] established 
firms”.2  
It is important to recognise that Christensen considers lead customers as wielding more 
power in influencing how organisations allocate their resource towards innovation projects. 
Accordingly, he argues strongly that “demands of a firm's customers shape the allocation of 
resources in technological innovation”, 3 highlighting the relatedness of his views to theories 
of resource dependence and resource allocation.4 He has however sometimes made what 
seems to be an about turn on this, acknowledging it as a “mistake”.5 “A more accurate 
prescriptive statement is that managers always must listen to customers. They simply must be 
aware of the direction in which different customers will lead them”6, he later revised his 
views. The purported insight behind this revised prescription is, thus, that lead customers are 
less likely to show interest in innovations which do not fulfil their own needs. The more 
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important insight is perhaps that resource allocation and innovation  “are the two sides of the 
same coin [because only] those new product developments projects that do get adequate 
funding, staffing, and management attention has a chance to succeeed; those that are starved 
of reseouces will languish.”1  
Christensen does however bring to light some further intricacies of the processes of decision-
making, recognising that “resource allocation is not simply a matter of top-down decision 
making followed by implementation.”2 He highlights that innovations are typically initiated 
at the lower levels of the organisations and follow different filtering processes dictated by 
decisions of different people at varying hierarchical levels of the organisation.3 This is 
because “crucial resource allocation decisions are made after project approval – indeed, after 
product launch – by mid-level managers who set priorities when multiple projects and 
products compete for the time of the same people, equipment, and vendors.”4 This 
explanation about influences on what ultimately become successful innovation projects, is an 
illustration of where power lies in organisations in relation to decisions.  
As Christensen explains, although it is commonly assumed that executives wield power 
regarding “important decisions about where a company go and how it will invest its 
resources… the real power lies with the people deeper in the organization who decide which 
proposals will be presented to senior management.”5 The point he raises here is particularly 
interesting given its highlighting of a different place within the organisation where sources of 
the innovator’s dilemma derive, as we begin to see the power of incumbents’ leaders as 
relatively less influential. That is, the executives’ making of final decisions is viewed as 
analogous to rubber stamping decisions which have long been made by different people 
below them, although such people are mostly viewed as deciding on the basis of customer 
needs. He also stresses the importance and the closeness of a propensity for success of the 
project with the career ambitions of different decision makers, which is presented as a pivotal 
element in determining how innovation proposals are presented to bid for resource 
sponsorship.    
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    Tightly coupled with this is their view of how their sponsorship of different proposals will  
    affect their own career trajectories within the company formed heavily by their understanding  
    of what customers want and what types of products the company needs to sell more of in order  
    to be more profitable. Individuals’ career trajectories can soar when they sponsor highly  
    profitable innovations projects. It is through these mechanisms of seeking corporate profit  
    and personal success, therefore, that customers exert a profound influence on the process of  
    resource allocation, hence patterns of innovation in most companies.1  
Parts of the quotation such as tightly coupled, affect own career trajectories, and personal 
success begin to show a different element in the process of resource allocation, the focus of 
which is individuals’ aspirations. There are also negative implications for supporting projects 
which fail due to lack of a market as these “tend to be much more expensive and public 
failures.”2 Thus, the potential for both success and failure of innovation projects and their 
close ties with the success or failure of individual’s careers are seen as critical in the decision-
making processes, which filter and thus determine which projects are ultimately presented to 
senior managers.  
These observations are indeed made in light of, or as influenced by, Pfeffer and Salancik‘s 
theory of resource dependence,3 which Christensen labels as “somewhat controversial” due to 
its portrayal of executives as powerless, as has just been discussed.4 Nevertheless Christensen 
points out that the findings of his studies on disruption support this view, asserting that 
“customer-focused resource allocation and decision-making processes of successful 
companies are far more powerful in directing investments than are executive’s decisions.”5 It 
is crucial to also mention that closely related to resource dependence is role of marketing 
departments, who influence the resource dependence dimension through conducting studies 
aimed towards understanding the needs of dominant customers. The emerging picture is that 
of inversed power distribution. Determinants of decisions are largely from outside the firm 
(i.e. in customers’ hands), followed by people from the lower levels of the organisation, with 
the executives wielding the least influence on decision-making about resource allocation.  
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2.7 Incumbents’ Market Positions 
The theory of disruptive innovation is about the failure of firms which are considered to be 
leading within their industries and “great”, as subtitle of The Innovator’s Dilemma, in 
particular makes clear: “when new technologies [or innovations] cause great firms to fail.”1 
In this book, as is the case with many of Christensen’s publications on the theory of 
disruption, a long list of industry leading firms as examples of disrupted firms is offered. For 
instance, he explains that in the case of Digital Equipment Corporation, a previously leading 
computer manufacturer “the very decisions that led to its decline were made at the time it was 
so widely regarded as being an astutely managed firm. It was praised as a paragon of 
managerial excellence [italics added] at the very time it was ignoring the arrival of the 
desktop computers that besieged it a few years later.”2 Such a depiction of astute and 
excellence are key themes of what characterises incumbents, which indicate how highly 
esteemed the firms are in the eyes of their observers. Their greatness is not reflected only in 
their market or industry dominance but also the excellence with which they are considered to 
be managed. Indeed, Christensen makes reference to their managerial excellence as 
astounding of characteristic, to which he queries: “Why might firms be regarded as astutely 
managed at one point, yet subsequently lose their positions of industry leadership when faced 
with technological change?”3 The theory of disruptive innovation was born out of 
Christensen’s interest in understanding the cause of failure of leading firms.4  
The first words of the introduction of The Innovator’s Dilemma are even more direct.  
     This book is about the failure of companies to stay atop their industries when they confront  
     certain types of market and technological change. It’s not about the failure of simply any  
     company, but of good companies… It is about well-managed companies that have their  
     competitive antennae up, listen astutely to their customers, invest aggressively in new  
     technologies, and yet still lose market dominance.5  
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Notable descriptors denote how esteemed these firms are. They include good companies, 
well-managed, competitive, admired, emulated, innovative, and perhaps more important, they 
dominate their markets. Corresponding labels are found, as Christensen makes evident, in 
prominent business magazines, praising their exceptional performances. It is however notable 
that these media outlets also report on the misfortunes of these organisations when they face 
decline.1 They are not only respected by journalists but also management scholars, 
considering them as “exemplars to follow.”2 As it is notable, the discernable hues of the 
theme of high esteem extend to the individual level, portrayed more directly by the phrase 
“well managed”, and although indirectly, by the esteem with which they are held by 
outsiders. The esteem of organisational members is primarily explained through description 
of senior managers of incumbents as perceived to be the best in their spaces of business. 
Senior managers are also the primary focus of analysis in Christensen’s theory, with their 
excellent business acumen referenced extensively to emphasise that they were among the 
best. As Danneels rightfully observes, Christensen gives much credit to senior managers 
“insisting on describing them as competent and at the helm of great firms.”3 
It is also important to note what the content of the narrative about these leadership positions 
of incumbents are, and in what context are leadership positions relevant. For instance, there 
are both references to industry leadership and market dominance, which highlights some 
distinctions. Further, it is evident that Christensen recognises that the disruptive and the 
sustaining markets for these incumbents are not the same. The domination is referred to 
specific markets, but also notable is that the leadership position is underpinned by and 
understood in terms of specified offerings.  
     IBM dominated the mainframe market but missed by years the emergence of minicomputers,    
     which were technologically much simpler than mainframes. …no other major manufacturer  
     of mainframe computers became a significant player in the minicomputer business. Digital  
     Equipment Corporation created the minicomputer market and was joined by a set of other  
     aggressively managed companies… But each of these companies in turn missed the desktop  
     personal computer market.4 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016)  
2 Christensen (2016, p. xv) 
3 Danneels (2004, p. 252) 
4 Christensen (2016, p. xiv) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 33 
Digital Equipment Corporation is considered to have “created” a market and joined in the 
created market by other companies. Where firms are considered to have missed a market, it is 
the case of these firms not joining, or said alternatively, not being players in this market.  
 
2.8 Critical Review of the Theory of Disruption  
Christensen’s work offers important insights, with the growth trajectory of innovation being 
recognised as one of its important features.1 The theory can also be applauded for 
highlighting that incumbents tend to lack interest in investing in smaller markets, which 
nevertheless grow to become dominant and present them with competitive challenges. Thus, 
it contributes towards prior narrative that incumbents tend to be slow to respond to 
discontinuous market changes. Christensen demonstrates that despite the fact that firms may 
initially start within such niches, when they are established they tend to keep holding on to 
their established markets – holding on to the sustaining path . That is, both entrants and 
incumbents tend to ultimately gravitate towards a sustaining path, overlooking to establish 
new markets.   
However, the resource dependence theory of resource Pfeffer and Salancik2 seems to have led 
Christensen to present incumbents almost as “beggars” who do little to influence the supply 
of needed resources from their customers. The theory’s central argument is that 
“organizational survival hinges on the ability to procure critical resources from the external 
environment.” 3 It is interesting to note, though, that Pfeffer and Salancik offer an extended 
view of firms in relation to how Christensen portrays incumbents. The authors explain that 
despite the constraints placed by external resources, managers make efforts to make their 
environments favourable,4 which include various tactics to minimise constraints imposed by 
the necessary resources.5 According to Casciaro and Piskorski, one method is through 
circumventing “the source of constraint by reducing the interest in valued resources, 
cultivating alternative sources of supply, or forming coalitions.”6 The point here is less about 
                                               
1 Danneels (2004, p. 241) 
2 Pfeffer & Salancik (1978[2003]) 
3 Casciaro & Piskorski (2005, p. 167) 
4 Pfeffer & Salancik (1978[2003]) 
5 Casciaro & Piskorski (2005) 
6 Casciaro & Piskorski (2005, p. 181) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 34 
an exhaustive list of manipulative acts, but their existence rather, which bring into focus 
incumbents’ active role in making their environments hospitable.1 
It remains a question as to the consequences, or as Weeks puts it, the ambiguities of 
managerial behaviour, following manipulations.2 Cognition affects actions as represented by 
explanations of decisions to account for organisational outcomes, but that does not exclude 
the opposite, in which actions affect cognitions.3 Pfeffer and Salancik seem to recognise this 
point, as when they explain that the majority of “constraints on organisational action are the 
result of prior decision making.”4 In explaining value networks, Christensen makes a 
(perhaps inadvertently) related remark by highlighting that “each firm's competitive strategy, 
and particularly its past choices of markets, determines its perceptions of the economic value 
of a new technology.”5 Accounting for actions in this regard – through demonstrating how 
prior conduct ties with subsequent cognitions – should bring to light what remains obfuscated 
by current expositions of the theory of disruptive innovation.  
Christensen explains that he “examined the phenomena through the lenses of marketing and 
finance.”6 The marketing departments, other than doing market surveys to understand user 
needs - an aspect touched on in the theory of disruptive innovation – they also advertise, the 
intention of which is to influence how customers perceive their organisations.7 That is a 
direct form of environmental manipulation which, for both ontological and epistemological as 
previously discussed, remained unattended to. Casciaro and Piskorski have already begun 
addressing incumbents’ actions from a financial point of view as cited. These observations, 
then, invite an inquiry which considers prior decisions or behaviour in explaining conduct, 
but also sensitive to the consequences of current decisions and behaviour in placing some 
constraints in subsequent behaviour.8  
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Christensen also places greater weight on the deeper organisational filtering processes, 
especially individuals at varying levels of hierarchy but mostly middle manager, which shape 
organisational processes of innovation. He stresses the role of people at lower hierarchical 
levels of incumbents, although he seems to blame decision-making of middle managers and 
their beliefs in explaining the negative organisational outcomes. What is discernable in these 
jarring references is recognition that individuals have needs for success, which influence how 
organisations manage innovation projects. Despite this recognition, he gives these needs and 
how they influence human conduct less attention.  
Further, his explanation about individual organisational members’ needs seem to show that 
the prior debates about organisational values and how they contribute to organisations 
abilities and disabilities are partial. They are partial to the extent that the needs and values of 
individuals are not accounted by the RPV model, despite seemingly playing a critical role in 
directing innovation projects. More important though, they also clash with those of the 
organisations in which they work, to a degree – for example, this is notable by explanations 
of frustrated people leaving. Additionally, although there is a hint that Christensen recognises 
uncertainty as a critical aspect of what challenges established organisations in their response 
to disruptive innovations,1 he remains silent as to how these organisations deal with this 
problem. 
As previously hinted, the theory of disruptive innovation has gained much appeal from 
practitioners and scholars alike, except this has largely not been accompanied by academic 
scrutiny, at least initially.2 Weeks correctly notes that Christensen’s publications about the 
theory have largely been published by the Harvard Business Review, and that include The 
Innovator’s Dilemma. Hence, these publications are editorially-reviewed, rather than peer-
reviewed.3 While some have made efforts to develop it,4 arguing for its usefulness, some 
scholars have challenged its core tenets.5 Some of the core arguments Christensen makes are 
thus beginning to be exposed to criticism as notable voices from the academia continue to 
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scrutinise it.1 These scholars contribute to the development of the theory by highlighting its 
limitations. This section has built upon previous discussions in the Problem Development 
section, which make contribution to these critiques. However, the ultimate goal is to highlight 
the aspects which will be addressed by the alternative perspective of sensemaking which is 
presented in the next chapter. 
 
2.9 Conclusion  
The chapter revisited the core concepts underpinning the theory of disruptive innovation, as 
principally explicated by Christensen, setting the stage for later discussions of this framework 
from a sensemaking point of view. The body of work presented in the chapter represents 
Christensen’s thinking on the concept of disruption, and thus serve to specify precisely what 
Christensen refers to as disruptive innovation and how he theorises about it. In as far as the 
challenges incumbents face, which lead to their inability to successfully respond to disruptive 
innovations, Christensen’s analysis of organisational processes in short point to decision-
making processes as the problem. More generally, he highlights several factors which 
coalesce around decision-making processes, shaping these processes in ways which lead 
incumbents to favour sustaining innovations over disruptive innovations. They are presented 
through the concepts of value networks, asymmetric motivation, and the RPV framework 
(especially the values aspect).  The critical analysis of conceptions of the theory of disruptive 
innovation highlight several weaknesses which either remain unchecked or have been 
brought to light but not addressed. These issues will be revisited in in Chapter 4, particularly 
making effort to discover the potential for the ways in which sensemaking addresses them.  
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Chapter 3: Sensemaking in Organisations 
3.1 Introduction  
The current chapter turns attention to the sensemaking perspective. It looks at the conceptual 
basis and propositions of the perspective, giving added nuance to how it contrasts with the 
theoretical assumptions of the theory of disruption. Thereafter, an explanation of what 
sensemaking entails follows, ensued by discussions focusing on its seven properties. The 
sensemaking’s interruption model is then discussed, which highlights how it instigates and 
thus demonstrates explicit efforts for making of sense in organisations. Then attention is 
devoted to beliefs and actions as drivers of the sensemaking, before a critical analysis of the 
sensemaking perspective is offered. According to Weick “there are ways to talk about 
organizations that allows for sensemaking to be the central activity in the construction of both 
the organization and the environment it confronts.”1 The main purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate this central activity.    
 
3.2 Foundations of the Sensemaking Perspective    
Weick’s thinking on organising and sensemaking has been developed over years through 
embellishing vestiges of findings from his doctoral dissertation. The study was designed to 
understand the effects of cognitive dissonance (cognition) on performance (action).2 Weick 
reiterates that “[w]hat continues to interest [him] about that study is that it does not only 
capture the effect of cognition on action, it also captures the effects of action on cognition.”3 
Thus, the sensemaking perspective sheds light on the effects of both cognition and actions on 
each other, or more precisely, the interplay of these effects. The historical roots of the 
sensemaking perspective are however not as easily traceable. Citing potential “seductions of 
hindsight bias and concealment of the powerful role that chance plays in the determination of 
outcomes,”4 Weick remains indisposed to their tracing. Hindsight bias, as a characteristic of 
reflective thought, is indeed one of the key themes of the sensemaking perspective. 
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Retrospection is one of its seven properties.1 The hints of chance’s role in the process are 
clearly indicated by its plausibility quality.2 It would thus appear as though Weick eschews 
being caught up making effort at accomplishing that which his work demonstrates as hard to.  
One of the earliest sources Weick references is the American philosopher and psychologist 
William James’ 1890 publication, The Principles of Psychology, in which issues of human 
consciousness are of focus, especially regarding how consciousness selects stimuli (cues) 
relevant to current projects from its environment.3 Sensemaking (initially spelled sense-
making) as a tool to conceptualise organising was first introduced by Weick through his 
seminal book, The Social Psychology of Organizing, as a core function in his Enactment-
Selection-Retention [ESR] model.4 The ESR model is a portrayal of a “reciprocal relationship 
between ecological change and enactment [which] includes sensemaking activities of sensing 
anomalies, enacting order into flux, and being shaped by externalities.”5 The model draws 
from ecological studies to explain organisation-environment relation, in which the degree of 
organisational openness to discontinuities or changes in its environment places demands on 
sensemaking processes driven to achieve internal order in relation to the external changes.6 
This process may also start with organisational actions, which change their environment and 
thus invigorate cues to which attention is subsequently drawn.7 
Weick’s The Social Psychology of Organizing expresses a dissatisfaction with the dominant 
theorisation about organisations of the time, which are however still dominant to date. 
Eisenberg notes that before Weick, “organizational analysts regarded equivocality as 
inherently problematic and to be either ignored or expunged from organizational life. Weick 
turned this idea on its head, arguing instead that equivocality is the engine that motivates 
people to organize.”8 Weick’s work moves away from and challenges assumptions about the 
rational model of organisations. As pointed out on the back cover of Sensemaking in 
Organizations, the more dominant rational model of organisations and its “focus on decision 
making and the conception of strategic rationality… ignores the inherent complexity and 
                                               
1 Boland (2008, p. 58); Weick (1995, pp. 24-30) 
2 Weick (1995, pp. 55-61) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 65) 
4 Maitlis & Christianson (2014); Boland (2008); Weick (1969)  
5 Weick et al. (2005, p. 414) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 70); Weick (1979, pp. 130-131) 
7 Weick (1995, pp. 30-38); Weick (1988) 
8 Eisenberg (2006, p. 1696) 
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ambiguity of real-world organizations and their environments.”1  
 
Weick views organisations and their environments as complex entities, which are in constant 
flow of rapid change. On this basis he conceives that the core question to pursue when 
studying organisations is less about what they are than the processes by which they are 
produced.2 He further counsels that organisational scholars have to “stamp out nouns” and 
replace them with verbs or gerunds when talking about organisations.3 This redirects 
attention away from an objectified view of organisations (e.g. structures) to the organising 
process which draws together human action towards collective objectives. He affirms that 
“[t]he language of sensemaking captures the realities of agency, flow, equivocality, 
transience, re-accomplishment, unfolding, and emergence, realities that are often obscured by 
the language of variables, nouns, quantities, and structures.”4 Despite the focus on process 
over structure, Weick does not outright reject objective reality of organisations. He submits 
that if we froze, or observed over a short time interval, the core process by which human 
action is organised (i.e. sensemaking), we would be disposed to adopting a realist ontology 
and see an object. However, an extension of this duration over longer periods sensitises the 
observer to the core process which holds together the organised activity.5  
Another point Weick raises concerns the limited information processing capacity of humans, 
which draws from Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, in which the challenge for theories 
of rational decision-making are brought to light. As Weick puts it “[t]he essence of this 
notion is that individuals have perceptual as well as information-processing limits, and even 
though they may intend to act rationally, they can do so only in a limited fashion.”6 
Therefore, not only do humans have to make decisions which are “satisfying”, but further, 
implementation of that which follows from the decisions are also subject to limitations due to 
the grounding of the decision in satisfying conclusions.   
 
                                               
1 Weick (1995) 
2 Weick (1969) 
3 Weick (1979, p. 44) 
4 Weick et al. (2005, p. 410) 
5 Weick (1969) 
6 Weick (1969, p. 9) 
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Weick traces his earlier interest in sensemaking back to Garfinkel’s study of decision-making 
in jury deliberations in the 1960s, which demonstrated how “[f]acts were made sensible 
retrospectively [italics added] to support the jurors’ choice of verdict.”1 This suggests an 
inversed construction of accounts where a conclusion is first entertained, after which 
justifiable “facts” which support that conclusion are selectively sought. Weick associates this 
with Festinger’s dissonance theory and its concern with “postdecisional [italics in original] 
efforts to revise the meaning of decisions that have negative consequences.”2 What is 
interesting about both these cases is that prior decisions go through revisions contingent on 
their outcomes, meaning that which is finally referred to as the decision is in effect only 
belated as the “outcome comes before the decision.”3 This insight sensitises investigators to 
potential biases which can be involved when people construct accounts about which decisions 
are placed as precursor for some related outcomes.4 The sensemaking perspective is also 
informed by ethnomethodology. Weick parallels that with cognitive dissonance theory given 
that both operate under the assumption of a presence of some observer, which influence 
conduct by placing demands on accountability on human actors to prove rationality and 
social competence.5  
 
3.3 Sensemaking Explained      
Weick explicates sensemaking as a process through which human consciousness attends to 
portions (extracted cues) of their ongoing flow of experience and draw from a stock of prior 
conceptions (frames) of reality stored in memory to generate plausible account of what is 
going on.6 What makes sense is that which resembles something in the past,7 which means 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 10); for disambiguation, both Brenda Dervin (1999) and Dave Snowden (2005) have proposed 
variations of “sense making” theorisation which differ from the Weickean perspective as discussed in this 
chapter. 
2 Weick (1995, p. 11) 
3 Weick (1995 citing Garfinkel, 1967) 
4 It is observable thus, that Weick does not move away from theories of decision-making, but instead draws our 
attention to how rationalisation of decisions shapes cognition as efforts are made to find justifiable “facts” 
supporting outcomes of decisions. This also begins to show that the earliest parts of decisions may not be as 
clear in later stages, which means that which is referred to as the decision may have only been formulated in 
light of evident outcomes.   
5 Weick (1995, p. 13) 
6 Weick (1995) 
7 Weick (1995, p. 110, 170) 
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the process relies on reflective thought.1 Sensemaking is the search for answers, first to the 
question “what’s the story here?”, or queried alternatively, “what is going on?”, and the 
second question, “now what should I do?” which implies that the process orientates and 
regulates human conduct towards the emerging reality.2 While prior experience (causal maps) 
affords people a sense of immersion into their current flow of experience through a sense of 
familiarity, occasions which lack in this familiarity violate the flow of experience, which 
engender a search for meaning, or said alternatively, instigate a sensemaking process driven 
by a quest for meaning.3  
Unusual situations, under which held expectations about how the world functions come under 
duress, instigates the sensemaking process, just as it is the case for a need to act into worlds 
in which no clear expectation have been constructed yet.4 The inability to generate an account 
equates to absolute lack of congruity between any held expectation with what is occurring, or 
what may occur, which leads to a state of puzzlement. The collapse, violation or interruption 
of expectation engenders a search for answers for the two questions as previously mentioned 
and thus, to solve the puzzle. Plausible hunches are constructed based on the stock of frames 
stored in the memory and tested through action. However, this process unfolds on, and 
therefore changes, for better or worse, the puzzling situation just as it affords the opportunity 
to generate meanings for resolving the puzzle.5 The recursive interplay between actions and 
cognition potentially leads to the enlargement of the speculation as it continues to gain some 
credence.6  
 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 24-30) 
2 Weick et al. (2005) 
3 Weick et al. (2005) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 83-100) 
5 Weick (1988) 
6 It is important to note so far that what perpetuates this process is not so much that credence is built upon 
accurate resemblance, which was implied by the mention of a construction of “plausible account” earlier, as it 
may be a belief analogous to a self-fulfilling prophecy set in motion. Thus, plausible sense made may turn out to 
be perceived as accurate sense depending on whether the initial hunch or supposition validated itself by 
initiating favourable actions, which in their outcome confirmed the supposition. Weick broadens the self-
fulfilling prophecy proposition, initially made by Merton (1948 as cited by Weick, 1995, p. 147), in which the 
latter viewed the incipient supposition as inaccurate, or an error. However, Weick contents that whether the 
initial supposition was accurate or not will depend on who the observer is, for he or she who confirms it by their 
actions under the drive of such an “inaccurate” hunch, can only perceive the initial prophecy as having been 
accurate because the outcome proved it. Thus for Weick, if the initial supposition was verified, then it means it 
was accurate. (Weick, 1995, p. 147)   
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Explained within the organisational context, sensemaking is considered to be “a significant 
process of organizing… [which] unfolds as a sequence in which people concerned with 
identity in the social context of other actors engage ongoing circumstances from which they 
extract cues and make plausible sense retrospectively, while enacting more or less order into 
those ongoing circumstances.”1 In addition to highlighting the significance of sensemaking as 
a mechanism by which organising is achieved, this explanation highlights core characteristics 
of the process, which are identity construction, retrospection, enactment, social, ongoing, 
extracted cues, and plausibility. Most important, the enacting of “more or less order” 
highlights the important fact that the outcomes of efforts to make sense of puzzles “are not 
always sanguine.”2 The counsel here is that sensemaking and its genesis trade on invention 
rather than discovery. The strength of the beliefs under operation and the resultant plausible 
sense made, greatly influence the direction of its ensuing processes.  
Because any process which follows from interrupted expectations constructs new meanings, 
Weick has the following caution: “When people confront noncontingent reinforcement of 
their [interaction with their environment], they try to discover a structure that is not there. 
Their main recourse is invention.”3 Commitment may be achieved just as a window of danger 
may open because “[t]these inventions tend to be plausible, persistent, and sealed off from 
refutation.”4 This is because “once a tentative explanation has taken hold of our minds, 
information to the contrary may produce not corrections but elaborations of the 
explanations.”5 In other words, sensemakers are disposed to the potential for acting either 
favourably or dangerously, the latter of which may persist even in the face of information 
which suggests the behaviour is not favourable to the actor or their subject.   
A study by Weick and Sutcliffe about the conduct of leaders at Bristol Royal Infirmary’s 
(BRI) makes that point clearer. The authors observed how members of the BRI continued to 
administrate a paediatric cardiac surgery program for many years despite evidence showing 
its failure as the death rate of the centre was much higher than the national statistics. 6 As 
Weick highlights, “[t]hat mindset prevailed partly because surgeons constructed their identity 
                                               
1 Weick et al. (2005) 
2 Weick et al. (2005, p. 416) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 84) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 84) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 84 citing Watzlawick, 1976, p. 50) 
6 Weick & Sutcliffe (2003) 
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as that of people learning complex surgical procedures in the context of unusually 
challenging cases.”1 Although this is a case of a public institution and not a firm, Weick has 
often reminded us that what is explained in the sensemaking perspective concerns human 
conditions, which means any given context with favourable ingredients for commitment may 
lead to a similar conduct.  It was the justifications considered acceptable within the context 
that allowed for the organisational members’ beliefs to continue taking such a harmful route.  
 
3.4 Properties of Sensemaking 
Previous discussions have indicated that the sensemaking process is characterised by seven 
properties, often referred to as Weick’s “sensemaking framework”.2 He suggests that they are 
core explanatory guides to understanding the sensemaking process, “how it works, and where 
it can fail.”3 Weick likens the seven properties to “an observer’s manual or a set of raw 
materials for disciplined imagination.”4 That is, the listing provides a set of ideas which may 
be used to probe the subject of interest to elucidate which among them become evident or 
salient. Weick captures this framework in what he calls a “recipe” for sensemaking. It follows 
a narration of a little girl who is told to think before speaking, to which she quizzes: “How 
can I know what I think till I see what I say?”5 Notably, in this question the girl wanted her 
action of saying to precede her presentation of what she will explain her thoughts as, because 
from that point she would have generated a fodder from which her later justifications about 
what she considers to be her thoughts can feed from.  
 
 
                                               
1 Weick at al. (2005, p. 416) 
2 Maitlis & Christianson (2014, p. 62) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 18) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 18) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 12); according to Weick, the I represents identity, the saying which precedes the thinking both 
indicate that action precedes cognition, which is retrospective and that this action put something out there to be 
inspected, which equates to enacting an environment. Further, this process unfolds in a social setting, implied by 
he or she who asks the initial question and thus socialises the girl. The question is also spread over a duration, 
which explains the ongoing property. The focus of the talk is on the “what” the girl thinks, which is the cue 
extracted, but there also remains an element of doubt which means that which is ultimately the answer is 
plausible (pp. 61-62). 
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3.4.1 Grounded in Identity Construction 
Weick firmly anchors the sensemaking process in the human actor’s identity construction, 
highlighting that in the previously mentioned sensemaking recipe she who does the 
sensemaking is the central point of reference.1 While this may denote a quality of 
individuality, Weick maintains that “no individual ever acts like a single sensemaker.”2 That 
is, from a Weickean standpoint, sensemaking is always social. He explains that people 
assume different identities given different social settings, a point made vivid through Mead’s 
depiction of an individual as a “parliament of selves”.3 The result is that for human actors, to 
shift “among interactions is [to] shift among definitions of self”,4 which implies a process in 
which continued assessment in pursuit of finding and presenting the self which is considered 
appropriate for certain settings is always ongoing.  
While that may suggest that different contexts will represent sources of the puzzles, the 
attempt to find a suitable self for a said context also points to self-definition as another 
source. As Weick puts it “the sensemaker is himself or herself an ongoing puzzle undergoing 
continual redefinition, coincident with presenting some self to others and trying to decide 
which self is appropriate.”5 The more general point is that the self and the context recursively 
influence each other, despite the higher chances that the “self, rather than the environment, 
may be the text in need of interpretation.”6  
Brought to organisational settings, Weick shares the important insight that, “who we think we 
are (identity) as organizational actors shapes what we enact and how we interpret, which 
affects what outsiders think we are (image) and how they treat us, which stabilizes or 
destabilizes our identity.”7 Some identity scholars have gone further to make connections 
between organisational identity, image and reputation. As it is notable above, usage of the 
concept “image” here functions as a referencing tool which represents external stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the organisation. Thus, an image refers to the meanings held by external 
stakeholders about an organisation’s references as interpreted and perceived by internal 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 18) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 18)  
3 Weick (1995, p. 18) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 20) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 20) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 23) 
7 Weick et al. (2005, p. 416) 
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stakeholders. However, from external stakeholder perspective, the image constructed about 
an organisation equates to reputation.1 This, then suggests that the concept of image serves as 
the nexus through which “[i]dentity and reputation depend on… and feed off each other”2 as 
they are interlocked by these perceptions from the internal and external sides of 
organisations. Indeed, organisational identity is considered to be “the backbone of 
reputation.”3 
Weick makes clear that identity construction and the process of sensemaking in general, 
involve affect, the negative feeling of which motivates actions to repair the perceived 
discrepancy. Despite the fact that “people learn about their identities by projecting them into 
an environment and observing the consequences”;4 and also by taking “cue for their identity 
from the conduct of others, [although making] effort to influence this conduct to begin 
with”,5 observers do not accept those presented identities arbitrarily. More important, he or 
she who does the sensemaking is conscious of the observers’ conduct, and in fact sizes up 
their appraisals in the process, the inferred judgements of which influence subsequent 
sensemaking.  
     Depending on the “weight and character” of the questioner [i.e. the observer], the    
     imagined judgement of that person, and one’s own resulting self-feeling [italics added],  
     that small act of sensemaking… can affect individual interpretations and actions, which  
     can then diffuse and have much larger organizational effects.6  
 
Thus, it further matters who the observer is and the weight of their feedback influences 
subsequent sensemaking. Weick parallels the negative affect with how people deal with 
cognitive dissonance, as when he states that “the chance to reaffirm a self-concept reduces 
the discomfort felt when the person confronts discrepancies between belief and action similar 
to those that animate dissonance reduction.”7  
                                               
1 Brown et al. (2006) 
2 Rindova & Fombrun, (1998, p. 66) 
3 Fombrun (1996, p. 111) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 23) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 23) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 22) 
7 Weick (1995, p. 23) 
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Weick gives added nuance to explain issues of identity construction within organisational 
settings by drawing from Dutton and Dukerich’s analysis of a case of identity ambiguity or 
dissonance at New York Port Authority. This was a result of homeless people occupying the 
facilities of the organisation, “whose identity in the eyes of its employees was that of a 
professional, altruistic, can-do agency that acted like a family while delivering quality 
service”.1 This presented organisational members with certain degrees of ambiguity as their 
organisation was now associated with a social problem which lends itself to multiple 
interpretation. As such, “the positive identity and the negative image affected members’ 
interpretations of who they were, what they felt, what they faced, and what they were 
doing.”2 Because individual organisational members construct meanings about the self 
idiosyncratically, nevertheless relative to the organisations for which they work, their 
perception about the meaning outsiders attach to their organisations have a bearing on their 
sense of self as it does to their sense of association to their organisation’s identity. Weick 
explains how dynamics of this complexity could lead to individual organisational members, 
who assume both the identity of the individual self just as this individual self could act as the 
organisation,3 making efforts to maintain, try to repair, or dissociate with their organisation’s 
identity.4  
Thus motivation to maintain or repair the identity of their organisations hinges strongly, or 
weakly, on the degree of organisational members’ association with the identity of their 
organisations. Because “depending on who I am, my definition of what is ‘out there’ will also 
change”,5 dissociation and association with organisational identity are coping mechanisms 
organisational members may apply in dealing with the ambiguities. How organisational 
members associate and dissociate with organisational identity has a bearing on how they 
interpret organisational events, given that interpretation depends on the definition of the self 
in relation to what is out there.  
Weick suggests that organisational members are inclined to engage in efforts which are likely 
to paint them in a positive light, an explanation which ties to the three identity needs drawn 
from the cultural self-presentation theory of Erez and Earley. Weick presents identity 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 21) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 21) 
3 Weick (1995 citing Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 21) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 20) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 47 
construction as aimed towards sustaining self-enhancement, self-efficacy and self-
consistency.1 A threat to affirming any of the three triggers a sensemaking process aimed 
towards restoring the disconfirmed need. As Weick puts it “[t]he meaning that is actually 
sustained… tends to be one that reflects favourably on the organization and one that also 
promotes self-enhancement, efficacy, and constancy.”2  Furthermore, he points out that 
threats to identity may instigate sensemaking processes driven to “alter the sense they make 
of those images, even if it means redefining the organisational identity.”3 He also suggests 
that organisational members may intentionally engage in sensemaking processes which aim 
to redefine their organisational identity in the event that efforts to repair the meanings 
attached to the identity of their organisations fail. More important for the current study is the 
sequence here, in which the first efforts are driven toward repairing the identity, after which 
the alternative action of seeking a new identity would follow.  
The overarching, implicit message in Weick’s discussions of identity in sensemaking is that 
the property of identity construction is more influential in the process of sensemaking relative 
to the other properties. For instance, the implied message in the saying that sensemaking is 
“grounded in identity construction”, is a hint that the identity of the sensemaker is the 
primary concern and has a major influence on how the process unfolds. Indeed, he points out 
that “sensemaking begins with a self-conscious sensemaker”,4 a point more vividly stated 
earlier by pointing out that all of the four pronouns of the sensemaking recipe point to the 
sensemaker. Further, Weick stresses that “the establishment and maintenance of identity is a 
core preoccupation in sensemaking”5 because “[d]epending on who I am, my definition of 
what is ‘out there’ will also change.”6  
While all these observations are implicit in Weick’s discussions of sensemaking, he explicitly 
concedes to Helms-Mills’ argument that identity construction “is at the root of sensemaking 
and influences how other aspects or properties of the sensemaking process are understood”.7 
Also important to the current study is the observation that “[b]eliefs about the identity of the 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 20) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 21) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 21) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 22) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 20) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 20) 
7 Weick et al. (2005 citing Helms-Mills 2003, p. 55) 
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firm are a key part of the mental model”,1 which influences organisational strategy.2 Weick’s 
analysis of the work of Porac et. al., demonstrates how organisations competing within the 
same space identify themselves as players within the market, and yet seek to differentiate 
their competitive characteristics from the rest. The study also highlights how leaders’ mental 
models help define organisational strategy and its competitive space.3 Some scholars note 
that “identity is a major influence on the resource allocation process… [as] the firm that 
defines itself as a distinctive consumer products company will seek to build organizational 
processes and to accumulate the resources and skills that complement this identity.”4 Thus, 
organisational identity, as a metaframe within which the environment is interpreted and 
meaning is made, plays a critical role in defining what organisations do and where they prefer 
to direct their actions.  
Weick has allegorically explained tools as the mode by which people identify themselves, 
noting that sensemakers tend to be unwilling to drop these tools, even when it is critically 
indispensable to do so. They do so because dropping the tools is equivalent to dropping their 
identities, which leads to puzzles in as far as one does not know who they are afterwards. 
     The reluctance to drop one's tools when threat intensifies is not just a problem for  
     firefighters. Navy seamen sometimes refuse orders to remove their heavy steel-toed shoes  
     when they are forced to abandon a sinking ship, and they drown or punch holes in life rafts  
     as a result. Fighter pilots in a disabled aircraft sometimes refuse orders to eject, preferring  
     instead the "cocoon of oxygen" still present in the cockpit. Karl Wallenda, the world-renowned    
     high-wire artist, fell to his death still clutching his balance pole, when his hands could have  
     grabbed the wire below him.5 
Despite the symbolic flavour of these examples when used to explain organisations and the 
people within them, Weick has suggested the social-psychological implications of dropping 
these tools have usefulness in analysing the conduct of organisational members.6 Weick and 
associates emphasise Albert and Whetten’s description of organisational identity as that 
                                               
1 Weick (1995 citing Porac et al. 1989, p. 399) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 76) 
3 Weick (1995, pp. 76-77) 
4 Stimpert et al. (1998, p. 88) 
5 Weick (1996, p. 301) 
6 He also demonstrated how even scholars, just as it is the people they study in organisations seem to have the 
same challenge, often reluctant to drop their outdate paradigms (Weick, 1996). 
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which is “core, distinctive, and enduring about the character of the organization”1 as the basis 
upon which inquiries of identity are built.  Some scholars have come to demonstrate that 
identity is indeed malleable and can be changed, despite the acknowledged difficulty related 
to the process.2 
 
3.4.2 Retrospective  
The property of retrospect brings into focus the position of the person who does the 
sensemaking in relation to duration or time, and the implication of the ongoing, fleeting 
quality of time and its experience on attention. Weick explicates that time has two distinct 
forms. The first is the “coming-to-be and passing-away that has no contours, no boundaries, 
and no differentiation.”3 This denotes an ongoing, never-stopping quality of time which, 
however, when its portions are bracketed and attended to, can also be understood in terms of 
episodes. He states that the latter form is more common because it is how we usually perceive 
(or rather talk about) time. The splitting of pure duration into portions or episodes only 
implies that direction of attention is towards portions of the continuity, and in effect, that 
which has already elapsed.4  
Therefore, “the creation of meaning is an attentional process, but it is attention to that which 
has already occurred.”5 This is particularly so because the never-stopping quality of time 
dictates that our perception of reality is in fact always delayed and therefore in the past, even 
if this delay may be as minute as a fraction of a second.6 As such, the slight passing of 
portions of our perception into the past is inescapable. The implication of this is that, no 
matter how small the slippage is, human perception is in reality always a memory. That 
anchors Weick’s argument that sensemaking can only be retrospective. He makes this point 
clearer by stating that “it is only possible to direct attention to what exists, that is, what has 
already passed.”7  
                                               
1 Weick et al. (2005 citing Albert & Whetten, 1985) 
2 Gioia & Thomas (1996) 
3 Weick (1995 citing Schutz, 1967, p. 47) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 25) 
5 Weick (1995, pp. 25-26) 
6 Weick (1995 citing Schutz, 1967) 
7 Weick (1995, p. 25) 
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Brought closer to organisational context, Weick makes clear the influence of the mixed 
content which passes into the past, from which content for meaning construction is drawn. To 
do so, he also points out an element instrumental to the glancing back, namely current action. 
Given that “people typically have more than one project underway, and have differing 
awareness of these projects, reflection is overdetermined and clarity is not assured.”1 Thus, 
over-determination of reflection is dictated by the fact that attention can only be backward, 
although there remains the challenge that the past makes “many different kinds of sense”2 
given the varied, passing away content vis-à-vis undergoing projects. He stresses that this 
leads to confusion, rather than ignorance.  
     The important point is that retrospective sensemaking is an activity in which many possible    
     meanings may need to be synthesized, because many different projects are underway at the  
     time reflection takes place… The problem is that there are too many meanings, not too few.  
     The problem faced with a sensemaker is one of equivocality, not one of uncertainty. The  
     problem is confusion, not ignorance.3 
The challenge, for organisations, is therefore that different people will interpret events 
differently, given their differentiated sentiments and goals in relation to similar projects. As 
he puts it “projects and feelings that are under way will affect the backward glance and what 
is seen.”4 The recognition that people in the higher up levels of organisations see and 
interpret event differently from those who are the lower levels of organisations,5 in particular 
underscores this notion. Another implication of this is that “meanings change as projects and 
goals change.”6 This explains the reality of organisational life where projects are not only 
underway at the same time, but are as likely to compete for attention and resources too. He 
views that what will guide what people search for when they look back is “values, priorities, 
and clarity about preferences” because these help with prioritisation of critical projects,7 but 
in so doing also direct attention to specific cues over others.  
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 27) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 27) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 27) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 26) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 27) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 27) 
7 Weick (1995, pp. 27-28)  
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Furthermore, retrospection introduces the element of hindsight bias in sensemaking.1 The 
point Weick makes is that glancing backward does not yield accurate results, and that this is 
contingent on whether the outcomes are already known or not. Thus, retrospective 
sensemaking edits the history of outcomes which are already known in a manner which 
simplifies what led to the outcomes. Drawing from Starbuck and Milliken, who assessed the 
accuracies of executives’ perceptual filters, Weick states the following: “If the outcome is 
perceived to be bad, then antecedents are reconstructed to emphasize incorrect actions, 
flawed analysis, and inaccurate perceptions, even if such flaws were not influential to or all 
obvious at the time.”2 Weick reminds us that everyday sensemaking involves short time spans 
which should minimise the effects of hindsight bias. He advises students of sensemaking to 
take seriously, or rather “become more comfortable” with retrospective sensemaking as it 
underpins most assumptions about organisations, including issues of strategy,3 just as it does 
organisational structure.4  On this, he sensitises the student of sensemaking to the role of 
hindsight and how its influence permeates much of organisational reality. 
 
3.4.3 Enactive of Sensible Environment 
The essence of enactment sensemaking is that actions produce cues which serve as raw 
material that form part of, or become, that which is perceived as the environment. If we 
unpack the inherent process of ‘enacting of sensible environment’, we see that it contains two 
parts, the first of which is an action, which produces and links directly to the second part, 
which is a sensible environment. In effect, it is the consequences of actions which produce 
that which becomes sensible. Viewed within the context of organisations, Weick’s idea 
suggests that sensible portions of the organisations and their environments are in part 
produced by the actions that go on in organisations. He states that “people who act in 
organizations often produce structures, constraints, and opportunities that were not there 
before they took action.”5 Thus, Weick’s idea functions as a useful analytical tool to observe 
organisations and the actions which go into them, or put more precisely, to observe how 
actions produce organised work, opportunities and constraints within organisations.  
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 26) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 28) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 29) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 24) 
5 Weick (1988, p. 306) 
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To portray how managers enact their environments, and in what ways they produce 
structures, constraints and opportunities, Weick analogises law making with managing. Law 
makers, he explains, “take undefined space, time and action and draw lines, establish 
categories, and coin labels that create new features of the organisation that did not exist 
before.”1 The same can be said about strategy formulation, where lines are drawn for 
instance, about what will be done, how it will be done, timeframes for completion, including 
what will be excluded. In so doing, people will act within the confinement they placed in 
their environment, which did not exist before.   
To convey the same message, Weick uses the word “materialize”. He and his associates state 
the following: “When we say that meanings materialize [italics added], we mean that 
sensemaking is, importantly, an issue of language, talk, and communication. Situations, 
organizations, and environments are talked into existence [italics added].”2 Apart from the 
hint that words are the content of sensemaking, this exposition highlights what the process, 
including its content, does. They produce meanings which, in their subsequent perception, 
become the feedstock of what is considered to the reality. Said alternatively, the outcome of 
sensemaking equate to such sensible, noticeable (to a degree, orderly) realities as situations, 
organisations and environments. A similar term he uses, which nevertheless puts in clear 
view the role cognition plays in the process, is “real-ize”. In his words, “[i]n the process of 
acting out and real-izing their ideas… [people] create their own realities.”3 The word “real-
ize” suggests invention, instead of discovery. It literally means, to bring into reality. Thus, 
actions turn those that were abstract (ideas) into concrete or perceptible things (realities). 
These realities are linked, or more precisely, relate directly to the actor, as indicated by the 
adjective, “own”.  
In other words, organisations are not detached from their environments, but instead they 
relate to these environments, which is in contrast to conceptualisations of organisations 
which are reactive to supposedly detached environments. Weick states that, instead of 
“talking about adapting to an external environment, it may be more correct to argue that 
organizing consists of adapting to an enacted environment, an environment which is 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 31) 
2 Weick et al. (2005, p. 409) 
3 Weick (2001, p. 195) 
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constituted by actions [italics in original] of interdependent actors.”1 This enacted 
environment represents the raw material left from  elapsed action, referred to as a “residuum” 
as well, chiefly to stress its coupling with the actor and related implications.  
     The word ‘residuum’ is preferred to the word ‘residue’ because residuum emphasizes that  
     what is left after a process cannot be ignored or left out of account because it has potential       
     significance… The product of enactment is not an accident, an afterthought, or a byproduct.      
     Instead, it is an orderly, material, social construction that is subject to multiple  
     interpretations.2 
An important point for issues of sensemaking is captured by the last line, and that is, this 
residuum lends itself to multiples interpretations. Organisations are themselves social 
constructions, which implies that they are products of social interaction, which involves a 
synthesis of multiple, idiosyncratic meanings of individuals. The result is that the system is 
itself is a reservoir of differentiated beliefs, and despite that it is saturated in and held 
together by relatively uniform beliefs or values, and it is still capable of producing multiple 
interpretations of a single point of reference.3   
While it is evident so far is that actions and cognition are involved in the process. Weick is 
resolute about the sequence, arguing that at “the heart of enactment is the idea that cognition 
lies in the path of the action.”4 In his view, people “often don’t know what the ‘appropriate 
action’ is until they take some action and see what happens… it is less often true that 
‘situations’ determine appropriate action than that ‘preconceptions’ determine appropriate 
action.”5 This implies that ‘appropriate action’ is relative to the consequences of the 
preceding actions, except those elapsed actions were under the direction of, and testing prior 
conceptions. In this way, “frames guide conduct by facilitating the interpretation of cues 
turned up by that conduct.”6 Thus, not only do people’s actions effect changes to the 
environment, but these very actions are based on preconceptions developed in prior 
sensemaking, which he explains in this manner: “Actions enable people to assess causal 
beliefs that subsequently lead to new actions undertaken to test the newly asserted 
                                               
1 Weick (1969, p. 27) 
2 Weick (1988, p. 307) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 71) 
4 Weick (1988, p. 307)  
5 Weick (1988, p. 306) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 127) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 54 
relationships.”1 What Weick also highlights is uncertainty in the outcomes of actions, implied 
here by the assertion that the preconceptions (causal beliefs) are themselves undergoing 
assessment and updating on the basis of outcomes of recent actions. In other words, the 
testing of causal beliefs implies that the actor’s puzzle is ongoing. 
Another important aspect of Weick’s conceptualisation of the sensemaking perspective for 
the current study, and in particular enactment as a process which materialise situations, 
organisations and environments, is the relation frequently referenced thus far. The relation 
between human actors and their outputs, or lifted instead to the macro level of analysis, 
between organisations and their environments, Weick’s exposition sensitises us further to 
consequences of environmental changes for organisations which remain open to these inputs. 
As we have noted in identity construction, the exchange of inputs works also in reverse. 
Thus, “[p]eople create the environment as the environment creates them.”2 Therefore, Weick 
counsels that we should eschew anticipatory judgement. He draws from Follet to give nuance 
to this idea,3 pointing out that outcomes of this relation cannot be predicted. To elaborate, 
Weick points out that what is often observed as the outcome is a portion of an ongoing 
process.  
Some of the preceding expositions do indeed reveal realist ontological hues in Weick’s ideas, 
as when reference was made to realising and materialising. This “ontological oscillation” is 
however something Weick embraces. In Weick’s explanation “[p]eople engage in oscillation 
when they attempt to show how the supposedly hard, concrete, tangible aspects of 
organisational life are dependent on subjective constructions, but smuggle in realist 
assumptions that posit constraints and objects that exist independent of subjective 
constructions.”4 In this analysis, which is characteristically ontologically oscillating, Weick 
moves between the subjective quality of human actors’ preconceptions in enabling them to 
register that which is seen5 and its nuances for interpretation. This however also points to real 
objects which are seen, or may be realised/materialised. Not only is the material world 
socially constructed, in this fashion, but it influences further processes of sensemaking.  
                                               
1 Weick et al. (2005, p. 416) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 34) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 33 citing Follet, 1924) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 34) 
5 As he puts it, from a sensemaking standpoint, believing is seeing.  
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More important, the nuance to organisational actions is neatly coupled with the challenges or 
fortunes organisations come to face.1 If the “enactment perspective urges people to include 
their own actions more prominently in the mental experiments they run to discover potential 
crises of which they may be the chief agents”,2 organisational observers should then come to 
grips with sensitiveness to potential spinoffs of actions which go on into these organisations.  
 
3.5.4 Social  
Previous discussions about identity construction have already begun to highlight the social 
quality of the sensemaking processes. This section gives added detail. In sum, human conduct 
“is contingent on the conduct of others, whether those others are imagined or physically 
present.”3 Hence, sensemaking “is never solitary because what a person does internally is 
contingent on others. Even monologues and one-way communications presume an audience... 
[They] change as the audience changes.”4 Accordingly, organisational life is conceptualised 
as social just as the process of coordinated action is premised on shared meanings, by which 
people manage to achieve agreed upon goals.  
However, Weick goes beyond the narrative about shared meanings used often to explain how 
coordination is achieved within organisations, highlighting its limitations. He exemplifies that 
goals may be achieved through alternatives means such as “equivalent meanings, distributed 
meanings, shared experiences, overlapping views of ambiguous events, or nondisclosive 
intimacy.”5 All of these present interesting questions for how organisations achieve goals 
because assumptions may replace expressed agreements just as the quality of relations among 
people should influence organisational outcomes or processes. The key message is that 
organisations are social entities and that this quality of them has a bearing on human conduct.   
 
 
 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 31) 
2 Weick (1988, p. 316) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 39) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 40) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 42)  
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3.4.5 Ongoing Projects  
Weick asserts that the essence of sensemaking is that “reality is an ongoing accomplishment 
that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs.”1 
Closer to this is the notion that “pure duration never stops”,2 which has been discussed 
previously. The implication of duration on attention is thus a key issue. To attend to a certain 
portion of a flow (of experience) is to ignore other portions of it. Moreover, Weick views that 
it is not in the will of a human actor to step outside this flow and objectively observe it.3 That 
idea is captured well in the following statement: “The experience of sensemaking is one in 
which people are thrown into the middle of things and forced to act without the benefit of a 
stable sense of what is happening.”4 In other words, action unfolds into an unknown terrain 
after which assessment ensues, aimed at making sense of what is going on.    
The ongoing property of sensemaking sensitises us to challenges human actors face when 
events defy their expectations, in which case prior beliefs collapse under the weight of 
implausibility. It makes vivid the point that when human actors are faced with puzzles, the 
world does not pause so as the puzzling situation can be resolved first, following which one 
can continue to act with at least a sense of what is going on. In this state of “throwness”, 
human actors “cannot avoid acting”5 and the significance of traces (i.e. its residuum) of this 
action cannot be ignored.6  Human actors are therefore constantly involved in ongoing effort 
to accomplish a sense of reality, where acting in this flow is not just inevitable, but the 
consequences of the action can only be known afterwards.7 Retrospective effort to 
accomplish the meaning in what is going on should thus be constant if one is to have a sense 
of about what to do next, but in the pursuit of the answer, or meaning, that context is being 
changed.  
 
 
                                               
1 Weick (1993, p. 635) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 43) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 44) 
4 Weick (2001, p. 462) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 44) 
6 Weick (1988, p. 307) 
7 Weick (1995, p. 44) 
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3.4.6 Focused on and by Extracted Cues 
Weick explains that sensemaking tends to be swift, the associated curse of which is that it is 
harder to study the process than its outcomes. He proposes, nevertheless, that in order to 
study sensemaking processes, “we need to watch how people deal with prolonged puzzles 
that defy sensemaking, puzzles such as paradoxes, dilemmas, and inconceivable events.”1 
That is, because of the “sluggishness” imposed on the process as a consequence of associated 
effort to make sense, we can have a glimpse of how people notice and then interpret cues. He 
further explains that we “also need to pay close attention to ways people notice, extract cues, 
and embellish that which they extract.”2 There are two important factors, or “two points of 
reasoning” he highlights in relation to cue extraction. Namely, they are perceived to represent 
the entire “material” from which they are extracted, and their extraction implies some 
implication. The example he gives to clarify this, is one of observing a chemically unstable 
dye on a cloth as an implication of low quality of the entire cloth. The point here is that 
focusing on and extracting these cues from the material has some implication for the entire 
substance, despite that other parts of the substance may not be of equal character.3  
Weick describes extracted cues as “simple, familiar structures that are seeds from which 
people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring.”4 The metaphor of seed is used here 
to point out the open-endedness of sensemaking when focused by extracted cues. He 
analogises that while a seed may specify what kind of tree will become of it, it will never 
determine its exact shape and height. That analogy suggests the vague and indeterminate 
quality with which sensemaking processes develop.  
The noticing and interpretation of an extracted cue depends on “local contingencies” or 
context. However, noticing is additionally under the influence of the quality of that which is 
noticed, which is in some way salient given the local contingencies. An important message 
here is that “context affects the extraction of cues, and [that] ...small, subtle features can have 
surprisingly large effects on sensemaking.”5 Weick also highlights that organisational settings 
are made of different people and that they are political, leading to a range of influences on 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 49) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 49) 
3 The dye might for instance be unstable but the textile of higher quality and less susceptible to being torn. 
4 Weick (1995, p. 50) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 52) 
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how cues are enlarged. That suggests the possibility for multiple interpretations (later 
discussions clarify how multiple meanings are synthesised) and power in determining how 
the extracted cues are enlarged, or said alternatively, which meanings are sustained. He 
underlines that “the point to be retained is that faith in these cues and their sustained use as a 
reference point are important for sensemaking.”1 The faith in these cues lead people to act 
with some confidence, which suggest that they act as if the meanings derived from 
interpretation of these cues are real. Indeed they may, through the ensuing enactment, become 
real in consequence, a process which Weick equates to the unfolding of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.2  
 
3.4.7 Driven by Plausibility Rather than Accuracy 
Drawing from the work of Starbuck and Milliken on managerial perception, Weick advances 
the idea that even if accuracy was achievable, managers’ perceptions about their environment 
are seldom accurate.3 However, Weick does not see this as problematic given the 
sensemaking perspective’s concern with “plausibility, pragmatics, coherence, reasonableness, 
creation, invention, and instrumentality.”4 In line with this, he suggests that inaccuracies of 
the environment may still be beneficial if they serve as motivation for action.5  
Weick offers a variety of reasons6 why he considers that plausibility, rather than accuracy, is 
of primary concern in sensemaking. They include that (a) perception entails filtering of 
relevant stimuli for current projects from noise; (b) hindsight bias dictates that accuracy will 
be difficult to achieve because the past has been reconstructed in light of current 
understandings; (c) the time pressures of organisational life means that speed often takes 
precedence over accuracy; (d) the fleeting nature of sensemaking means that even if accuracy 
is to be achieved, it becomes relevant for short time; (e) the social nature of organisational 
life brings into question the attainability of assessing the accuracy of a group (e.g. 
executives), which is dynamic rather than static; (f) perceptions of accuracy are validated 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 53) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 54) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 57) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 57) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 57-60) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 57-60) 
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when ensuing actions enable resumption of and facilitation of ongoing projects, which means 
“accuracy is project specific and pragmatic”;1 (g) “[b]iased noticing may be bad for 
deliberation, but it is good for action”2; and (h) perceptions are themselves in part predictions, 
which may change what is prophesised just as the similarity of perceptions do not guarantee 
similar outcomes. What Weick considers important is a plausible account or good story 
which leads to a bolder, motivated action. This produces material that can be retrospectively 
attended to and interpreted in the interest of gaining understanding of what is going on.  
Weick asserts that “in studies of sensemaking… accuracy is nice, but not necessary.”3 To 
illustrate this, he often recounts of a story about a reconnaissance unit which got lost in 
snowy mountains, but used a map found in a pocket of one them to find their way back to 
their camp, only to discover later that it was a map of a different mountain.4 This highlights 
the resemblance of sensemaking processes to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Their bold action 
based on stronger faith in a map that is nevertheless faulty led to a discovery of a path to 
safety. 
Thus, plausibility in sensemaking brings attention to the fact that smallness may have large 
consequences if people take it more seriously and enlarge it through committed action. When 
the soldiers committed to a wrong map, their actions facilitated orientation and motivated 
continued effort, all of which ultimately saw them finding their way back. He extends this to 
organisational strategy, explaining that viewed from a sensemaking perspective, strategic 
plans function in an analogous way to self-fulfilling prophecies set in motion because they 
motivate action, and have the potential to validate the initial plans in their outcome.  
     Strategic plans are a lot like maps. They animate and orient people. Once people begin  
     to act (enactment), they generate tangible outcomes (cues) in some context (social), and  
     this helps them discover (retrospect) what is occurring (ongoing), what needs to be  
     explained (plausibility), and what should be done next (identity enhancement). Managers  
     keep forgetting that it is what they do, not what they plan, that explains their success.5 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 59) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 60) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 56) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 55) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 55-56) 
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Weick and associates assert that the sensemaking perspective’s character of plausibility is at 
odds with theories of rational decision-making, “which assume that the accuracy of 
managers’ perceptions determine the effectiveness of outcomes.”1 However, Weick cautions 
that “[t]he very ease with which people can slip into such self-sealing logics is part of the 
unease that all of us feel when we think about ‘plausibility’ as one of the properties of 
sensemaking.”2 The danger lies in plausible sense which gives confidence to actions which 
may be directed towards producing negative outcomes. 
 
3.5 Sensemaking in Organisations 
Weick highlights that organisational sensemaking and sensemaking in general are not 
identical. Principal to what distinguishes the two is that organisational settings are permeated 
with high expectations of accountability, are less social and less tolerant to mistakes. For this 
reason, Weick explains that “organizations challenge everything and ask for explanations of 
everything including rationality itself.”3 The point is to underline a different sort of 
expectation about how organisational members should conduct themselves and how such an 
expectation – of high accountability for one’s conduct and its outcomes – shapes 
organisational sensemaking processes. That is in contrast to sensemaking which unfolds in 
different contexts. Accordingly “much of organizational life is fair game for continual 
negotiation, controlled information processing, and mindful attention and how much needs to 
be reaccomplished and how pervasive is the need for accounting, justification, and 
rationalizing.”4 
Further discontinuities include “when imagined social conduct is converted into face-to-face 
social interaction, and …when one of the participants in the interaction is replaced and the 
interaction continues somewhat as it did before.”5 His conceptualisation sensitises the 
observer to what holds together organisational members’ orderly, coordinated action and their 
efforts in the direction of collective goals, which in their outcome realise what is then 
conceived as organised activity, environments or outcomes. Accordingly, Weick 
                                               
1 Weick et al. (2005, p. 415) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 84) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 64 citing Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 63) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 72) 
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conceptualises organisations "as social structures that combine the generic subjectivity of 
interlocking routines, the intersubjectivity of mutually reinforcing interpretations, and the 
movement back and forth between these two forms by means of continuous 
communication".1 Explained inversely, the two conceptual tools of intersubjectivity and 
generic subjectivity explicate an oscillating social process by which organising is achieved, 
where at the intersubjectivity level selves interact to establish routines. The innovative 
interaction at this level follows interruption or a sense of uncertainty which requires 
unfreezing or placing less control on formerly established routines to allow adjustments. 
When order is established, freezing follows, in which the tighter grip of the hand of control in 
generic subjectivity takes over so that these established routine can allow for substitunality. 
That allows people who did not partake in the establishment of those routines to take over 
from predecessors.2 Thus, intersubjectivity is more conducive to organisational change while 
generic subjectivity is favourable to stable environments. Nevertheless, Weick highlights that 
“[g]eneric subjectivity does not disappear completely when people interact to synthesis new 
meanings”,3 since it is existing routines and roles that are under modification.  
These expositions suggest that the social construction process begin at the lower level, where 
individual organisational members’ interpretations are synthesised, and the organising tools 
of interlocked routines are updated, before control becomes possible. However, the system 
continually oscillates between these levels, contingent on the level of discontinuity in their 
environments and the need to absorb changes into its processes. Core to this oscillation is 
communicating selves with varying levels of contribution and authority. Thus, 
intersubjectivity is the primary site where meanings are generated before they are crystallised 
into organisational roles and routines. As such, organisations “make sense, literally and 
figuratively, at the bottom.”4  The level above generic subjectivity, extrasubjectivite, is “a 
symbolic reality such as we might associate with capitalism or mathematics, each viewed as a 
subjectless batch of culture”5, and the level below intersubjectivity is the individual level of 
intrasubjectivity. These two levels can be thought of as relevant for the analysis of 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 170) 
2 Weick & Quinn (1999); Weick (1995, pp. 70-75)   
3 Weick (1995, p. 71)  
4 Weick (1995, p. 117) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 72) 
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sensemaking at individual and institutional level.    
 
3.6 Interruption of Ongoing Projects 
According to Weick, sensemaking “begins with the basic question, is it still possible to take 
things for granted? And if the answer is no, it has become impossible to continue with 
automatic information processing".1 Thus, human actors are constantly “immersed in flows, 
[and] they are seldom indifferent to what passes them by… [as] the reality of flows becomes 
most apparent when that flow is interrupted.”2 Weick equates interruption to “a signal that 
important changes have occurred in the environment.”3 The changes also evoke emotion, 
considered to feature “between the time that an organized sequence is interrupted and the 
time at which the interruption is removed, or a substitute response is found that allows the 
sequence to be completed.”4  
The involvement of emotion in the process triggers an activity in the autonomic nervous 
system, which has influence on both attention and recall. As Weick explains, what is more 
troublesome about this situation is that, as arousal increases, people focus more on that which 
is considered psychologically central, and away from that which is considered 
psychologically peripheral.5 In other words, actors at this stage will focus more on that which 
causes interruption, and pay less attention to context or other environmental factors which 
may nevertheless be crucial for dealing with the interruption. Therefore, any peripheral cues 
that may be necessary to make sense of the psychologically central phenomena would 
consequently be missed, making sensemaking more difficult.6 
Weick cautions that focusing only on the centre and neglecting the periphery may mean that 
one is getting better at performing a task which has become irrelevant. Thus “not only does 
interruption produce arousal but arousal uses up attention, reduces the cues that can be used 
in sensemaking, focuses attention of the interruption, and has the potential to escalate 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 14) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 45) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 46) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 46) 
5 Weick (1995 citing Mandler, 1984, p. 256) 
6 Weick (1995, pp. 101-102) 
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cognitive inefficiencies.”1 Arousal decreases efficiencies for "complex thought processes".2 
Both interruptions and arousal have the potential to lead to narrowed perception as well as 
heightening habitual response.3 This means the availability of attention for sensemaking 
should depend on the degree to which the pendulum swings between the extremes of taking 
things for granted and lack of any sense as a consequence of interruption. In the former, much 
of what is going on is perceived to reaffirm expectations, while in the latter case, held 
expectations collapse under sheer puzzlement. Weick refers to that latter extreme as 
cosmology episode, where “people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a 
rational, orderly system.”4 During interruption, the flow of the process starts with effort to 
resume the interrupted activity, and if resumption “is problematic, sensemaking is biased 
either toward identifying substitute action or toward further deliberation.”5 The ensuing 
illustration (Figure 2) depicts the process. 
 
Figure 2: Interruption model (general)  
 
Brought closer to organisations, Weick links emotion to interrupted organised activity (e.g. 
task completion through following standard operating procedures); drawing our attention to 
the fact that core to organised activity is expectation. For example, specific actions following 
a plan should be anticipated to lead some outcomes for which the plan is intended. More 
important, he highlights the fact that “the interruption of higher order, more pervasive plans 
should be more arousing than disruption of lower order plans.”6 These ideas should bring 
some light to the analysis of how organisational members deal with varying degrees of 
interruptions to (e.g. strategic) plans. In particular, the last point is worth some attention as 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 101) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 102) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 85) 
4 Weick (1993, p. 633); he uses the word vu jade, which is the opposite of déjà vu to explain the experience. 
5 Weick et al. (2005, p. 409) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 46) 
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the description “higher order, more pervasive plans” seems suitable for plans which are core 
to organisational wellbeing.  
He also suggests that “[a]rousal should build more quickly the more tightly organized an 
interrupted action sequence is.”1 Weick makes note that the propensity for arousal to heighten 
is contingent on the value of the plans as well as the actor’s capacity to find the substitute 
means to complete the interrupted activity. He views that people with richer repertory of, and 
thus, alternative responses to interruptions, or those who have the ability to improvise, should 
experience less arousal than it is the opposite case.  
 
3.7 Beliefs and Actions in Sensemaking   
Sensemaking “is an effort to tie beliefs and actions more closely together as when arguments 
lead to consensus on action, clarified expectations pave way for confirming actions, 
committed actions uncover acceptable justifications for their occurrence, or bold actions 
simplify the world and make it clearer what is going on or what it means.” 2 Arguments and 
expectations represent beliefs or cognitions, while commitment and manipulation represent 
actions. Weick explains that beliefs drive the sensemaking process through selective 
perception, which is explained by the rather counterintuitive saying that “believing is 
seeing.”3 He adds that “to believe is to initiate actions capable of lending substance to the 
belief”,4 which resemble the unfolding of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Weick has long argued that “too little attention has been paid to actions and too much to 
conditions, plans, and beliefs.”5 He expresses that “organizations are loosely coupled systems 
in which action is underspecified, inadequately rationalized, and monitored when deviations 
are extreme”.6 The degree of autonomous actions which go on into organisations and the 
puzzles of the traces they leave, should lead people to “search for explanations that are 
                                               
1 Weick (1955, p. 46) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 135) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 134) 
4 Weick (1995, pp. 133-134) 
5 Weick (1969, p. 30); As it was noted in the previous chapter, this symptom was evidently characteristic of the 
framework of Disruptive Innovation, and it was in particular discussed as one of its weaknesses.   
6 Weick (1995, p. 134) 
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appropriate in that context and that also preserve self-esteem”,1 given the high demands of 
accountability in organisational settings and the innate need for people to look socially 
competent. The ensuing sub-sections offer more flesh to these forms of sensemaking.2  
 
3.7.1 Sensemaking as Argument 
Weick acknowledges that despite the usefulness of the sensemaking recipe “how can I know 
what I think until I see what I say?” to convey the process imagery of sensemaking, it is too 
tidy to explain organisational sensemaking. There remains a degree of tension in 
organisations, because organisations are made of individual members whose beliefs are 
idiosyncratic, which should consequently lead to differentiated noticing and interpretations. 
Thus, idiosyncratic sense may be made, but its curse on organisation will be restrained 
coordination, unless they are synthesised towards achieving orderly interaction. Thus, 
argumentation is seen as a process in which the assortments of meanings are merged to define 
collective goals.  
The colourful description by Taylor and Van Every that sensemaking “is a way station on the 
road to a consensually constructed, coordinated system of action”3 highlights the role of 
communication in this form of sensemaking. Likewise, it underlines communication’s role in 
facilitating sensemaking processes in organizations.4 This also puts into the spot light 
organisational events where interactive talk is characteristic, such as meetings. Thus, 
argument sensemaking can be viewed as a tunnel into which diverging views may be brought 
and synthesised towards consensus on action and what it is hoped to achieve. Some 
arguments may gain lasting durability as “weak definitions of a situation, embedded in 
tentative initial proposals, gradually become elaborated and strengthened as proposers 
confront critics.”5 Despite the implicit message that such definitions should gain strength on 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, pp. 134-135) 
2 While argumentation is discussed here, it remains a lesser salient feature in debates of how beliefs and actions 
lead to constraints in the conduct of organisational members. It is therefore not offered as a dedicated section in 
the ensuing chapter, although its operation in organisational setting, and thus incumbents as discussed in this 
study, is assumed.  
3  Taylor & Van Every (2000 as cited by Weick et al. 2005, p. 409) 
4 Weick et al. (2005) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 145) 
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the basis of the weight of the argument, critics of sensemaking1 have lamented that Weick’s 
treatise leaves unexplained the role of power. Thus, if power is factored we may also expect 
that the definitions that are elaborated and strengthened may be those of powerful people, 
despite their weight, or lack of it.  
 
3.7.2 Sensemaking as Expectation 
Weick explains that beliefs, in the form of expectations, can be drivers for sensemaking 
through working as frames within which cues are noticed and interpreted.  He suggests that 
expectations have a tight grip on the sensemaking process as they “tend to filter input more 
severely, which raises a host of issues concerning accuracy, errors and the limits of social 
construction.”2 The suggested limit on social construction of meanings, denote traces of 
“group think” as it entails that common expectations within organisational members should 
lessen the chances that individuals will make differentiated interpretations of events. An 
important message is that although organisational roles, routines, and strategies “create the 
orderliness and predictability that we count on when we organize”, they nevertheless remain 
source of blind spots. His caution is that these blind spots “often conceal small errors that are 
getting bigger and can produce disabling brutal audit.”3 In other words, expectations may 
create organisational blind spots in perceiving environmental variations that may bring into 
question that which is expected, and this may in effect, delay noticing of threatening events.4 
As he explains it, since expectations “tend to be held more strongly… people tend to be more 
interested in confirming them than in rebutting or contradicting them.”5  
A further important point concerns the operation of expectations under turbulence, stating it 
in the following manner: “Time pressure encourages people to seek confirmation of 
expectancies, to cling to their initial hypothesis, and to prefer a narrative mode of thought to 
one that is paradigmatic and more data driven.”6 By this he means that accuracy is hard to 
achieve in turbulent environments, in which top-down, that is schema, rather than evidence 
                                               
1 e.g. Helms-Mills (2003) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 145) 
3 Weick & Sutcliffe (2007, p. 23) 
4 Weick & Sutcliffe (2007, p. 23) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 145) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 153) 
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driven, sensemaking will be dominant. Weick makes note that in fact expectations should be 
the primary drivers of sensemaking in times of uncertainty than are arguments, suggesting 
that the role of arguments in the process may only come later to validate the initial sensible 
structures first put in place by expectations.   
 
3.7.3 Sensemaking as Commitment 
Commitment sensemaking is important to understand because it embodies interacts that seed 
initial stages which lead to social order. Although the order is continuously reaccomplished, 
the glue facilitating that order is continually produced by justifications for prior interacts.1 In 
other words, this form of sensemaking explains how organisational members become bound 
to certain projects or conduct in or outside organisations based on prior actions, decisions or 
actions. It can be understood better if the phenomenological influences are underlined, 
because they highlight the behaviour of people as influenced by some perceived observers, 
and the continued need hence, to act rationally for ego-defensive reasons in the eyes of such 
observers.   
These ideas explain how people direct attention towards certain cues which are used as 
acceptable resources for justifying their actions, which does nevertheless not exclude biases 
towards to cues which support the justifications. As Weick expounds, “tenacious justification 
can produce selective attention, confident action, and self-confirmation. Tenacious 
justifications prefigure both perception and action, which means they are often self-
confirming.”2 The emerging picture is that of people engaged in a self-sustaining system 
which favours continued embellishment rather than the opposite. The conundrum is therefore 
that acknowledgement necessary for discontinuation may likely portray a negative 
(unwanted) image on the part of the actor. If the aim has been to achieve an image of 
rationality and social competence, failure at these should induce cognitive dissonance and 
efforts to remove related negative feeling. As the system builds up, people are not conscious 
to its operation and their continued hand in feeding it, which increases commitment, even 
though such commitment may be in the direction of jeopardy.    
                                               
1 Weick (2001, p. 15) 
2 Weick (1988, p. 310) 
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Thus, commitment follows from the trace of action for which one is evidently accountable, 
placing constraints on the actor’s subsequent conduct. Weick mentions three basic conditions 
which should result in commitment to actions, namely that (a) there is evidence that the 
actions took place, or they were publicly observed (visibility of the behaviour); (b) that the 
actions are irrevocable (irrevocability of behaviour); and (c) that there remains no doubt that 
the actor is responsible for the actions because they made the choice to act (volition of 
behaviour).1  
In organisational contexts, highlighted as placing higher demands on accountability and even 
question rationality itself, the pressure for accounting for one’s actions should be expected to 
be higher. Such result in increased need for justification for one’s intended actions or the 
outcomes of these actions, including outcomes of autonomous actions; particularly when they 
are negative. Weick highlights just how such justifications may heighten commitment, and 
thus continue to feed the system, pointing out that “[e]xplanations that are developed 
retrospectively to justify committed actions are often stronger than beliefs developed under 
other, less involving, conditions.”2 Here, an important factor to which attention should be 
drawn is the distinction between the contexts which have higher demands for justification of 
one’s actions and those which are less so. He further states that a “tenacious justification can 
produce selective attention, confident action, and self-confirmation”3 which begins to indicate 
how perceptions become influenced through selection of acceptable resources over those are 
considered, by the sensemakers, to be less so.  
Weick specifies that the “macrolevel recipe to produce commitment is a setting where there is 
action, publicity, choice, high stakes, and low tolerance of mistakes.”4 He further explains 
that “[l]ow tolerance of mistakes strengthens commitment by increasing the necessity to 
justify whatever one does although low tolerance could also mean weakened choice.”5 In 
other words, once the system of commitment begins to strengthen, it limits different choices 
which deviate from the initial choices made. That is because “[o]nce it becomes harder to 
change the behaviour than to change the beliefs about that behaviour, then beliefs are 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 157) 
2 Weick (1988, p. 310) 
3 Weick (1988, p. 310) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 158) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 158) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 69 
selectively mobilized to justify the act.”1 Weick cautions about the selective attention related 
to commitment and thus the influence on perception.  
     The dark side of commitment is that it produces blind spots. Once a person becomes  
     committed to an action, and then builds an explanation that justifies that action, the  
     explanation tends to persist and become transformed into an assumption that is taken  
     for granted. Once this transformation has occurred it is unlikely that the assumption  
     will be readily viewed as a potential contributor to a crisis.2 
The way in which the blind spot develops and the consequences thereof are worth watching, 
especially because, as pointed out, this may drive the behaviour right into the direction of 
jeopardy without the actor realising how the initial justification set a stage for the chimera. 
Thus, the blind spots also make it difficult for people to see where the problem lies, which 
perhaps is why the system of commitment becomes self-sustaining.  
The notion of self-sustaining ties to the reason commitment is also discussed as escalation, 
“where it is portrayed as a force that blocks withdrawal from situations of growing loss. [It] is 
viewed as a liability because it reduces flexibility, learning and adaptation.”3 All this has its 
genesis from the fact that “once people choose how to justify the actions that they choose to 
perform, they fix their frame within which their beliefs, actions and accusations will then 
make sense.” 4 That fixing of frames is worth some extension here because the question 
becomes what is the content of the frames to which beliefs are fixed and thus cues are 
interpreted within. Discussing interruption of projects and where people draw from to resume 
them, Weick and associates mention “institutional constraints, organizational premises, plans, 
expectations, acceptable justifications, and traditions inherited from predecessors”5 as the 
content. It is important here to remain sensitive to the type of reservoir (frame) which may be 
fixed as the place into which fitting resources or acceptable justifications (cues) are fit in to 
make sense. The fixing suggest that once this framework begins to function as the primary 
context in which cues are fit, it will continue to stubbornly remain the primary framework. 
Weick and associates make direct portrayal of where and how frames can be fixed, with 
further cues fit within them to make interpretations and thus construct meaning.   
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 156) 
2 Weick (1988, p. 310) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 161) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 164) 
5 Weick et al. (2005, p. 409) 
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     Bristol Royal Infirmary’s (BRI) [continued]  a pediatric cardiac surgery program for  
     almost 14 years in the face of data showing a mortality rate roughly double the rate of any  
     other center in England… [Investigations] concluded that there was a prevailing mindset 
     among people at BRI that enabled them to ‘wish away their poor results’ as a ‘run of  
     bad luck’ even though ‘there was evidence sufficient to put the Unit on notice that there  
     were questions to be answered as regards the adequacy of the service’.1 
They explain that the “mindset prevailed partly because surgeons constructed their identity as 
that of people learning complex surgical procedures in the context of unusually challenging 
cases.”2 Thus, once the premises which served as one of the primary frames within which to 
interpret death rate (cues) was that they are in a process of learning something difficult, the 
increased in death rate was seen to them as acceptable. The consequences should have, from 
an outsider’s perspective, such as the community served, been interpreted differently which 
should have been why the investigation was necessary to begin with.  
Weick advises that “if we want to understand the sense people make of the world, one place 
to start is to inquire about earlier binding actions and the acceptable justifications that were 
available when the binding took place.”3 He also stresses that just because “justifications may 
be adopted for ego-defensive reasons, that does not mean they are necessarily inaccurate or 
fanciful.”4 By that he highlights that given the focused attention on that which is justified and 
the need to legitimise it, sensemakers begin to see more details on it, which further gives 
them confidence about what is being justified.  It is therefore observable that commitment 
may lead people into treacherous terrains, just as it may be beneficial in strengthening or 
motivating actions. Also, it may start with small sensible structures which are continuously 
embellished into those which are larger and more impactful.    
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Weick et al. (2005 citing Kennedy, 2001, pp. 247-248) 
2 Weick et al. (2005, p. 416) 
3 Weick 1995, pp. 156-157) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 158) 
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3.7.4 Sensemaking as Manipulation 
According to Weick, manipulation “involves stabilizing an otherwise unstable set of events 
so that it is easier to explain them.”1 That is just another way of saying manipulation 
“involves simplification of the perceived world by operations on the word itself rather than 
on the perceiver.”2 The message conveyed is that in manipulation, the unfolding of the 
actions is driven by pursuit of orderliness that fulfils some aspirations. For example, 
organisations use different manoeuvres to make their environments hospitable.3 Weick sees 
the unfolding of such actions, in accordance with the beliefs under which they are directed, 
functioning in a mode analogous to self-fulfilling prophecies.4 That means the incipient 
beliefs’ propensity for self-validation is increased when the beliefs strengthen the actions.  
To the degree that these environments lead to selective perception, as for instance, when the 
expectations limit cues noticed5, manipulation has some constraints as well. In relation to 
this, Weick argues that the view that “environments can be manipulated collapses the 
deterministic/choice dimension, because people choose their constraints…once people 
choose how to justify the action that they chose to perform, they fix the frame within which 
their beliefs, actions, and associations will then make sense.”6 That is, once an intention to 
manipulate an environment for certain ends exists, rationalisation of the actions taken forms a 
pillar around which the sensemaking process pulls towards, selecting some cues from the 
environment while filtering out contradictory cues, which may nevertheless be beneficial. 
Thus, Weick sensitises us to the role of actions in constructing constraints regardless of what 
may have been an intention, given that once a justification is made, the subsequent actions 
and cognitions will be interpreted within the belief on which the justification hinges. But this 
also suggests that the justification may in consequence redefine that intention by seeing only 
those aspects which support the justification in the developing story.  
 
                                               
1 Weick (1995, p. 135) 
2 Weick (1995, p. 135) 
3 Weick (1995, p. 164) 
4 Weick (1995, p. 134, 163) 
5 Weick (1995, p. 26) 
6 Weick (1995, p. 164);  
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In short, action driven sensemaking sensitises us to what people do about their enacted 
environments. The trace may be a pillar around which the ensuing sensemaking is anchored 
when accountability for the actions that produced them matter, just as the equivocality in this 
enacted world may require efforts, or said in the language of this section, manipulation to 
make it orderly. 
 
3.8 Scholarly Criticism of the Sensemaking Perspective 
The sensemaking perspective has often been criticised for paying less attention to power 
relations.1 That is because much of the ideas Weick presents assume that organisational 
participants have an equal role to play in the process. However, that obscures the fact that the 
sense made by more influential participants may, through processes of sensegiving, for 
instance, 2 receive more currency over that of the less influential participants. That has 
prompted Weick and associates to suggest that future inquiry of sensemaking and power may 
direct attention to such questions as “how does power get expressed, increase, decrease, and 
influence others?”3 They nevertheless point to some modest answers already provided by 
scholars in this regard thus far, despite being less developed. On a more general level, these 
answers point to more than the sensegiving by more influential participants, highlighting a 
pervasive way they may extend their control. For instance, through dictating how other 
participants make sense through the seven properties of sensemaking. That includes “things 
like control over cues, who talks to whom, proffered identities, criteria for plausible stories, 
actions permitted and disallowed, and histories and retrospect that are singled out.”4 
Therefore, powerful people may for highlight which cues are more important to focus on in 
organisations, and thus directing organisational attention or resources towards those cues.  
Another aspect of the sensemaking perspective which is considered to be less developed is 
how emotion imbues and thus influence sensemaking processes,5 although this aspect has 
relatively received better attention in comparison to the issue of power prior discussions 
                                               
1 Helms-Mills (2003) 
2 Helms-Mills (2003) 
3 Weick et al. (2005, p. 418) 
4 Weick et al. (2005, p. 418) 
5 Maitlis & Christianson (2014); Weick et al. (2005) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 73 
about interruption and affect indicated.   
  
3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the sensemaking perspective, explicating its unfolding, which follows 
recursive interplay between cognition and action, materialising environments that become 
opportunities and constraints for organisational members. The chapter discussed the historical 
background of the ideas which underpin the sensemaking perspective, and in particular 
highlighted some of the core concepts which underpin the sensemaking framework. The 
chapter also explained and discussed the seven properties of sensemaking. This was followed 
by a look at a sensemaking perspective on organisations, which indicated features of 
organisational sensemaking, contrasted with every day sensemaking. The principal 
distinction between the two was that organisational sensemaking unfolds under conditions of 
greater need for accountability and justification, which is the case with everyday 
sensemaking. Then followed a look at the concept of interruption, and how it engenders 
sensemaking, directed towards search for meanings, first to enable resumption of the 
interrupted activity, and secondly, towards substitute action or further deliberation, should 
resumption fail. The chapter also brought into view the role of beliefs and actions in driving 
sensemaking, before critical analysis of sensemaking was discussed.   
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Chapter 4: Making Sense of the Innovator’s Dilemma  
4.1 Introduction 
Following presentations of the theory of disruptive innovation and the sensemaking 
perspective in the two preceding chapters, the current chapter proceeds to explore the role of 
sensemaking in shaping incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. The core focus of 
the chapter is to try to establish links between the activity of sensemaking, which has been 
demonstrated as constructing organisations and the environments they confront, and 
incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. The debates begin with a recap of the 
contrast between rationality leading to and rationalisation of actions. The former shapes 
assumptions of the theory of disruptive innovation, while the latter is well entertained in the 
sensemaking perspective. The debates continue to explore the potential role for identity 
construction processes to shape incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. The debates 
about organisational identity are focused mostly on beliefs organisational members hold 
about who they are and the expectations nested in those beliefs, which include how outsiders 
view and perhaps should treat them. Thereafter, attention is directed to organisational actions, 
demonstrating how organisational members may enact environments which become the 
constraints they confront. Further, discussions about plausibility follow, the arguments of 
which highlight the challenge incumbent members may face in identifying an emerging 
disruption. Then the interruption of ongoing projects model is presented and discussed, 
highlighting that it has vignettes of much of what has been discussed in prior sections, before 
a conclusion is provided.  
 
4.2 Rationality for Choice versus Post-decisional Rationalisation  
To recap, the theory of disruption has its arguments positioned ahead of a point at which 
decisions are made, assessing the motivations, beliefs and rationality (or its lack thereof), as 
they lead to or shape those decisions. Accordingly, it builds argument on these bases to 
explain what shapes incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. However, as to what 
consequences follow from the actions resulting from those decisions has not been much of a 
concern. It has nevertheless been demonstrated so far that such an approach leads to 
theoretical obstacles which can be addressed from a sensemaking perspective. Boland does a 
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great job in drawing the line between where Christensen stands and the opposite side of the 
line in his explanation that decision-making “is prior to and culminates in the action of a 
human being.”1 On the other hand, sensemaking “is concerned with making things that have 
already happened meaningful to us. It follows from, and is based on, the prior action of a 
human being.”2 What he explains is that the dominant focal points of the two look at 
contrasting sides of time as it relates to actions to explain human conduct. The sensemaking 
perspective swings between the two lines, although it is less concerned about the future and 
how it influences perception and rather explains how reflective thought guides the action that 
is unfolding into an unknowable and indeed sometimes treacherous terrain.   
As previously highlighted, human decision-making is under the fate of bounded rationality 
resulting in decision-making processes which are good enough, or satisfying.3 Burgelman and 
Grove highlight another challenge with such an assumption: “In spite of the best attempts at 
business and engineering schools to inculcate rational analysis, when the business gets into 
serious difficulties or key managerial assumptions are challenged, objective analysis takes 
second seat to personal/emotional reactions.”4 The point here is not to deprive rationality of 
its rightful place in organisational processes, or more precisely, attempts people make to 
achieve it, but rather to revisit conspicuous cautions already flagged on it. Further, the 
sensemaking perspective does assume some rationality of organisational members, but only 
contextually and plausibly so. Indeed, Weick asserts that despite the potential for being good 
at making decisions, organisations can still falter if they fail at making good sense.5  
The jarring gaps between the aspired goals in plans and the outcomes of those plans 6 
stubbornly place demands on theories of organisations to account for the actions of 
organisational members instead of focusing just on their supposed rational or irrational 
intentions. This is perhaps a consequence of the slippages between espoused theories of 
actions and what in effect is done.7 The importance can be stressed by underlining that 
actions leave in their wake trails which, along with their intended and unintended outcomes, 
have to pass the test of accountability and high expectations, which make up organisational 
                                               
1 Boland (2008, p. 55) 
2 Boland (2008, p. 55) 
3 Simon (1991) 
4 Burgelman and Grove (1996, p. 19) 
5 Weick (1993, p. 636) 
6 Brusnsson (2007); Burgelman & Grove (1996) 
7 Argyris & Schon (1974) 
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contexts. Such assumptions as decisions which mirror actions1 already fail this test because, 
as we have seen, some decisions which are said to have led to the actions are sometimes only 
constructed or modified after the action has already elapsed, in the interest of accountability. 
Similarly, well planned projects do not always lead to intended goals, which open up a 
window for finding acceptable justifications to construct accounts for the outcomes, which, 
despite being plausible, may not necessarily be accurate. These invented stories are presented 
as though one has been rational or at least justifying why they may have failed to be so, at the 
time of or prior to taking actions. 
While the concept of accountability as a crucial feature of organisational contexts is clear in 
sensemaking, it is implied in discussions of disruptive innovation theory. The suggestion that 
incumbents are publicly traded makes a straightforward example. Nevertheless, the mere fact 
of their existence as organisations suggest that Weick’s sensemaking perspective and its 
explication of accountability as an important feature of organisations mean Christensen’s 
organisations of focus bear a similar characteristic. The point here is to underline 
accountability as a core issue in organisations, which highlights the necessity for both efforts 
to act rationally and to justify outcomes for which people are responsible. However, cognitive 
biases related to efforts to act rationally and rationalisation for outcomes of actions already 
taken are like two roads going in opposite directions, each leading to the end of the other. The 
end of rationalisation for outcomes is a position constructed following the arrival (outcomes), 
driven towards legitimising why this position was reached. Conversely, the end position of 
rational action (why choosing the alternative) is first specified, and justification for why it 
must be reached constructed beforehand.  
Although negative outcomes of clear choices can be judged by observers as being 
consequences of error in judgement, rationalisation of decisions highlights the possibility that 
people may alternatively be motivated to cover these presumed errors in order to look 
accountable, to preserve their self-esteem (e.g. the view that they are excellent leaders). 
Brunsson has in particular remarked that when faced with negative consequences of their 
decisions, organisations disguise in order to cover up for the discrepancies.2 His point is 
similar to the “postdecisional” attempts to reconstruct meanings of prior decisions, which is 
                                               
1 Christensen & Bower (2003, p. 18) 
2 Brunsson (2007) 
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aimed towards influencing how negative consequences are perceived, as discussed in the 
sensemaking perspective.  
The point is not to disparage arguments that errors in judgement do occur, but to shift the 
focal point towards the conduct which may ensue when actors perceive or anticipate such 
judgements from observers, and the fate of vestiges of such conduct. For instance, it could 
lead to manipulative conduct as people make efforts to reorganise their environments so that 
it remains favourable to what they aimed to achieve (e.g. disrupted projects which were 
ongoing). What these expositions highlight is that rationalisation of actions will, consciously 
or unconsciously, function in the service of portraying decision makers as rational, which is 
what they have set out to portray themselves as in the first place.1 However, that may come at 
a cost, which will begin to be visible from the next section, although the more related later 
debates on organisational actions have better vignettes of how such costs may be incurred. 
 
4.3 Identity and Disruption 
This section addresses the issue of identity as it relates to disruptive innovations, arguing that 
the concept of identity construction presents a multifaceted way to understand incumbents’ 
conduct vis-à-vis disruptive innovations. A reasonable place to start is to highlight that from a 
vantage point of sensemaking leadership positions, and therefore the identities, of incumbents 
are a salient feature worth watching. Hence it is crucial feature worth analysing so as to 
establish its potential links with the challenges these organisations face in dealing with 
disruptive innovations. However, understanding the linkage is contingent on the clarity as to 
the contexts in which identities or leadership positions are relevant, and more important, the 
boundaries of those contexts within which such relevance prevails. This clarification is seen 
as necessary because there remain some ambiguities placed by indiscriminate references to 
industry and markets in the theory of disruptive innovations. The mind-set which guides this 
analysis is that moving between different contexts (markets or industries) will require 
organisations to construct relevant identities suitable for the new context. This is argued to be 
not a mere issue of identity construction, which is core in sensemaking, but also a factor 
which leads to direct impingement on organisational strategy. 
                                               
1 Boland (2008, p. 61) 
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4.3.1 Organisational Identity and New Markets 
It is important to highlight from the beginning that no clear distinction between industries1 
and markets is made in the theory of disruptive innovation, which is exemplified soon. To 
begin with, an existence of demarcations created by different innovations is notable in 
Markides’ explanation that “[d]ifferent kinds of innovations have different competitive 
effects and produce different kinds of markets.”2 Although it is also notable that Christensen 
differentiates between low-end, new-market, as well as sustaining markets,3 it is argued in 
this section that there are potential limits to these categorisations. Hence, a clarification 
which is made to pointing out that more than different value networks, there are varying gaps 
between different markets. The demarcations and the related gaps are demonstrated as 
instigating identity puzzles in incumbents.  
 
4.3.1.1 Industry versus Market 
The first line of the introduction of The Innovator’s Dilemma states: “This book is about the 
failure of companies to stay atop their industries [italics added] when they confront certain 
types of market and technological change.”4 Here the focus is on the industry, but the last line 
of the same paragraph states the following: “It is about well-managed companies that have 
their competitive antennae up, listen astutely to their customers, invest aggressively in new 
technologies, and yet still lose their market dominance [italics added].”5 And so is a 
statement he makes in a recent publication: “Across industries ranging from computers to 
retail to steel, leading firms failed to remain dominant in their respective markets [italics 
added].”6 A loss of market dominance and industry dominance may be simultaneous but it is 
not necessarily the same thing (expounded further down).  
                                               
1 The label industry is used here to generally refer to a major sector (computer manufacturing) within which 
different niches of markets (e.g. desktops, laptops, etc.) fall. 
2 Markides (2006, p. 19) 
3 The concept of new market disruptive innovations is itself an upshot of Markides’ (2006) frustration that 
Christensen’s work was initially applied to technological innovations but was later indiscriminately applied 
beyond its initial scope.  Thus, the concept was introduced to address Markides’ point, but that may have not 
been sufficient. 
4 Christensen (2016, p. xiii) 
5 Christensen (2016, p. xiii) 
6 Christensen et al. (2018, p. 7) 
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The lack of clear distinction between an overall industry, for example computer 
manufacturing, and segments of this industry, which could include desktops computers or 
laptops is problematic for reasons stated. That should also benefit the ability to achieve some 
precision as to the loss of leadership positions. Thus, is the loss related to a market or an 
industry? Is the loss of leadership necessarily a failure? These questions will be clarified as 
we go along. To begin with, a desktop manufacturer could, as an example, be an overall 
industry leader on the basis that it accounts for the majority of sales in the computing industry 
(e.g. 80%). Another firm may be a player in this same industry, and have a market share of 
80% in sales in the laptops segment, which may nevertheless account for just 20% of overall 
industry sales, meaning both these firms are leaders in their respective markets. This is 
despite the desktop manufacturer taking the overall industry lead. Notable, and an important 
feature of the theory of disruptive innovation, is that small firms initiate specific market 
niches, which are smaller in the beginning but grow to become larger. Whether they are 
within the existing value network or not, if they reach a point of disruption, they would 
ultimately overtake previously dominant firms they ultimately supplant.  
From a strategic point of view, incumbents consciously define who they are going to serve as 
their primary customers (market) and by the same token, who they will exclude. Furthermore, 
the fact that incumbents’ offerings differ from those of entrants suggest that these two 
assemblages of firms define themselves differently. This is the same point Markides makes as 
previously (4.3.1) quoted. Tripas highlight the same point, which is more directly linked to 
the current debates, when she says: “Even seemingly minor shifts from a technological 
standpoint may challenge the existing organizational identity if, by pursuing the new 
technology, the organization violates the core features associated with its existing identity.”1 
Thus, whether the disruptive innovation is low-end or new market, from an incumbents’ point 
of view, both the markets associated with these two different categories are new. This 
distinctiveness has implications for current organisational identity just as it will impinge of 
the existing strategy. It invites redefinition of who organisational members think they are and 
how they do things. It violates existing expectations.   
 
                                               
1 Tripsas (2009, p. 441) 
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4.3.1.2 Sustaining and Disruptive Innovations Demarcations  
Not only do lines between markets, including low-end and sustaining innovations, exist but 
they exist because they are put in place, or said in the language of sensemaking, enacted 
(discussed further later) by the organisations themselves. They are socially constructed, for 
instance, through strategy formulation in which parameters are set to define the space within 
which the organisation will operate, whether these are geographical or it is achieved through 
segmentation of the market. Such concepts as low-end and new-market disruption point to 
some contexts which incumbents had excluded from their core strategic focus, or never 
conceived of which by default suggest the market-to-be would have never been within the 
definition of current strategies of these firms.   
The point is that incumbents are aware of these boundary demarcations because they 
constructed them so as to distinguish themselves and give their existence a clearly defined 
purpose. Beyond their individual organisation demarcations lie groupings of organisations 
which identify themselves alike and compete against one another.1  Indeed Christensen 
recognises these demarcations and groupings, notable for instance in this observation: 
“Digital Equipment Corporation created the minicomputer market and was joined by a set of 
other aggressively managed companies… But each of these companies in turn missed the 
desktop personal computer market.”2 Thus, in this grouping of each should have identified 
itself more generally as minicomputer manufacturer, who competed against other players in 
the segment, yet each of them would have still tried to distinguish itself among its 
competitors. Being ranked a leader in a market is a clear example of how an organisation may 
begin to distinguish itself.  
 
4.3.1.3 Relevance of Leadership Positions to Markets 
Organisational rankings play an important role in as far as identification is concerned.3 Also, 
organisations do not only identity themselves by the markets within which they play, but also 
through the modes by which they achieve their strategic goals, symbolised previously as 
                                               
1 Gioia (1998); Porac et al. (1989) 
2 Christensen (2016, p. xiv) 
3 Elsbach & Kramer (1996) 
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“tools”. The latter feature of identity mirrors well the point made by Tripas’ as it has been 
highlighted (4.3.1.1). Such identification is recognised, but nevertheless although 
unsurprisingly, unappreciated by Christensen. Such references to minimill firms to define 
firms which use minimill technology to make steel or integrated mills as those which “take 
their name from the integrated process of transforming iron ore, coal, and limestone into final 
steel shapes”1 substantiate this point. Such meanings are not simply differentiating the firms 
but also play a critical role on how these firms define who they are, and how they differ from 
their competitors.2 Thus, incumbents’ identities may be anchored on such features as markets, 
within which they are embedded, the mode by which they compete within these markets, and 
their rankings.3  
Following the analysis here in conjunction with those which have been made so far, a firm 
which should successfully avoided losing industry leadership would have to transition from 
its home segment into a new market which is overtaking its own. The challenge for retaining 
a leadership position in the industry is already noticeable – the previously leading firm will 
not automatically be a leader in the new market until it enters it. To become dominant it 
would have to enter the market and grow to become larger than the players already in the 
segment, or acquire a firm already leading in this emerging segment. The question which 
naturally follows then is, when an organisation is said to have lost a leadership position, does 
this position relate to its former home segment of the industry, the new segment, or the 
overall industry? That question is relevant also because a firm which has lost an industry 
leadership position may remain a leader in its home segment. One of the reasons for this is 
that disruption does not always lead to the total removal of incumbents’ markets, but also 
does not always reach a point at which the markets size initiated becomes bigger than 
incumbents’ segment.4 Thus, some firms continue to operate in their home markets post 
disruption, either providing their offerings to a smaller market or because their offerings still 
appeal to a greater market share – as when disruption did not overtake their markets.  They 
may, conceivably, remain leaders in the niche markets.   
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, p. 87) 
2 Porac et al. (1989) 
3 But we are also beginning to see frames within which environmental cues may be fit and make sense of 
changes. From the sensemaking perspective, such efforts as to remain in a leadership position within a particular 
market may bear incipient minimal structure, with remaining a leader becoming a fixed frame within which cues 
enlivened by enactment are fit and continue to feed and embellish the initial minimal structure. 
4 Charitou & Markides (2003) 
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IBM, which is the pioneer of the mainframe computer market, and remains a leader in this 
segment to date, makes a straightforward example. Even though it is referenced as having lost 
its leadership position when the minicomputer segment overtook the mainframe, and thus  
dominating the computing industry, the fact remains that IBM is still a leader in the 
mainframe market.1 Christensen has in some cases even treated belated entry into the new 
segments as failure, even though some of these firms retained leadership in their markets and 
have later grown to become dominant again in the new segment.2 Indeed, the delay in 
entering the new segments is considered to decrease the chances for successfully retaining 
dominant industry positions by occupying a bigger share of the new segment (that is, if this 
segment has overtaken incumbents’ home market share). However, belatedness does not 
always equal to a failure. With that said, it is evident that the leadership positions, which may 
be an important aspect of identities of incumbents, are tied to the firms’ core market 
segments. The important point to retain is that identity meanings, such as leadership 
positions, which are crucial as demonstrated through the sensemaking perspective, do not 
automatically become applicable to the new context.  
 
4.3.1.4 Demarcation Hopping and Potential Obstacles 
From here, an important factor to revisit and expound on is that moving between these 
contexts should place demands on sensemaking processes driven to answer two key 
questions, namely, what is out there, and who should we be in order to deal with it? The 
sensemaking perspective has suggested that in addressing these two points of the puzzle, the 
latter will carry more weight. Rephrased in the language of this chapter, the question of who 
incumbents should seek to be or define themselves as when they shift from their home 
markets into a new market, will present more difficulty than defining the new market it has to 
enter (Intel example to follow underscores the same point). From Christensen’s point of view, 
the focus is limited to the impetus or lack of it, to investing in the new market, as dictated by 
assumptions of financial gain. If there is no motivation, as a consequence of perceptions of 
lesser profits offered by the new market relative to the size of the firm and its growth 
                                               
1 Vanian (2016) 
2 Weeks (2015, p. 419) 
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aspiration, the argument is that incumbents would not move into the new market. 
Presentations in this subsection offer an alternative explanation.   
It is demonstrated that to “hop” between different markets requires these firms to construct 
identities congruent with the new market. The two points of the puzzle just mentioned 
suggest that this redefinition will be a challenge. It requires the discarding of currently held 
meanings established about whom organisational members think they are, and the 
construction of new ones. It is a case of moving from some sense of order to uncertainty and 
the actions which are associated with the movement are neither inconsequential nor 
avoidable. These points matter particularly in light of arguments presented earlier, namely 
that identity meanings do not necessarily transition into the new markets with these firms. 
The possibility that incumbents may continue to define themselves in terms of well-
established identities rooted in markets within which they operate in longer than it is safe 
cannot be precluded. Meanings such as being a leader could especially be stronger because 
they define the organisation in a more prestigious way to both organisational members and 
outsiders, which should be motivating to and imbue a greater sense of self-esteem to internal 
members.  
The drive to focus on, making effort and wishing to remain leaders can function as a 
metaframe within which a leading firm interpret market changes just as it is its basis for 
formulating or continuously redefining its strategy. That extends the explanation to the 
possibility that current identities may consequently function as filters, disabling an earlier 
welcoming of and interpretation of salient cues about market changes. The prior point 
rephrased then, it is possible that incumbents may hold on to established identity meanings 
such as being leaders in their current market longer than it is safe to do so. Christensen gives 
tantalising acknowledgements about incumbents’ tendencies to hold on to and thus defend 
their leadership positions.1 Nevertheless and perhaps for the reason that the propositions of 
the theory of disruption do not recognise identity beliefs as important, he continues to explain 
what shapes this conduct as a problem of asymmetric motivation. Limitations to this 
explanation versus current arguments will be demonstrated in the ensuing debates. For now, 
suffices it to emphasise that this latter point maybe the more challenging to incumbents than 
Christensen acknowledges.  
                                               
1 E.g. Christensen (2016, p. 47) 
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Figures 3: Disruption trajectory (computer industry)  
 
Again, the introductory section of The Innovator’s Dilemma will be helpful here, which for 
instance states the following: “IBM dominated the mainframe market but missed by years the 
emergence of minicomputers… no other major manufacturer of mainframe computers 
became a significant player in the [italics added] minicomputer business.” 1 Notably, this was 
a single instance of disruption and other instances recurrently followed in the same industry. 
The point is, for a firm such as IBM to have transitioned into different new markets (figure 3) 
which emerged and dominated the overall computing industry over the years, it would have 
required the redefinition of its identity to match the different markets it would have had to 
enter.2 The recurrence of these changes should in particular heighten the challenge given the 
frequency with which established identity meanings would be destabilised in the process of 
making effort to move from one context to the next.  
However, the more challenging problem would have been holding a lead across these 
different markets because it would have required not only redefining the new identity but also 
the letting go of such strong identity meaning as being a leader in a particular market. It is the 
ensuing example from The Innovator’s Dilemma which however, inadvertently, unravels 
some of the core arguments made in the theory of disruption, just as it clarifies and support 
the arguments advanced in this chapter. Christensen explains how Intel (incumbent) 
transitioned from sustaining offerings to, or as he puts, discovering a disruptive market as 
follows: 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, p. ixv) 
2 The only exclusion would have been playing in these markets through acquiring firms in the market or setting 
up stand-alone firms in each of these different markets as they emerge. The work of Christensen indicates that 
this has been a strategy used by some firms which avoided disruption, but no firm he observed seems to have 
repeatedly adopted the same strategy.   
Mainframes Minicomput
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     Its storied success is even more remarkable because, when its initial leadership position  
     in the DRAM market began crumbling between 1978 and 1986 under the onslaught of  
     Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, Intel transformed itself from a second-tier DRAM  
     company into the world’s dominant microprocessor manufacturer.1 
Although Christensen paints a somewhat neat picture of how Intel made this transition, 
Burgelman and Grove give an “untidy" version of what took place. Their explanation is as 
follows:  
     Intel's exit from the DRAM business, for instance, was delayed by the fact that top  
     management was still holding on to Intel's identity as a memory company [italics added], 
     even though the company had become a non-factor in DRAMs with 2-3 percent market  
     share by 1985… Getting through the period of immense change requires reinventing—or  
     perhaps rediscovering—the company's identity. Since companies and their leaders are shaped  
     by their past, this is truly hard.2  
It is important to note that Andy Grove was one of the leaders at Intel at the time. It must also 
be noted that Christensen used this example for demonstrating how organisations discover 
and move into new markets. The example’s usefulness relates to how it outlines an 
organisation’s move from one market to the next, which is just what incumbents would have 
to do when their home markets are disrupted. In fact, Intel had to move from its core market 
because it was no longer profitable as the Japanese firms invaded its market with cheaper 
products, a case similar to how disruption impacts incumbents’ markets. This example defies 
the narrative provided by Christensen on many levels. Conversely, it sums up some of the 
arguments made so far, which are themselves based on the discussions of identity 
constructions as presented in the preceding chapter. First, it underscores the point that 
organisational leaders may hold on to established identity meanings, but also highlights the 
necessity for and the related challenge for redefining the current identity. A further 
noteworthy point is that Intel had as minuscule as a 2-3% share of the market it formerly 
dominated (DRAMs) and yet its leaders continued to define the firms according to that fading 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, p. 153) 
2 Burgelman and Grove (1996, p. 15); the authors further suggest that holding on to identity meanings may have 
led to the failure of many other leading to swiftly move into new markets before their home markets shrunk or 
diminished into insignificance. For instance, they mention that “IBM's slowness in taking advantage of the 
RISC microprocessor architecture (which it had invented in the mid-1970s) was, no doubt, attributable, at least 
in part, to top management's perception of IBM as the leading ‘mainframe computer’ company in the world. 
Similarly, Microsoft's relatively weak past strategy in networking operating systems probably was, in part, due 
to their corporate identity throughout the 1980s as the ‘desktop operating system’ company.” (p. 16).  
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shadow of its former self. Also, indication by the quote is that organisational members 
identified themselves by the form of offering (a memory company) by their organisation, not 
the microprocessors which formed a bigger share of their offerings. Even of further 
importance is that the changing of the company’s identity from DRAMs to microprocessors 
manufacturer is noted as having had a delaying effect. 
Christensen further details how Intel entered the new market prior to formal strategic 
decisions, in which only in retrospect managers realised that the organisation had a sizeable 
share in the new market. It is important to note here that Intel was already profitable in the 
microprocessor manufacturing business before formal decisions about entering the market, 
and efforts to change the firm’s identity from DRAM to microprocessor manufacturer were 
made. In Christensen’s words, Intel moved “away from the DRAM business and into 
microprocessors— without an explicit management decision to do so.”1 This contradicts the 
view that decision-making processes in incumbents sow the seed for incumbents challenge to 
move into new markets. But it also highlights a theoretical obstacle of the theory to the 
degree that it defies assumptions that organisational actions always proceed from clearly 
defined decisions.  
Furthermore, the effect of asymmetric motivation and value networks do not account for why 
Intel found it hard to change its identity from a DRAM into microprocessor business, which 
may perhaps explain why this was observed as being “remarkable”. In the case of Intel, 
formal decisions to enter the new market followed only when the firm was already profitable 
in this market, which leads to the second point. Christensen emphasised profitability, the key 
issue in the asymmetric motivation concept, as the core issue which lead to incumbents 
lacking motivation to move into new markets. But as this example shows, Intel was already 
profitable in this market but it nevertheless found it difficult to change its identity from 
DRAM to microprocessor manufacturer. Although it ultimately moved into the market, its 
identity delayed it from discarding meanings related to its prior market and identifying itself 
with the new market as earlier as it should have. Indeed, Christensen explains that moving 
into this market could not have been based on clear choices as “so little was known of the 
microprocessor market at that time [i.e. prior to entering the market, hence] explicit analysis 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, p. 153) 
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would have provided little justification for a bold move into microprocessors.”1 That is, if we 
follow from some of Christensen’s core arguments, it should have been easier for Intel to 
change from DRAM business to microprocessor considering that Intel was already facing 
trouble in its home market while profiting in the new market.  
Even if organisations made an intentional move to enter the emerging market however, the 
sensemaking research suggest that there exists another challenge, which relates to how 
organisational members construct an identity, which should be congruent with the new 
context.2 The sensemaking process of identity construction has to be ensued by sensegiving 
processes in which leaders make efforts to pass on their envisioned identities to 
organisational members, the new meanings of which may conflict with the old, which 
increases the potential for identity dissonance. Whether this becomes a successful process or 
not, what is suggested is that it may lead to delays. Signs of possible identity dissonance are 
notable in the Intel’s example where offerings were at a certain stage incongruent with their 
perceived identity.    
In closing, these debates in part answer the following puzzle: “why have incumbent firms 
generally intensified their commitments to conventional technology, while starving efforts to 
commercialize new technologies-even while the new technology was gaining ground in the 
market?”3 Although debates focused on commitment will follow, suffice it to answer so far 
that one of the reasons may be that these new markets are viewed as incongruent to 
organisational identity, hence the current strategy too. An interesting observation is that if at 
this stage we revisit the disruptive innovation theory model, following debates made in this 
section, something begins to look missing. Because the model’s growth trajectory indicates 
only an upward growth, possible re-direction, and even the branching of innovation 
trajectories, or firms into new markets, is obscured. These debates also highlight that 
innovation trajectories do not simply move upward but may take sideward turns.   
 
 
 
                                               
1 Christensen (2016, pp. 153-154) 
2 E.g. Corley & Gioia (2004) 
3 Christensen & Bower (1996, p. 199) 
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4.3.2 Organisational Image and Disruption  
Prior discussion of the RPV Framework highlighted resources, processes and values which 
are necessary to drive current projects (sustaining innovations), although the same may 
become deficiencies in disruptive innovation projects because they are constructed around the 
former projects. It was recognised that some of these building blocks of the framework are 
tangible while others are intangible. Although acknowledging brands and product designs, 
the meanings attached to which could potentially be some valuable intangibles, a missing 
factor among them is reputation as a key component of organisational resources.  As it has 
been noted, the reputations of incumbents (as it is their identity) become a salient feature 
when the theory of disruption is looked at from a sensemaking standpoint.  Therefore the 
general point made here is that the sources of the competitive advantages of incumbents do 
not exclude their reputational statuses; 1 which have influences on or are influenced by 
organisational identity as previously discussed. This section looks especially at the ways in 
which organisational members’ sense of who they are, as mirroring the image or reputation of 
their organisations, may influence how they perceive disruptive innovations. The concept of 
image has been explained as the nexus linking identity, which is organisational members’ 
perceptions about their identity as viewed by external observers, and reputation, which is the 
external overseers’ perception about the identity of a particular organisation.  
Weick has suggested that identity construction in sensemaking is driven towards satisfying 
three needs, namely, enhancement, efficacy and consistency of meanings related to the 
identity of the self. As previously noted, Weick points out that when organisational identity 
meanings are incongruent with and thus leading to contradiction between meanings of self-
references and the perceived meanings observers impose on these referents, organisational 
members tend to make efforts to resolve the discrepancy. It was also highlighted that the 
incongruence is accompanied by a negative feeling that drives the need to remove it by taking 
actions which are driven to remove the discrepancy. That displayed organisational members 
as inclined to sustain meanings which reflect favourably on the organisation, which also 
means meanings which maintain enhancement, efficacy, and consistency of the self. These 
are social and psychological needs entrenched in organisations and their members.  
                                               
1 Rindova & Fombrun, (1998, p. 63) 
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The core argument of this sub-section is that identity needs of incumbents may have 
implications for how incumbents approach disruptive innovations. It is asserted that 
disruptive innovations do not seem to feed identity needs of incumbents, at least initially, 
which might explain why incumbents are initially uninterested in investing in them. As a 
start, the table ensuing (Table 4.1) makes a generic comparison of the characteristics of 
disruptive innovations and identity needs. The comparison of the characteristics of disruptive 
innovations with organisations’ identity hints at the conceivability that the nature of these 
offerings may negatively influence preferences for them by incumbents. Of focus are the very 
inferiority, poor performance and the new attributes, which may challenge those of sustaining 
innovations. In their initial stages disruptive innovations do seem to stand in stark contrast 
with an image of high esteem held by the industry leading firms with such labels as well-
managed, admirable, emulated, and innovative, among others. Continued effort to innovate 
sustainably should be in line, for instance, with the self-esteem needs of incumbents, 
especially if we factor Christensen’s realisation that these organisations are driven to win 
competitive wars. 
Another way to make the same point, especially giving some intricacies on how the points 
just highlighted may play out, is to present an illustration which takes the form a metaphor 
built around the three identity needs. The resulting analysis observably points to the identity 
construction process as likely to be open to growth and stability, rather than the opposite. The 
aim of the depiction is to link identity construction with features of the theory of disruption, 
pointing out the potential for identity incongruity to be presented by disruptive innovations.  
 
Characteristics of Disruptive Innovations 
 
Identity needs 
 
1. Inferior quality  
2. Poor performance  
3.  New attributes 
4. Discontinuity (or interruptive potential 
impact on ongoing sustaining innovation 
projects) 
 
1. Enhancement  
2. Efficacy  
3. Consistency  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of disruptive innovation versus incumbent’s identity needs 
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In the depiction, inflation corresponds with identity construction, in which there is continued 
availability of a fodder to feed the three identity needs, while deflation corresponds with or 
more precisely, results in identity incongruence or threat. As efficacy (success of current or 
sustaining projects) continues to be validated by sustained growth, consistency (e.g. we are a 
successful, growing and leading firms) will serve as a stopper. A threat to any achieved state 
of identity will lead to efforts to remove that threat and thus inhibit a downward progression 
(deflation). That is, (1) the ongoing feeding of the self-enhancement need represents inflation; 
(2) self-efficacy is represented by the inflate-ability of this balloon; and (3) self-consistency 
is represented by a stopper or valve. As organisations enact their strategies and achieve 
outstanding outcomes, which boost their identity and thus reputations, the enhancement need 
is fulfilled. This fulfilment is thus equivalent to inflating the balloon, but it also validates the 
efficacy (e.g. well-managed firm) demonstrated by the positive outcomes of actions, or 
beliefs of successfully executing of strategies. This imagery is in line with the word 
“construction”, the equivalent term of which could be “building” (e.g. reputation or self-
esteem).  
The balloon model suggests a different way to look at organisations because in essence, the 
success of this process constructs an increasingly improving self-esteem, which may possibly 
develop an amour proper (used here to refer to organisational ego).1 A sense of the potential 
for losing leadership positions, for instance, cannot exclude certain forms of reputational loss 
(e.g. lower ranking), which may trigger the motivation to avert this rank. Notable efforts to 
move up-market when entrants begin to nibble on the lower-end of the market, which means 
beginning to take market share of incumbents, can be linked to organisational drive to 
innovate sustainably and stay ahead of current competitors. Further, events such as shrinking 
market share, revenues and/or rankings as a result of disruptive impact, should threaten the 
inflation processes as portrayed by the suggested model previously discussed. By the same 
token, these should threaten the identity or reputational meanings held by organisational 
members. To consider an organisation a leader in a specific market reflects a form 
comparison, or ranking, in which its peers are rated lower.  
                                               
1 An interesting alternative is to draw parallels between leadership position and their saliency in respective 
markets to a levitating balloon, whose higher levels lends itself to noticeability, or unobstructed constant watch 
by observers relative to its peers in the market.  
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A study by Elsbach and Kramer, which cements Weick’s identity construction model, seems 
especially pertinent to current demonstrations. In the study, the authors investigated the 
sensemaking processes of organisational members in “top 20” leading business schools and 
tried to understand how they cope with perceived drop in the rankings. The scholars 
demonstrate how, following a drop, organisational members of leading schools engaged in 
sensemaking processes which constructed new meanings to highlight aspects about their 
organisational identity not considered in the ranking to uphold their identity “status”.1 To the 
extent that holding on to identity meanings lead to delays in addressing problems, their study 
bolsters the insights proposed in the sensemaking perspective about identity construction, and 
used here as a portrayal of the balloon model. However, and more importantly, for current 
debates, it highlights that there will likely be an impetus on the part of incumbents to sustain 
meanings attached to the meanings centred on their leadership positions. The study is also 
crucial to the point that it shows that meanings related to leadership positions matter to a 
great degree. Indeed, some authors are taking note that leadership positions are in some cases 
responsible for the late adoption of emerging innovations.2  
Lastly, such an expression as made by one senior manager at Polaroid, a leading instant 
photography firm, recounting how he, among other organisational members interpreted 
changes related to an impending disruption driven by digital photography,3 also seems useful 
here. He queried as follows: “Can we be a down and dirty manufacturer at the same time 
we're an innovator over here? Can you have two different philosophies running 
simultaneously in the company?”4 Being “down and dirty” seems to stand in stark contrast 
with being “an innovator”, to the extent that the former descriptor points to a perception low-
esteemed vis-à-vis the latter, which portrays a certain quality prestige. In the case of Intel, 
Grove expressed the following: “Intel equaled memories in all of our minds. How could we 
give up on our identity? How could we exist as a company that was not in the memory 
business? It was close to being inconceivable.”5 This statement is permeated with a sense of 
attachment and defeat just as it denotes great uncertainty and confusion. It is deeply soaked in 
the question, who should we be if we are no longer a memory company, a label which meant 
                                               
1  Elsbach & Kramer (1996) 
2 The work of Burgelman and Grove (1996) was previously quoted to indicate how IBM and Microsoft became 
victims of their own identity beliefs.   
3 Gans (2016b, p. 56) 
4 Tripsas & Gavetti (2000, p. 1155) 
5 Grove (1996, p.90) 
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a lot to us? 
 
4.3.3 Individuals’ Identity Needs and Disruption  
Christensen has brought into view an individual level of analysis, at which he reports how 
professional success needs shape the conduct of those who are involved in innovation 
projects within incumbents. The picture is that of people motivated to drive projects which 
promise to boost or sustain their careers, as opposed to projects which do not support career 
growth or threaten their positions or job security. Of more importance is the observation that 
the professional growth needs often play a critical role in shaping the direction innovation 
projects and their fate. For instance, Christensen explained how these processes influence 
resource allocation within incumbent firms, emphasising how organisational innovations 
depend on resources. It was noted that organisational members act as individuals just as they 
act as the organisation. Their meanings are blended with other organisational members’, but 
also power does play a role in sensemaking processes.   
It remains intriguing then that Christensen devotes almost all attention to the reasons behind 
the supporting and pursuing of projects deemed to stand a better chance of gaining favour 
from dominant customers by managers. Thus, he recognises and yet remains silent of the 
influences of the needs of individuals in these members in shaping the innovator’s dilemma. 
Although the need for personal success may be justified as motivated by financial 
motivations, a successful career also provides these people with a perception of self-esteem 
attached to their status within them firm, within the market, industry or society in general. 
However, the opposite can be said about faltering careers as a result of disruption, which may 
in part result in efforts to hold on to such meanings of esteem depending on the malleability 
individuals believe there is in their environment and the powers they have. Christensen has 
noted that failures of projects tend to be costly and public. Such noting of the public nature of 
these failures should even be obvious in the event of the leaders of prominent firms which are 
of focus in this study; the firms which have been described as of constant watch by external 
stakeholders. What that publicity implies, however, is the potential dissonance in cognitions 
when people who are considered competent confront situations which begin to threaten that 
perception.  
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The more general point is that people in organisations have a high appetite for ascending to 
higher positions. Their conduct in pursing these positions and following achieving them may 
have an impact when these organisations have to make changes which threaten both. Hues of 
that point are discernable in the work of other scholars. Starbuck and Milliken note that the 
lower levels of organisational hierarchies are made of members who aspire to be in leadership 
positions and interpret their environments within their organisations on this basis.1 
Burgelman and Grove make the same point, although they extend the subject to include 
constraints which lead organisations to stick to current strategies, projects or markets, which 
is a key topic in this study:   
    Companies often experience an inertial aftermath of success: They have become sharply aware  
    of the competencies that made them successful against the initial competition and they continue  
    to rely on these distinctive competencies even when the competition changes. Also, companies  
    usually organize themselves in such a way that the employees representing these competencies 
    are likely to have the greatest influence in the strategic decision-making process [italics added]. 
    Changes in the basis of competition thus often evoke inertial responses by incumbents.2 
The emerging picture is that of organisational members who have become successful and 
influential as they move to the upper echelons of the organisation. The question which 
remains is what happens to the members who reach, or are in pursuit of, these higher 
positions when disruptive innovation driven changes emerge? Burgelman and Grove have 
suggested that those who are in positions of power, having reached there due to their 
successes can be a critical source of inertial forces. That point can be expanded and given 
more nuance if we revisit the identity needs already discussed, in relation to the professional 
growth related to projects they lead, or threat resulting from change. The previously raised 
question rephrased is thus, are there any influences identity needs have on organisational 
members’ interpretations and actions in the emergence of disruption which may, ultimately 
then, have influences on the directions their organisations take? It is argued here that the 
answer is yes, in part because of the deliberations made thus far in this subsection, but the 
picture can be given more detail.  
                                               
1 Starbuck & Milliken (1988, p. 53)  
2 Burgelman & Grove (1996, p. 14) 
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Another way to support the answer is to recognise that disruptive innovations may require 
cessation in projects which these individuals lead and have higher prospects for, which may 
negatively affect expectations on continued professional success. Thus, disruption may 
present organisations with the need to terminate ongoing projects – which were paired with 
the current organisational strategy. In the language of sensemaking, such a termination 
equates to interruption (to be delved into later). From an identity construction point of view, 
one critical aspect which should be threatened is continuity, if we recognise that the positions 
held may have to be redefined in the new competitive landscape. This could also threaten 
consistency and efficacy, for instance, should those who are well equipped to lead the new 
projects be positioned in more powerful positions at the expense of loss in power in 
previously powerful individuals. For instance, restructures are often related to incumbents’ 
challenges to wrestle or respond to the emergence of disruption.1  
The possibility that members may have individualistic values to protect and use their 
positions of power to direct organisations towards certain direction cannot be ignored. That 
does not exclude the possibility that these members may exercise resistance towards strategic 
changes, which threaten the projects they lead or have sponsored (and thus their positions) as 
when it is necessary to divert resources and attention to new projects for purposes of strategic 
renewal. The latter point is exactly what Burgelman and Grove have highlighted. A study by 
Burgelman, which also focused on Intel and what delayed the firm from shifting from DRAM 
to microprocessors, makes a similar point: “Emotional attachment by many top managers to 
the product that had ‘made Intel’ was also part of the inertial force [which delayed Intel from 
moving into a new market]. In the course of the interviews, most managers mentioned 
emotional factors to explain why it had taken so long for Intel to get out of the DRAM 
business.”2 Burgelman’s work may also mean that these managers’ sensemaking processes, 
in the face of change, may be fastened around justifications sustained by the noted emotional 
glues.  
If we tie the careers of these organisational members with the concept of identity 
construction, it is then possible to explain how this sensemaking processes may influence 
organisational members’ interpretations and actions. Weick has allegorically made reference 
                                               
1 Christensen & Raynor (2003) 
2 Burgelman (1994, p. 41) 
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to identities as tools, by which he explicates how organisational members’ identification 
based on the means by which they achieve their goals.1 In the current study, the tools or 
identifications may be in reference to sustaining innovations – for instance, the ongoing 
sustaining innovation projects, how they have been achieved and the status meanings which 
are tied to these innovations. If we follow the narrative of this subsection and the work of 
Christensen in general, it suggests that organisational members’ success is based on the 
sustaining innovations, and therefore, their esteem is tightly coupled with them.2 Dropping 
these innovations and pursuing disruptive innovations may then present challenges, such as, 
who these people are when they let go of the projects which led to their success, just as it may 
be a question of who their organisation is when it is no longer a leader in the industry. 
Although the rational choice stance might propose that these organisational members will 
readily drop the tools when they begin to see them as less beneficial, this is not the image 
portrayed in the theory of disruptive innovation. Arguably, incumbents’ persistence in 
clinging to their sustaining innovations (tools), sometimes until their death, mirrors the work 
of Weick than the arguments Christensen makes. Indeed, scholars have also empirically 
demonstrated that organisational leaders often do cling to what has made them successful.3   
All of the points deliberated on within this section portray the critical role of identity 
construction in organisational processes, especially as these processes relate to and shape 
innovation projects. What is ultimately important is what sense is made as people interpret 
changes within the metaframe of current identities and the related beliefs – e.g. we are leaders 
and intend to maintain these ranks within current markets or on the basis of current “tools”; 
and what actions ensue as coloured by the sense made. It is of crucial importance then to 
revisit the “chilling” aspect of sensemaking, which is that “once a tentative explanation has 
taken hold of our minds, information to the contrary may produce not corrections but 
elaborations of the explanations.”4 In other words, organisations may continue to hold on to 
meanings which are irrelevant to current challenges, and continue to do so until a crisis 
situation.5 The initial steps into these dangerous traps as beginning with beliefs has been 
                                               
1 Weick (1996); Weick (1993) 
2 Burgelman and Grove (1996) add that when these members have reached leadership positions, thus on the 
basis of the success of their projects, they tend to be emotionally attached to their projects, which present 
challenges when organisations have to make strategic shift and pursue different projects. 
3 E.g. Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) 
4 Weick (1995, citing Watzlawick, 1976, p. 50) 
5 The empirical study about Bristol Royal Infirmary presented previously demonstrated the same point. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 96 
demonstrated so far, and the ensuing two sections begin to highlight how actions may enact 
an environment which itself becomes a constraint.  
 
4.4 Enacted Constraints  
The theory of disruption has been criticised as leaving organisational actions and the 
ambiguities of their outcomes unaccounted for. Nevertheless, Christensen has highlighted 
that incumbents may be “creative” in fighting disruptive innovations. The blind spots related 
to such an assumption or leaving unexplained organisational actions have been highlighted in 
previous debates. This section begins to bring some light to this obscured facet, especially 
linking it to disruptive innovation or related contexts.  The enactment model of sensemaking 
has highlighted the role of the interplay between cognitions and actions in organisations. The 
focus here is how they may lay a ground which becomes rife with entrapments of 
commitment (discussed in the next section), which could potentially delay incumbents from 
changing their strategies and/or move into new markets.  
In essence, enactment denoted the interplay between cognition, which has been of much 
focus in the preceding section, and actions, which will begin to show up from hereon, and 
how this process materialises the environments which people confront. This view directs our 
attention to the actions of organisational members, in addition to their cognitions, as places to 
look for in order to understand challenges organisations confront. Hence, some of the places 
to look for in order to understand these challenges will include the conduct of incumbents 
prior to the emergence of disruptive innovations, especially understood within the context of 
the prevailing beliefs and related actions during these times. Also, the analytical focus should 
cover the time when disruptive innovations have emerged, whether these define ignoring or 
fighting them. Unfortunately, the theory of disruption is almost silent in this regard. Given 
this gap, the study draws from related work of other scholars of disruptive innovations, who 
have at least provided some insights, especially into the conduct of incumbent leaders when 
confronted with disruptive innovations.  
Hints given by Christensen such as fighting the laws of disruption, including ignoring them, 
provide a good starting point. Some of the obvious questions to ask then should include, in 
what ways and on what basis do incumbents fight disruptive innovations, or what Christensen 
terms the “laws” of disruption? Although fighting does clearly denote a form of action, 
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ignoring is itself not void of action. Christensen explains that rather than paying attention and 
responding to disruptive innovations, incumbents focus on and improve on sustaining 
innovations, including shifting to the higher-end tiers of their core markets. That signals both 
cognition and actions in that some justification has to prevail to sustain such strategic 
conduct. Hence, the ensuing debates build on these hints as useful anchor points. The aim is 
to highlight the forms of actions which incumbents take and the ways in which these actions 
may “materialise” constraints. 
The previous discussion of asymmetric motivation, in which incumbents are portrayed as 
looking down upon disruptive innovations, includes an element (i.e. talk) less paid attention 
to in the theory of disruptive innovation, but often made clear by other scholars. As clarified 
by Christensen, initially, disruptive innovations’ target markets which tend to be too small for 
and unappealing to incumbents. The same observation is reflected in studies of other scholars 
who sought to understand how incumbents respond to disruptive innovations.1 If from this 
point we consider talking as equivalent to acting, the expressed impressions made by 
incumbents, during this point or the emergence of disruptive innovations in general, are 
therefore worth some attention. The phrase expressed impressions thus serves the purpose of 
highlighting that the words incumbent leaders use,2 which may represent their beliefs about 
these innovations are made public, either within the internal space of organisations, or 
externally. In the language of this section, these impressions are enacting the environment. 
They put something out there. Some of these expressions are indeed reported in industry 
media such as the business magazines, but they also bubble up in scholarly literature when 
scholars conduct studies to understand the reasons behind incumbent leaders’ conduct.3  
It should be noted that the distinction between what is described as public and private may in 
this context be trivial, especially if we factor that organisational actions are observed by 
fellow organisational members.4 The expressed impression point to two directions 
simultaneously. It gives a glimpse of the meanings which incumbents’ leaders tend to impose 
on disruptive innovations; but it also brings into view how these expressions are “put out 
there” and become part of the environment. Evidence suggests that incumbent leaders are 
                                               
1 E.g. Charitou & Markides (2003) 
2 As it was noted in Chapter 3, words play a crucial role in sensemaking.  
3 Charitou & Markides (2003); Starbuck & Nystrom (1997) 
4 Weick (1995) 
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also often interviewed by the industry media to comment on the emerging competitor 
offerings.1 Although Christensen often cites these publications (especially in The Innovator’s 
Dilemma), his focus tends to be on reporting the performance of incumbents.  
A notable regularity across the expressed impressions, which is in line with the unevenness 
notable in Christensen’s concept of asymmetric motivation, is that incumbents are inclined to 
focus on the cues which highlight the weaknesses of competitors’ offerings compared to their 
own. Interestingly though, this is not limited by the characteristics of disruptive innovations 
and extends as such to what may be regarded as sustaining innovations. In other words, 
incumbents seem be as likely to highlight their competitors’ weaknesses, while ignoring any 
additional strengths evident in the disruptive innovation offerings. Arguably, such a bias is 
driven by an effort to highlight the strength of their (incumbents) own offerings. In addition, 
these expressed impressions are also reported to often have derisive connotations, well 
exemplified by the work of Starbuck and Nystrom, explaining how a mechanical calculator 
manufacturer (Facit) reacted to the emergence of electrical calculators, as follows: 
     The immediate reaction of Facit’s top managers was that these funny little plastic boxes with  
     little red lights on them had to be a passing fad [italics added]. It was obvious to Facit’s top  
     managers that no one would trade in a nice solid machine that went thumpity, thumpity,  
     thump for a silly little box with little red lights on it! Facit would move into electronics  
     gradually over the next decade or two, but it would do so in a careful, orderly way while  
     maintaining high product quality.2  
Facit would go on and, in the language of the theory of disruption, be disrupted by electronic 
calculators in a space of just two years. Other examples of this include expressions at these 
earlier stages that emerging disruptions are not threats, as they are perceived to be in 
unrelated markets.3 The inclination to view entrants’ offerings as inferior should have a 
straightforward basis. Comparably, the markets incumbents serve are generally demarcated 
from those of entrants by the disparities of such main characteristics as offerings of superior 
quality, performance and price.4 Considering the size of incumbent organisations, their 
positions within respective markets (including reputation of brands) and the better quality of 
                                               
1 Gans (2016b) 
2 Starbuck & Nystrom (1997) 
3 Charitou & Markides (2003) 
4 Price may be viewed as a disadvantage for accessibility to those who cannot afford the offering, but it is 
arguable that people who afford expensive offering may also consider them as a status symbols. 
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their offerings, it is thus not surprising that these organisations will highlight their strengths, 
and the weakness of their counterparts to stress their competitive edge.  
Indeed, a positive appraisal of competitor offerings should, in the eyes of observers, signal an 
admission that one’s offerings are of lesser value.1 It seems implausible that incumbents’ 
appraisal of competitor offerings, and especially those of smaller entrants, the offerings of 
which are inferior, could be positive. This should nevertheless be cognitively challenging 
because held beliefs about high-esteem should be incongruent with an acknowledgement that 
a smaller opponent’s offerings are better. Thus, public acknowledgement by an organisation 
that competitor offerings are better should not only mean endorsing the competitor, but it 
should also lead to cognitive dissonance.2 The implausibility of this should even be higher if 
we consider that these organisations, as Christensen suggests, derive their resources from 
external stakeholders whose support is arguably based, in part, on the reputations of the 
organisations and their offerings.    
Expressions are also carried in the slogans of organisations, often used in adverts to highlight 
what they perceive as the “selling points” of their offerings. Previous discussions in 
sensemaking have indicated how organisations manipulate their environments, including 
through advertising, in order to make them favourable to their operations. The crucial 
questions, as earlier suggested, relates to the fate of these enacted worlds. An organisation 
may face challenges where it has to introduce a product which contradicts its marketing 
message.3 Indeed, in some cases organisational leaders do dismiss innovation ideas because 
they do not “want to confuse the marketing message already in place.”4 Porter makes a 
related point: “A company known for delivering one kind of value may lack credibility and 
confuse customers – or even undermine its reputation – if it delivers another kind of value or 
attempts to deliver two consistent things at the same time.”5 His remarks are especially 
interesting as they link what has previously been discussed (section 4.3.2.) with current 
debates, reflecting how important is organisational image and its influences on strategic 
choices. The influence wielded by marketing departments as demonstrated in the theory of 
                                               
1 Such admission should also lead to increased dissonance of cognition, just as the balloon model suggested.     
2 Weick (1995); Festinger (1957); the balloon model aimed to demonstrate the same.  
3 E.g. “The best or nothing.”  Mercedes Benz (2018) 
4 Schneider (2017, p. 65)  
5 Porter (1996, pp. 68-69)  
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disruption should lend support to these observations, particularly because they are the 
organisational departments directly responsible for environmental manipulation.  
Further, ignoring disruption suggests that incumbents do notice emerging innovations but 
instead engage in different forms of actions. What other scholars note is that some disruptive 
innovations, especially business model innovations, do not develop into disruption.1 In either 
case, they do reach a point at which incumbents notice them and have to respond. At this 
stage, several strategies to respond are pursued, but they do not exclude continuing to ignore 
these innovations. What this implies is that some legitimisation takes place, on which 
incumbents act. Whether these legitimisations are based on perception of the size of the 
market and its lack of convincing profit margins as Christensen has suggested,2 or because 
incumbents reckon disruptive innovations as unrelated markets,3 what matters in current 
discussions is the durability of these meanings as embedded in the legitimisations. It also 
matters how they are communicated and who the audiences are. Some scholars of disruption 
have shown that these views are shared among organisational leaders just as they are reported 
in financial reports, or presented to shareholders.4  
Christensen has particularly noted that given that the process of disruption is sometimes slow, 
“incumbents can get quite creative in the defense of their established franchises.”5 Their 
actions in doing so have been considered to include, for instance, lobbying legislators to put 
in place regulations which inhibit the growth or encroachment of disruptive innovations into 
their market;6 efforts to disrupt the disruptors through introducing counter offerings;7 and 
what is considered “rational decisions” to ignore disruption.8  If we consider that one of the 
core issues is the delay in incumbents to shift into the new contexts; that fighting of 
disruption is not always a successful approach to responding to them; and that justifiable 
actions may lead to commitments, these manipulations seem to suggests ways in which 
incumbents may begin to set themselves for failure in the face of advancing disruptive 
                                               
1 Charitou & Markides (2003) 
2 Gans (2016) and Charitou & Markides (2003) also cite similar examples in which incumbents ignore pursuing 
disruptive innovations on this basis.  
3 Charitou & Markides (2003) 
4 Gans (2016b); Charitou & Markides (2003); Starbuck & Nystrom (1997); Burgelman & Grove (1996) 
5 Christensen et al. (2015, p. 48) 
6 Osiyevskyy & Dewald (2015); it must be noted that this study was looking specifically at the behaviour of 
smaller firms. 
7 Charitou & Markides (2003) 
8 Henderson (2006) 
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innovations.  Whichever actions are taken opportunities as well as constraints are set in 
construction. These constraints have the potential to lead to selective perception of 
incumbents’ environments, in which the trace of actions or the justifications to manipulate the 
environment to favour incumbents’ businesses may become the primary pillar around which 
cognitions are bound. This is especially true if we consider Weick’s insight about the 
ingredients for commitment, a subject to which we will soon turn to.      
Both the Intel and mechanical calculator manufactures demonstrate more directly where the 
theory of disruption falls short. The theory cannot explain why the former company struggled 
to move its core business into a market where it was already a player and making profit. On 
the other hand, Facit continued to invest in mechanical calculator despite losing market share 
as a result of electronic calculators by a small competitor gaining customer appeal, which 
Facit could nevertheless manufacture but had opted to place the commencement of their 
production on hold instead.   
 
4.5 Commitment to Sustaining Innovations 
It was pointed out in the theory of disruptive innovation that there prevails a form of 
commitment in which incumbents continue to do what made them successful even in the face 
of a drastically shifting market, while entrants continue to attract a share of incumbents’ 
customers. In the event in which incumbents’ markets are ultimately disrupted, this process 
leads to the shrinking market niche of incumbents until a point of insignificance, which either 
leads to the death of that market or industry or it remains a small niche. Although 
commitment is explained in terms of resources, Weick provided an alternative mechanism 
which can constrain organisational members’ conduct. The recipe for this form of 
commitment included action, publicity, choice, high stakes, and low tolerance for mistakes, 
which heighten justification while limiting choice. Weick has also cautioned that the incipient 
steps into troubles may be small volitional actions which are enlarged over time through an 
enactment of an environment which becomes a constraint, inevitably leading people into 
unexpected traps. The aim of this section is to explore possible links between disruption and 
commitment.  
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To begin with, the profiles of incumbents seem to score higher on all of the ingredients of 
commitment. Their actions and choices are open to scrutiny, either through leaders acting or 
making choices other organisational members become aware of, or publishing their strategic 
moves, choices and justifications in annual reports, for instance. In fact, Burgelman and 
Grove observe that when faced with what they call Strategic Inflection Point (SIP),1 
organisational leaders go through a process that starts with denial, followed by escape or 
diversion, and then acceptance, before pertinent actions are sought.2 They explain this 
process in the following manner, quoted at length because it highlights some of the actions 
which are taken by leaders, which remain unobserved in the theory of disruptive innovation.   
     Denial is prevalent in the early stages of almost every instance. To appreciate this, read  
     the annual report management letters of companies that, in retrospect, we know were  
     facing a SIP. Escape refers to the personal actions of top managers. For instance, frequent  
     public speeches on vague subjects given by CEOs of companies facing difficult times or  
     the move of corporate headquarters away from the center of business action is signs of  
     attempted escape. Diversion, by contrast, refers to the worst kind of escape, often involving  
     major acquisitions unrelated to the core business that faces a SIP. Effective top managers  
     go through these first two stages as well, but they are able to move on to the acceptance  
     and pertinent action stages before it is too late.3  
An important factor to highlight about their observation is that the conduct of these leaders 
becomes exposed to the public; the public which comprises many people to which the leaders 
are accountable. Further, the denial stage gives rise to the question: what may be the 
consequences of such behaviour if viewed through the lens of commitment sensemaking? 
Although it is noted that pertinent action is ultimately sought, after such strategic moves 
represented by attempted escape or diversion, what is important to underline is the potential 
delays related to the process. In addition to publicity, a low tolerance for mistakes in these 
firms, particularly mistakes which could lead to the demise of the firm, or greater financial 
losses, must be highlighted as another feature which characterises these organisations. Thus, 
                                               
1 They explain it as a stage at which a firm will become less profitable as a consequence of drastic market 
changes, which necessitates the “giving away of one type of industry dynamics to another; the change of one 
winning strategy into another; the replacement of an existing technological regime by a new one.” (Burgelman 
& Grove, 1996, p. 10) 
2 Burgelman & Grove (1996) 
3 Burgelman & Grove (1996, p. 20 ) 
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the profiles of incumbents are those which display a greater environment in which 
commitments should be prevalent, either for rewarding ends or troubles.  
The potential for committing behaviour can thus begin with some of the actions already 
observed so far, which persistently drive their sensemaking into seeing from their 
environments aspects which confirm the expectations or justifications driving these actions. 
Weick has especially pointed out that these beliefs (expectations and justifications or 
justifications) function in the manner analogous to a self-fulfilling prophecy, which means 
they can become self-confirming. Thus, they drive actions into the direction of the incipient 
prophecy or expectation which set the action in motion. Alternatively, the need to justify 
traces of actions may lead people to selectively perceive their environment in ways which 
drive subsequent behaviour to centre on those justifications, which may in consequence prove 
that justification as real.  
The previously given example on Facit and the next example to follow, about Research In 
Motion (RIM), exhibit signs of the ingredients for commitment just as discussed. Their 
usefulness is that they exhibit not only the said requirements for committing behaviour but 
also, some of the core themes of the current study, and most importantly, representing both 
the frameworks. The second example is about the reaction of leaders of mobile phone maker 
BlackBerry (RIM) when an entrant, iPhone (smartphone), emerged as a contender in their 
industry in 2007.1 At the time, the BlackBerry brand was a clear leader in the high-end 
(sustaining) mobile phone market. On the arrival of the iPhone, one of the leaders and a 
founder of RIM, Lazaridis’ appraisals of the phone were derisive, aimed at highlighting only 
its weaknesses. He went on to exclaim: “Try typing a web key on a touchscreen on an Apple 
iPhone, that’s a real challenge. You cannot see what you type.”2 That challenge he focused on 
was the iPhone’s touch screen feature, which Lazaridis was evidently against. Thus, in his 
appraisal he “extracted cues” which are analogous to what Christensen regards as defining 
disruptive innovations. An important reminder is that extracted cues can be viewed as 
representing the material from which they derive, and thus despite the potential for the phone 
to have had advantages, it was perceived by Lazaridis as an inferior product overall.  
                                               
1 It remains arguable whether the iPhone was a sustaining innovation or not. Although it was considered by 
Christensen to be a sustaining innovation, there remain potential challenges, especially with the identification of 
competitor’s offerings as already hinted, but section 4.5 extends this through exemplification.  
2 Gans (2016b, p. 34 citing Yarrow, 2011) 
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The continuing dominance of the iPhone in the mobile phone market led to Lazaridis, along 
with co-founder, Jim Balsillie to “publicly belittled the iPhone (which had emerged as the 
market leader) and its shortcomings.”1 Balsillie, who was the head of marketing at the firm, 
justified this as a public relations effort [manipulation].2 At this stage, their flagship product 
BlackBerry was not selling well in the market.  
Indeed, a constellation of factors are considered to have led to later decline of BlackBerry 
smartphone’s market dominance. However, some of the core issues have been identified as 
including the emergence of the iPhone and touch screen phone designs, as well as the advent 
of Android operating system for mobile devices.3 For the current debate, it is the conduct of 
RIM leaders, the public nature of their conduct, including their beliefs, which are useful to 
understand what may have led to delays in transitioning to the new competitive landscape. As 
the previous expressed impression by Lazaridis makes clear, he was against the touch screen 
design for his BlackBerry smartphone. Careful analysis points to issues of commitment just 
as it points to issues of identity. First, the touch screen phones challenged the core design of 
the BlackBerry device. The name BlackBerry derived from the resemblance of the device to a 
blackberry fruit – its tiny buttons are similar to the drupes of the fruit. The device itself thus 
had design cues resembling the blackberry fruit. Therefore, to change the design of the phone 
was to move away from its core identity characters, the meaning of which should have been 
difficult for Lazaridis to let go, which may be because organisational members get 
emotionally attached to their offerings.4 This is in particular highly likely, given that he was 
the chief designer of the keyboard and the brand. Gans notes that “Lazaridis believed that 
people wanted a tactile response when using a keyboard.”5 Only when the smartphone maker 
was experiencing troubles as a result to the market shift did they make effort to try and make 
touch screen phones. Even then, some of these devices combined touch screen with the 
original keyboard design.6  
 
                                               
1 Schneider (2017, p. 65) 
2 Schneider (2017, p. 65) 
3 Gans (2016b) 
4 Burgelman & Grove (1996) 
5 Gans (2016b, p. 71) 
6 Gans (2016b) 
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Although in the case of Facit no details were provided by Milliken and Nystrom about 
expressions external to the organisation, their shared meanings about the electronic calculator 
being an inferior product signal views which were shared among them as organisational 
members. The crucial part about this example is that it embraces many aspects of the 
discussions presented so far. Firstly, Facit was (had just recently become) a global leader in 
its respective industry (identity/reputation). Secondly, the mechanical calculators it made 
were sustaining, while the electronic calculators which led to its woes had characteristics of 
disruptive innovations, at least based on the managers’ descriptions of their own offerings 
compared to those of the entrant (which was proved to be a dangerous bias). 1 Third, Facit 
could manufacture the electronic calculators but it continued to focus on turning the 
organisation into financial profitability again (resumption of interrupted project) even when 
(at least from an outsider’s point of view) the problem looked evidently related to the 
emergence of the new forms of calculators. Fourth, Facit was ultimately disrupted as a 
consequence of holding to its sustaining innovations and while placing on hold electronic 
calculators, the latter form of calculators of which supplanted the former. Their plausible 
belief that mechanical calculators were a passing fad may have been “persistent, and sealed 
off from refutation.”2 Meanwhile, their drive to remain a global leader, a status which they 
had just recently achieved and tried to maintain3 may have functioned as a tool to which they 
persistently gripped until their fall.   
 
4.6 Plausibility and Disruption  
A focus on the rationality or irrationality to explain incumbents’ challenges is one salient 
feature in debates of disruption.4 To present organisational members as faced with a dilemma 
mirrors this point — the presumption is that incumbents can clearly distinguish sustaining 
from disruptive innovations, make a clear assessment, from which (rational/irrational) 
choices follow. Hence, to assess the outcomes of organisations we can go back to the point of 
deciding, or analyse the decision-making processes to see where the problem lies. In so 
                                               
1 This will be expounded on later in discussions of plausibility. It will be argued that incumbents should be 
biased towards seeing competitor’s offerings as inferior compared to their own.  
2 Weick (1995, p. 84) 
3 Starbuck & Nystrom (1997) 
4 Henderson (2006); Christensen & Bower (2003); Christensen (1997[2016)] 
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doing, faults such as irrationality, or intention which were guided by rationality can be 
pointed out to explain why certain conduct led to certain outcomes. This view is however 
premised on an accurate perception of the environment by the decision makers.1 The 
operating assumption is that of some ability for organisational members to accurately 
perceive cues of disruptive innovations and because “different types of innovation require 
different strategic approaches”,2 follow a necessary strategic recipe for responding. 
The suggestion that incumbents tend to respond to disruptive innovations too late, at which 
point, as Christensen observes, entrants have already mustered a first mover competitive 
advantage, implies that early detection of disruptive innovations is required in order for early 
response to take place. That is, one of the core challenges incumbents confront in dealing 
with disruptive innovation include the identification of these innovations ex ante, and taking 
the necessary steps to respond. Christensen has defended against criticism from scholars who 
hold the view that the model can only describe disruptive innovation post ante, offering 
examples of firms or products for which positive prediction was made by him or followers of 
his model.3 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that “identifying true disruptive innovation is 
tricky”,4 which follows an analysis of Uber as, according to him and associates, incorrectly 
categorised as disruptive despite that being incorrect.  
A reasonable place to start is to highlight that scholars themselves wrestle about the definition 
of disruption innovation,5 just as Christensen acknowledges the difficulty with which it 
becomes to identity true disruptive innovations. It is arguable that organisational members are 
not immune to the same challenge scholars confront. In other words, the continued challenge 
to accurately define and predict disruptive innovation innovations extends to organisational 
members under investigation by scholars. One example which stands out in this regard is how 
Christensen used the theory of disruptive innovation to identity as sustaining innovation, and 
predicted the fate of the iPhone when it was introduced in 2007.6  
                                               
1 Weick et al. (2005, p. 415) 
2 Christensen (2015, p. 46) 
3 Christensen (2006) 
4 Christensen et al. (2015, p. 48) 
5 Weeks (2015); Danneels (2004) 
6 The Apple product became a success, to the contrary. The point here is not to continue to criticise a mistake 
already acknowledged, but rather to highlight that organisational members are prone to the same limitations 
which led to Christensen’s inability to predict, if not worse. While scholars still have a chance to rectify their 
mistakes, for organisations it can be too costly to err, as when it results in organisational death. 
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Following are the remarks Christensen made in this regard: 
     The iPhone is a sustaining technology relative to Nokia. In other words, Apple is leaping  
     ahead on the sustaining curve [by building a better phone]. But the prediction of the theory  
     would be that Apple won’t succeed with the iPhone. They’ve launched an innovation that  
     the existing players in the industry are heavily motivated to beat: It’s not [truly] disruptive.  
     History speaks pretty loudly on that, that the probability of success is going to be limited.1 
Indeed, the iPhone was considered not a straightforward offering to categorise in terms of 
Christensen’s sustaining versus disruptive innovation differentiations,2 but that is precisely 
the point being advanced. While some innovations may be easily identifiable as sustaining or 
disruptive some are not. In addition to this, Christensen adds that accurate categorisation is 
also contingent on relativeness of the innovations to a specific firm. The implication is 
therefore that a particular observer will either find a specific innovation falling between the 
two. That, nevertheless, does not exclude the possibility for confusion and inaccurate 
identification in trying to fit a specific offering between these categories. These latter factors 
are contingent on such human conditions as biases and bounded rationality, which is what 
organisational members have to deal with. Christensen’s prediction as discussed is a case in 
point. 
Arguably, the identity of the observer will have a greater influence in how the interpretation 
is made, and in the confidence of the ensuing actions. The organisations under study as 
incumbents, as previous analysis suggested, should have challenges especially with 
appraising competitor’s offerings, and to recognise an innovation as sustaining may require 
acknowledging its strengths, which may be difficult depending on who will appraise that 
acknowledgement as already discussed. Disruptive innovations could be confusing. In 
addition to the example given about BlackBerry, another dominant mobile phone maker 
which succumbed following the emergence of the iPhone was Nokia. Pekka Pohjakallio, the 
Vice President of Nokia expressed that: “They had music, internet, an email deal with Yahoo 
and a deal with Google, but it is a 2G device, not 3G, which was a surprise to me.”3 That 
stressing of the 2G was aimed at highlighting that the iPhone was weaker or of lower 
                                               
1 McGregor (2007) 
2 Gans (2016b) 
3 Gans (2016b citing Dredge, 2015)  
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performance as a mode of internet access because it lacked the better performing 3G; a more 
advanced technology at the time.  
Whether the iPhone was disruptive or sustaining innovation relative to Nokia or BlackBerry 
remains contentious. The cues incumbents’ extracted, or more precisely, emphasised, match 
disruptive rather than sustaining innovation,1 even though Christensen categorised the iPhone 
as sustaining innovation. The difference is that organisations’ errors, especially with regard to 
issues like disruption, may have a higher potential for costliness than it is the case with 
scholars, who may have the luxury of time to at least revisit their models and adjust them 
accordingly as Christensen has continuously done so for the past 23 years.2 Further, the 
systematic observations made by scholars, often in retrospect, may not exactly match the 
meanings organisational members, who will care less about the stringent accuracies required 
by paradigms such as positivism on which rational decision-making assumptions rest.  
Acknowledging identification of truly disruptive innovations as a core challenge highlights 
the problem as going beyond just choice, but comprising among other factors, confusion, bias 
and plain incapacity to have the requisite information about what will enable disruption. 
People make plausible rather than accurate sense and move on as if they have a good sense of 
what is going on. 
 
4.7 Interrupted Sustaining Projects 
Christensen often argues that incumbents tend to respond to disruptive innovations when it is 
already late. He also highlights a certain pattern in incumbents’ conduct at the initial stages 
when disruptive innovations begin to affect incumbents by invading their markets. He 
considers that incumbents tend to “rationally” move to the higher-end tiers to maintain their 
growth path and defend profit margins. An alternative explanation is provided here through 
the lens of the sensemaking’s interruption model, which in part weaves together the common 
thread that holds together some of core arguments presented in this chapter (section 4.3 – 
4.7). From a sensemaking point of view, the jolts caused by these initial stages of disruption 
                                               
1 Gans (2016b, p. 34) in particular raises the point that incumbents focused less on features considered 
disruptive-related when the iPhone emerged. 
2 Christensen (2006) 
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are defined as interruptions. Disruptive innovations emerge as incumbents have different 
ongoing projects at varying levels of development, which should mostly be embedded with 
expectations of positive outcomes constructed on the track record of these firms. Expectation 
of growth has been implied greatly in the theory of disruptive innovation, just as it is beliefs 
about being excellent and of high esteem. It is also arguable that any firm with the profile of 
incumbents should have lesser expectations about failing, particularly as a consequence of 
and dethronement by small firms, which justifies incumbents’ focus on competitive wars with 
their peers.  
Thus, a relevant question to ask from a sensemaking perspective is what conduct is expected 
of incumbents when disruptive innovations interrupt their ongoing projects? It must be 
recalled that an important feature of stronger expectations is that it leads to perceptual errors, 
such as increased filtering out of cues that are not in line with the expected. That has been 
linked to group think among those who share the expectation. Furthermore, interruption was 
considered to induce emotion and lead to autonomic arousal, which affects complex thought 
processing as well as narrowing attention. Rare as interruptions are considered to take place 
at a macro-level, it is arguable that depending on whether it leads to incumbents’ failures or 
not, highly affect their viability or not, or takes a significant portion of their market share, 
disruptions are likely to lead to interruptions of varying degrees in incumbents.  
 
Figure 4: Interrupted sustaining projects 
 
The interruption model suggests that incumbents’ first effort should be to resume the 
interrupted expectations, which can then be followed by further deliberation or alternative 
action, if resumption fails. Thus, if resumption succeeds ongoing projects are carried on. It is 
also interesting that as more effort is made to resume the project, performance increases due 
to an increase in focused attention on the project, whether the project is losing relevance or 
not to contextual contingencies. Figure 4 demonstrates incumbents’ actions within the context 
of disruptive innovation as per the interruption model. The discussions about identity 
Interruption of 
Ongoing Sustaining 
Projects
Resumption Effort
Adoption of 
Disruptive 
Innovations / 
Further 
Commitment 
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construction have demonstrated how organisations are likely to remain tied to established 
identity meanings. If we consider that the first efforts were driven to uphold their identities, 
such an explanation fits neatly into efforts for restoration of expectations. Established identity 
meanings have been demonstrated as stubborn, leading to efforts to restore them when 
threatened. Also, the balloon model suggested that there should be related efforts to address 
identity threats and the potential for less impetus for incumbents to invest in identity 
incongruous innovations. Thus, both the explanations presented organisational identity as 
having the potential to constrain organisations from moving into new markets. Nevertheless, 
emerging disruptions are associated with incidents of identity threat as per prior discussions, 
which should engender efforts for restoration of identity meanings, which is equivalent to 
resumption as per the interruption model.  
Efforts at resumptions can be linked to incumbents’ move into higher-end tiers of their 
markets. That conduct can alternatively be described as holding on to their sustaining 
innovations thus, which can be interpreted as indicating that these firms make effort to 
maintain current projects’ profitability. After all, that is what these projects were expected to 
achieve. But that explanation also fits the view that incumbents make efforts to resume 
interrupted projects and the expectations which colour them. Further, the proposition about 
serving current customers is equivalent to staying in the same market compatible with the 
current projects and identity. Efforts at resumption are also represented by discussions about 
environmental manipulation, such as efforts to “fight” disruption as Christensen has hinted, 
which illustrate how organisational members make efforts to sustain their ongoing projects. 
Discussions of enactment may fall within resumption efforts, but they may also extend into 
commitment escalation, which may be equivalent to further deliberation in the initial 
interruption model (Figure 4) and currently labelled as commitment to sustaining innovations. 
Despite often too late, the ultimate adoption of disruptive innovations parallels what the 
initial interruption model described as taking alternative actions.   
Core to this model is commitment to ongoing projects justified by current beliefs. That 
conduct may either persist until disruption, or a point at which alternative action is taken. 
Another key feature of the model, as a consequence, is inertial forces which initially lead to a 
restraint from changing current actions. Thus, despite the diversity of different features of the 
sensemaking as presented from section 4.3 to 4.7, as well as the current section, a delay as 
resulting from certain beliefs or actions is the common thread that weaves them all together. 
A perhaps remarkable feature of these debates as summed up by the model is the fact that 
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they match with the conduct of incumbents as explained by Christensen’s theory. Hence, they 
serve as an alternative explanation for what may lead to incumbents’ difficulties when 
confronted with disruptive innovations. A further notable feature is that effort at resumption 
of projects is associated with an improvement in performance, as per the interruption model. 
That matches Christensen’s observation that incumbents’ performance tend to increase 
following an emergence of disruptive innovations.    
 
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter explored organisational sensemaking processes and their potential for shaping 
incumbents’ responses to disruptive innovations. Salient features of incumbents, among 
which are their profiles, how they relate to the markets within which they operate, 
conceptualisation of their beliefs, and their actions were brought into view in order to 
demonstrate how they may contribute to how incumbents respond to disruptive innovations. 
The concept of identity was demonstrated as pervasive to the degree that it influences human 
conduct, cutting through the individual and organisational levels. Organisational actions and 
how their trace may lead to entrapments of commitment to sustaining innovations were 
brought into view. Then challenges organisational members face in perceiving their 
environments, which may undermine their timely response to disruption, were looked at. 
Finally, the interruption model of sensemaking was used to tie together some of the core 
arguments presented in the chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications 
5.1 Summary  
The current study has set out to explore the challenges incumbents confront when responding 
to disruptive innovations. The question was formulated as follows: in what ways may 
organisational sensemaking processes shape incumbents’ responses to disruptive 
innovations? The context of this question was that the theory of disruptive innovation, which 
borrows its spectacles (including assumptions about strategic rationality) from a decision-
making perspective, obscures organisational actions. Organisational sensemaking was 
presented as suitable alternative perspective to studying incumbents’ challenges, in particular 
because it accounts for organisational actions, but also because it derives from a different 
scholarly tradition. That latter point gave rise to the prospect that the alternative perspective 
could offer a novel way to understand the supposed innovator’s dilemma. Having given 
descriptive analyses of the theory of disruptive innovations and organisational sensemaking 
in the second and third chapters, respectively, the fourth chapter explored incumbents’ 
challenges to responding to disruptive innovation from the sensemaking perspective. The 
purpose of the current chapter is to present concluding remarks, focusing on the study’s 
significance, limitations, as well as implications for further research.  
 
5.2 Significance of the Study  
Research which adopts a decision-making perspective, with its related assumptions about 
strategic rationality, tends to develop toward a diverging direction in relation to that which 
takes a sensemaking perspective.1 The current study has brought into dialogue insights from 
these antithetic perspectives. That statement is expressed with, in mind, the important 
consideration that the theory of disruptive innovation is deeply rooted in the former 
perspective. The alternative perspective of sensemaking offered an opportunity with which 
important issues regarding the supposed innovator’s dilemma, which have nevertheless 
remained largely ignored by leading scholars on the subject, could be raised and explored. 
Henderson has pointed out that “popular accounts of Christensen’s theories often focus 
                                               
1 Boland (2008, p. 61) 
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almost entirely on the role of cognitive failures in the senior team as the central explanatory 
construct”,1 suggesting a competence-based construct, not only as an alternative explanation 
but as a potentially more central problem. Like the current study, her concern is that a focus 
on decision-making dynamics is partial, except that a different perspective was adopted. The 
current study has indeed demonstrated how a focus on decision-making leads to some blind-
spots. Nevertheless, it highlighted the significance of a broadened focus on cognition, in 
addition to a reciprocal effect of interplay between cognition and action, on human conduct.   
Consequently, the study achieves its major contributions to debates about the supposed 
innovator’s dilemma though bringing into view organisational actions and their 
consequences, and yet broadening the view on cognitive dynamics. It thus simultaneously 
extends the cognitive view which, along with competence-based view, remained a dominant 
focal point in studies which seek to explain incumbents’ challenges in responding to 
innovation driven discontinuous markets changes. It achieves both by default due to the 
sensemaking perspective’s interweaving of actions and cognitions in its conceptualisation and 
propositions. Thus, beyond addressing initially notable blind-spots of the theory of disruptive 
innovation as identified, it also highlights a different feature which remained unchecked by 
the theory of disruptive innovation. Chiefly, the missed feature is composed of established 
beliefs or meanings and the embedded expectations as held by organisational members and 
their observers. Despite in modesty, the study has also highlighted the hand of emotion, as 
related to both actions and cognitions, in shaping the conduct of organisational members. 
That is not by accident because sensemaking can be infused with affect as prior debates have 
pointed out. From here on, the remainder of the section focuses more closely and yet 
succinctly, on the study’s key contributions.   
Based on the insights from sensemaking, it is argued that the additional features brought into 
view are not inconsequential to organisational processes and outcomes given their central 
position in their shaping of human conduct, whether people are within or outside 
organisations. Inevitably then, the study brings into question some of the strengths of the 
arguments presented in the theory of disruptive innovation. The more compelling, if 
controversial, question to ask in this regard is: how convincing should the narrative offered in 
the theory of disruptive innovation to explain the supposed innovator’s dilemma be when the 
                                               
1 Henderson (2006, p. 5) 
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theory offers only a partial view of what shapes organisational members’ conduct? The study 
made effort to shine more light on the obscured side through the following. 
It first recapped the ontological and epistemological of decision-making and sensemaking 
perspective, demonstrating their contrasting qualities so as to set a stage for directing 
attention towards the blind-spots of the theory of disruptive innovation, which inherits the 
imperfections of the former. 
The study demonstrated that new markets, which include disruptive innovation segments, 
may be perceived as identity incongruent by incumbents as a consequence of the difference 
between the offerings in the new market and what these established firms already offer, and 
by which they define themselves. That suggests an alternative answer to Christensen’s puzzle 
as to why incumbents tend to be successful at serving current customers (sustaining markets) 
but fail to address disruptive market. It may be possible for market segments, rather than the 
value networks as Christensen contends, to build difficult (social psychological) hurdles 
which constrain incumbents from hopping cross, into the new markets (the Intel example and 
the arguments built around it offer a compelling reference). The demonstration of the 
stubborn role of identity to constrain organisations from moving their core businesses, which 
may in effect suggest “killing” the established identities, gives an added support to the 
deliberations and explanations provided on this aspect of the study. Hence, it was argued that 
the upshot of any obfuscation resulting from inconsistent references to lines which demarcate 
different segments of markets comes in the way of presenting precise references and thus 
fruitful debates. Such include missing the point that organisations define themselves, in part 
or wholly, by the segments in which they are actively doing business, and that this aspect of 
organisations is imperative.  
A balloon model, constructed on the basis of three crucial identity needs, pointed to the 
possibility that the low quality or inferior performance of disruptive innovations, particularly 
at their initial stages, have the potential to lead to perceptions of incompatibility with the 
image of prestige of incumbents. Said alternatively, these innovations seem to stand in stark 
contrast with the backdrop of organisations which are considered in high regard. Therefore, it 
is viewed that in this way, perceptions of the qualities of current organisational identity may 
undermine efforts to invest in markets which are perceived to be incongruent with the stature 
organisational members perceive themselves to embrace or represent. This model extends the 
theory of disruptive innovation’s narrative about asymmetric, which is focused on monetary 
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incentives to demonstrate that the impetus or lack thereof, to invest in certain innovations. 
The alternative view is that such conduct may be under the control of perceptions of 
congruities, or the lack thereof, between the emerging offerings and current identity beliefs. 
The work of Tripsas demonstrates the same point.1   
Although identity is malleable and thus can be changed,2 the sensemaking perspective 
suggests that the first attempt organisational members make when it is threatened is effort to 
remove the threat and thus restate established identity meanings. Hence, organisational 
identity, especially as rooted in sustaining innovation markets, is viewed in this study as 
strong pillar to which organisations may be fettered, disabling them from swiftly shifting into 
the new markets when it is so necessary. 
Indeed, identity’s role further surfaces at the individual level. Christensen raises this issue by 
highlighting organisational members’ career ambitions, which are viewed as steering 
innovation projects towards fulfilling professional growth needs, or to preserve their status 
within organisations. However, he lamentably gives little credit to its contribution to shaping 
innovation processes and thus influencing how incumbents respond to disruptive innovations. 
Demonstrations for how powerful individuals may influence processes of organisational 
change, such as strategic renewal, when it is necessary to adjust to a new competitive 
landscape were presented. More generally, the challenge may relate to threatened identities as 
related projects on which these identities thrived become immaterial in relation to disruptive 
innovation driven market changes.  
The study has also interrogated references to loss of leadership positions. It points out that the 
incumbents’ markets may be disrupted and yet remain leaders in their home markets. 
Furthermore, that transitioning into the new markets does not necessarily translate into 
incumbents becoming leaders in the new setting, despite chances of success. These points are 
important to the extent that sometimes Christensen refers to firms which are initially not 
dominant in the new markets, but only grow to become dominant later, as failures (e.g. 
                                               
1 Tripsas (2009) 
2 Gioia & Thomas (1996) 
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Seagate).1 Said alternatively, unclear references to what entails a failure obfuscates improved 
understandings about incumbents’ challenges.  
However, the observation that organisational identity may lead to constraints or result in 
constraints when organisational change is necessary has already received considerable 
attention from organisational scholars.2 Helms-Mills has in particular organised her study 
around identity to study organisational change, demonstrating how discarding established 
identity meanings or constructing new ones lead puzzles in organisational members. What is 
important about her study is that it is one among those which studied intended programs of 
organisational change. Hence, it demonstrates that even when there is a strategic intent to 
make identity changes, there still remains identity related delays, which could arguably 
worsen in the context where the need for changing the identity is not yet recognised. 
A more related work to debates about organisational identity as presented in this study is that 
of Tripsas. An important remark she makes is that there is a lack of research on the role of 
identity when drastic market changes require firms to adopt new technological changes,3 
which highlight the need for further research just as it underscores the contribution of the 
current study. Despite the relatedness of the challenges, Tripas’ work looks at issues of 
identity from the perspective of a small firm,4 instead of established firms, as it is the case 
with the current study. It has also been observed that beliefs about how a strategy which led 
to consistent success (tool) does result in leaders holding on to (tools).5 What is novel about 
the current study, based on the literature consulted, is that it is the first to delve in-depth in 
the theory of disruptive innovations in order to understand identity’s role in shaping 
incumbents’ responses.  
The study has brought into view organisational actions and the fate of their residuum in 
influencing the conduct of organisational members and therefore organisational outcomes. It 
also highlights the potential problems associated with escalation of commitment, especially 
drawing attention to the initial action which may seed the eventual escalation.  
                                               
1 Weeks (2015, p. 419) 
2 Maitlis & Christianson (2014) 
3 Tripsas (2009) 
4 Tripsas (2009, p. 442) 
5 Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) 
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Furthermore, the study highlighted challenges related to limits in organisational members’ 
perceptions, which could hinder timely or appropriate responses to an impending threat 
brought about by disruptive innovations.   
These ideas enhance prior understanding on the supposed innovator’s dilemma, including 
highlighting limitations of and challenging assertions offered by the theory of disruptive 
innovation.  
 
5.3 Limitations 
The understandings of the challenges incumbents face depend primarily on the theory of 
disruptive innovation, whose assumptions differed significantly with the sensemaking 
perspective. However, peripheral studies which focused similar or related ideas as those of 
focus in this study have been helpful, especially by serving as examples which helped in 
clarifying some of the arguments presented. Although the sensemaking perspective offers a 
limited attention to power, the modest contributions made so far have been useful in this 
study, especially in explaining identity construction as it relates to individuals in 
organisations and the power they muster as they ascend organisational ladders.  
 
5.4 Implications for Research  
5.4.1 Implications for Further Research  
If we take seriously the argument that from the perspective of incumbents, especially when 
looked at through the lens of identity, both the low-end and the new-market segments are 
new, then there remain varying degrees of gaps between the new market (disruptive) and the 
established market (sustaining). This should have implications for understanding incumbents’ 
responses, which have in part been addressed in this study. For instance, it suggests that the 
capabilities of incumbents may either be complementary to the new market or the gap may be 
too wide that these capabilities are mostly not transferrable to the new market. For example, 
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mobile phones are said to have disrupted the digital cameras market,1 which means for digital 
camera manufacturers to have responded to this impact, it may have required very different 
skills sets (e.g. making and distributing smart phones) from what the existing, making the 
responses more difficult. Even further, digital cameras presented a challenge to films,2 which 
means the gap became even broader. However, for an established airline which is impacted 
by low-cost entrant into its market, for example, it is highly likely that the former will have 
the necessary capabilities, despite the possibility that there may be other factors which shape 
their response. For example, the current cost model may be incompatible with the new 
market.  
To the extent that identity congruity and incongruity are concerned, the degree to which the 
gap is narrowed or broadened presents an in intriguing question. Thus, the varying degrees of 
gaps may induce certain feelings of identity incongruity. That is, the new offerings 
(disruptive innovations) may be perceived to be distinct from the form of business 
incumbents identify themselves as, which may impede earlier recognition of the need to shift 
into the new market. To revisit earlier example about smartphones and digital cameras, 
although capabilities may be acquired, for instance through acquisitions or developed through 
setting up a stand-alone firm, the two products differ considerably that it would require much 
effort for digital camera manufactures, especially those who are not players in mobile phone 
manufacturing, to transform themselves into smartphone manufacturers. That could worsen. 
For instance, if we consider that firms like Kodak, whose business focused on films when it 
was disrupted by digital photography, would have had to transform from films to digital 
cameras in order to survive being disrupted. Still, the firm would have to transition into smart 
mobile phones within a relatively short period of time when smart phones began taking a 
market share of digital cameras. 
The gap between the markets and more so between industries, may be perceived to be greater 
that it is viewed as presenting higher difficulties for mustering necessary skills. It may also 
lead to perceptions of high implausibility for success in the views of organisational members, 
which could hamper efforts to move into the new market. From a sensemaking perspective, 
whether such effort result in success or not is not of primary concern, given that “people 
                                               
1 Gans (2016b, p. 58) 
2 Dewald & Bowen (2010, p. 197) 
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know what they have done only after they do it.”1 In other words, it can never be known, 
until after the fact, if a firm which makes effort to transition into the new market will fail or 
not.  The more general point is that we do not know, beyond the current speculation made in 
relation to the identified gaps, as to the extent to which they affect noticing and interpretation, 
2 and thus subsequent actions. Thus, we need to better understand the degrees to which 
perceptions about gaps or differences between existing and emerging markets influence early 
action to make, or delays with, strategic change initiatives in order to respond to the 
imminent threat.      
The multifaceted nature of incumbents’ challenges may signal the need to understand 
contexts within which certain conditions may be more dominant than others. That approach 
however contradict such positions scholars often take, like this: “I suggest that organizational 
competence, in the traditional sense of the embedded organizational routines of established 
companies, may be much more central to established firm failure in the face of disruptive 
innovation than is generally acknowledged.”3 Whether that is the case or not, what may be 
more beneficial is to understand the conditions within which different factors, as several 
scholars raised, will become more dominant given some specified local contingencies to a 
particular firm. That point is especially important if we consider that organisations face 
environments which have been enacted by them. It entails some uniqueness of each 
organisation’s environment.4 Stimpert and associates make the same point when they 
highlight the core blind-spot of the resource-based view of the firm as “its implicit 
assumption of interfirm homogeneity.”5 Tripsas suggests that an “important question for 
future research is whether certain types of identities are better than others and under what 
circumstances.”6 Both remarks are woven together by the appreciation of inter-firm 
heterogeneity.   
                                               
1 Weick (1988, p. 309) 
2 Starbuck & Milliken (1988, p. 60) 
3 Henderson (2006, p. 6) 
4 Weick (1995); Weick (1988) 
5 Stimpert et al. (1998, p. 84) 
6 Tripsas (2009, p. 456) 
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5.4.2 Final Remarks 
As an exploratory study, this project did not depart from a specified position in the form of a 
hypothesis and proceed towards a point of confirmation or disconfirmation.1 Instead, it 
explored the terrain first, the outcomes of which lead to a hypothesis on the basis of insights 
collected or generated along the way. The discussions, deliberations and arguments presented 
chapter four, give rise to the postulation that organisational sensemaking processes have a 
critical role to play in shaping incumbents’ response to disruptive innovations.  
With that observation as the backdrop, it is considered that those organisations whose identity 
beliefs or meanings are rooted and thus anchored more strongly within certain markets will 
likely experience challenges in moving into different markets. Such a shift from one context 
to the next requires a construction of an identity compatible with the new context or market. 
The strength of the current identity may lead to seeing fewer alternatives because of increased 
commitment. Disruptive innovation markets have been demonstrated to be inherently 
different from incumbents’ core markets in some ways. Essentially, such a transition 
threatens the established meanings. Hence, there is an increased likelihood that market 
leading firms may have their identity beliefs or meanings rooted and thus anchored more 
strongly within their core markets. The richness or value of these identities meanings could 
strengthen the grips on current identities when disruptive innovations emerge, leading to 
delays in necessary efforts to shift into new markets. Such richness may, for instance, be 
characterised by the ranking of the firm in the market; ongoing projects and expectations 
embedded in those plans as they relate to these identities (e.g. efforts to achieve or maintain 
higher ranks); and emotional attachment to current identities and/or their related tools.  
These delays should be expected to be rich in justifications directed towards legitimising the 
grips, with the potential for enactment of environments which become constraints in 
consequence, which should be associated with heightened chances of commitments. This 
latter part should be a crucial point to watch in as far as the profiles of incumbents, especially 
as defined and deliberated on in this study, point to their higher score in the ingredients 
necessary for stronger commitments, which could undermine efforts to make requisite 
                                               
1 Creswell (2007); Mouton & Marais (1988[1996]) 
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learning, adaptation and alternative actions or choices.1 It may function is several ways. It 
may start with actions that need accounting for their outcomes, or the managing of 
expectations related to their unfolding. It may also begin with beliefs, leading to the 
enactment of an environment which becomes a constraint. Hence, it may lead to justifications 
anchored around identity meanings (e.g. we are a camera not a smartphone manufacturer, or 
ranked the best in our home market) which heighten the propensity for enactment of 
entrapments of commitment.  
That could result in organisations continuing to hold on to sustaining innovation paths despite 
continuing market shrinkage and related losses. Or it may, for instance, lead to manipulations 
of the environment as disruptive innovations emerge to defend leadership positions or 
customer loss, which could also heighten the propensity for enacting entrapments of 
commitment. The theme which runs through all these demonstrations is the constant 
highlighting of places which have high potential to lead to delays in incumbent leaders’ 
efforts to drop their sustaining innovations (heavy tools), in order to make necessary strategic 
moves to steer their organisations towards safety. 
  
                                               
1 In as far as alternative actions and choices are considered, it is worth revisiting and thus drawing some lessons 
from Weick’s concept of a parliament of selves, which suggests that those who have several identities to access 
may find the situation to be less puzzling as they have an alternative identity to adopt, which should change 
what they see. The opposite is also true because an organisation which has no alternative identity may find it 
more difficult to drop the only identity it has. Thus, the dilemma may also be in the form of finding it difficult to 
drop the only identity an organisation has. Said in the language of this chapter, an organisation which is 
established in more than one market (i.e. diversified into different markets) may find it less likely that the 
emergence of disruption leads to an inability to shift its core business into a different market.       
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